Industry sign banking iowa document safe
good morning everybody coghlan's Clark with the professional development services branch and as I said welcome you to today's webinar our speaker today is dr. jinhua dr. Roth is a distinguished professor and director of the Center for food security and public health in the College of Veterinary Medicine at Iowa State University he receives BBM and PhD degrees from Iowa State University and dr. Roth currently focuses on securing supply projects working with state and federal officials and industry and planning for optimal responses to trans foundry and emerging diseases that threaten food supply for public health dr. Roth received the public service award from the American Veterinary Medical Association and the USDA aces administrators award for lifetime achievements in animal health he has testified before Congress on biosecurity preparedness on efforts to address file terrorism and agri terrorism and on the need for back pain for born annual diseases dr. Roth served on the National Science Advisory Board for biosecurity sis its inception in 2005 until 2014 an alternate over to dr. Roth Thank You Liz and thank you for this opportunity to present updates on the secure food supply plans I'd also like to thank dr. John Zack for joining the call and he'll be available for comments and helping to answer questions at the end so thanks for joining Jon C so what I plan to cover today is provide a brief introduction to the secure food supply plans in case some of the participants aren't familiar with the concept I'll provide a very brief background on foot and mouth disease classical swine fever and african swine fever and then discuss some revisions to the secure food supply plans based on experience with hpai the fmd plans are all under development and we've made some progress on those but there were lessons learned in the HPA I I'll break that will help us to revise and refine those plans and then the documents that we hope to be able to send out soon for review so there are several secure food supply plans we started with the securing supply plan in 2007 secure turkey supply and secure broiler supply plans are part of the HPA I plans these are being developed by nin to a secure poultry supply plan led by the University of Minnesota the FMV plans are pure milk supply and secure beef supply plans and then the secure pork supply plan also includes classical swine fever and african swine fever as well as foot not disease the overall goal of the secure food supply plans are to detect control and contain a foreign animal disease as quickly as possible avoid interruptions in animal and animal product movement to commercial processing from farms with no evidence of infection provide a continuous supply of safe and wholesome food to consumers and maintain business continuity for producers transporters Porter's and food processors through response planning and there are a couple of websites there where you can read more about these plans the primary goal focus of these plans is to enable movement of products and animals from premises with no evidence in an infection in a control area this picture shows several overlapping control areas these are fictional but they're not unlike the control areas that we had in Iowa for hpai in the center of every red circle is one infected premises the yellow circle is 6.2 miles radius around that premises which is the minimum size for control area in a foreign animal diseases I'll break a 6.2 mile radius encompasses 120 square miles in one circle so in a livestock den state like Iowa that can include a lot of livestock and poultry premises so focus of these plans is to develop plans where these premises in a control area can demonstrate they have no evidence of infection and have adequate bio security and surveillance to be able to get a permit to move their animals and products outside of the control area to market now that's the initial focus of all of the secure food supply plans these plans are a partnership between industry and state and federal officials and academia the state and federal officials review the plans and help provide input on the information they need to see to be able to do their job to help control the foreign animal disease industry provides input on the information may want to see to be assured that the point animals lead is disease is being controlled and what it's possible for them to do ahead of the outbreak in during the outbreak to control the disease but also to continue to provide food for the American public the academic partners and you can see listed here Iowa State University of Minnesota Kansas State and UC Davis our role is to help draft the plans listen to the input circulate the drafts to the working group members for further input review and suggest improvements and then revived in pilot tests so our our role is to help develop the plans but the input for the plans comes from industry state and federal officials all of these plans are based on current capabilities and will evolve with science completion of risk assessments and any new capabilities such as new diagnostic tests or new vaccines that may come along it's very important to remember that the secure food supply plans are guidance only responsible officials will make decisions based on the events during the outbreak but it's helpful to have group think through these situations and come up with guidance before the outbreak the common components to the plans there's voluntary pre outbreak preparedness that especially involves biosecurity preparedness for surveillance and training of employees epidemiology questionnaires that will need to be filled out in the event of the outbreak by each premises to determine if they have any contacts with known infected premises guidance for issuing movement permits risk assessments these plans need to be based on risk and risk assessments some of those are completed and some are still in process as risk assessments are completed that is taken into account and the plans may be revised based on that and then training both before pre outbreak and post outbreak training to enable everyone to meet the requirements of the plan so the HPA I plans are very far advanced and as you know we got a chance to practice those plans this cure egg and secure tricky supply plans in the Upper Midwest the FMV plans are still under development they're actually more difficult for some reasons I'll go into and we're still developing those and then we experience during the HPA I outbreak has has led to some things that we will work on changing and updating so what went well during the 2014-2015 HPA I outbreak well the the movement permitting for poultry and poultry products in a control area which is what the plans were initially designed for seemed to go quite well there were approximately 8,000 movement permits issued during the outbreak enabling more than 20,000 movements of birds or products or other necessary movements out of the control area during the outbreak the epidemiology reports suggested that three movements may have contributed to disease spread but HPA I was not spread any other regions of the US by the permitted movements so I think the consensus is that the permitting of movements did go quite well having the plans in place enabled the responsible officials to issue movement permits relatively quickly so that eggs and poultry and poultry products could get to processing so the producers could continue their business and the public would have access to those products also the testing required to get a permit for movement contributed to early detection and control of infected flops so the main purpose of the plan seemed to work quite well however there were other things lessons learned where we're working to revise the plans and this is a list and I'll go through these but I'll just list them here one thing that became apparent is we need to encourage all producers to have validated premises IDs already registered preferably with you their state officials ora demers we need to make the plans more concise for ease of use during an emergency we are working to change the approach to biosecurity based on lessons learned and we're working with the state animal health officials to get coordinated input from their group during planned development to try and have a more consistent of an approach between states as possible and those are being applied to all of the secure food supply plans for the secure milk pork and beef supply plans we're working on optimal surveillance to give confidence of negative disease status that's more challenging with FMB and then it was for hpai as I'll explain we are encouraging producers to plan for potential extended period with restricted animal movement because of the challenges with especially fmd it may be a while before movement permits will be issued so producers should have contingency plans to care for their animals that they're not allowed to move for a period of time and emphasize the need for rapid vaccine availability for foot mouth disease and classical swine fever for quick control so first of all the validated premises ID validated pins including GPS coordinates of the animal facility is essential for receiving movement permits and this information needs to be in immerse in order to issue movement permits it was discovered during hpai outbreak that some of the premises ID information was located at the owners address not at the address where the animals were located and that caused some delays so the more that we can get premises signed up ahead of time with validated Prem IDs will help in any outbreak so if as part of the plans we're encouraging all producers to have their premises registered either with state officials or in immerse when ears is ready and the state officials need to be able to transfer that information to e MERS when the time comes of an outbreak and USDA is in the process of enhancing immerse for data management and issuing of permits during an outbreak we are working to make the plans more concise for ease of use during an emergency the plans the original plans as we develop them became quite long and during an emergency when everybody's very busy it can be difficult to follow those plans so we're working to summarize key information in the plans so that they're concise and organized to facilitate use during an emergency we plan to will keep the plan short by referring to other documents the current plans tended to have all of the information in the plan but by referring to other documents this facilitates maintaining consistency with existing policies because many of the policies are already in other documents then when these other policies are updated the plans will automatically remain current by referring to the to the other documents which can be updated we there's a lot of good science that went into developing these plans and that science will be maintained and kept as addendum or appendix to the plan so the science will still be available but the summary plans were working to make them concise and easy to use during an outbreak for the revision of the secure egg turkey and royal supply plans this is being led by the University of Minnesota secure food supply team they've been requested to produce one secure poultry supply plan instead of three this was requested by the state animal health officials and dr. Zach that secure poultry supply plan will accommodate differences for various types of flocks and commodities and the previous science behind the plans will be maintained and when the University of Minnesota has made more progress on those and is ready it would be a good idea to have them present a seminar or webinar to this group on the revised plan the cure milk pork and beef supply plans are being revised that's being led by our team here at Iowa State University the secure milk supply plan was initiated in 2009 for foot and mouth disease focusing initial and movement of milk but also we need to have movement of animals and other essential materials that have to move out of a control area or into a control area the secure pork supply plan focuses on movement of animals and it's four covers foot and mouth disease classical swine fever and african swine fever the secure beef supply plan is the most recent plan we've been working on it for FMV and focusing on movement of animals especially initially movement of animals to processing from feedlots first very brief background on SMB and and CSS and asf FMV as I'm sure everyone knows is a highly contagious disease as present in 96 countries in the world so it's it's out there in many countries and as a constant threat to our agriculture the US has had nine outbreaks of SMB between 1870 in 1929 all of these outbreaks were controlled successfully by stop movement and stamping out however we can no longer count on stop movement and stamping out a loan to control foot and mouth disease we have very large herds that are too large to stamp out quickly we have extensive movement of animals we have areas with very high lifes density public resistance to stamping out carcass disposal issues would be a huge problem if we did stamp out the large herds and we also have a very large population of feral swine and deer that in many cases can move relatively freely between hurts and spread disease either as fomites or as infected individuals there is a big difference between the options we have for control of avian influenza the other diseases hpai really has to be stamped out it has a high fatality rate it has potential to be zoonotic and it continually mutates making vaccination very difficult however for the other diseases for FMV m-csf we do have the option of allowing animals to recover if it's not possible or desirable to stamp out all of the infected herds SMD CSS and a SS are not food safety or public health concerns they're bad livestock diseases but they're not a concern for human health and for FMV and CSS if it gets beyond the point where we can stamp it out on vaccine will be an essential tool to help control those two diseases so because of the potential option of not stamping out if needed one of the early documents we developed for the secure food supply plans as part of that was the phases and types of FMD response and this will provides guidance on how the disease could be handled if the outbreak progresses and becomes larger the phases of the response are shown here these are not time phases heightened alert phase in case Canada or Mexico get FMB before we do and then we need to be on heightened alert for its introduction phase one is from confirmation of the first case of FMV in the u.s. until there's reasonable evidence to estimate the outbreak extent and during phase one the focus would be on stop movement and stamping out and hopefully that will take care of it but the outbreak may be growing or may have already grown and we may need to move beyond that hopefully phase one will only last a few days and by the end of that time there will be good evidence epidemiologic evidence of how big the outbreak is phase two is surveillance and epidemiology provides timely evidence of outbreak then to support decisions by incident command and this is the long phase where we need to get the disease under control and get the disease stop phase three is recovery where it looks like the disease's eradicated and we need to do surveillance to prove that to ourselves and to our trading partners phase four is when the US has declared free of FMD possibly with vaccination and we have to convince each trading partner individually that this is the case and they should begin taking our products again the types of outbreak would be during phase two type one is a focal small outbreak it's still possible to stamp out all of the resources are focused focused on stop movement and stamping out type two is moderate regional we're stamping out continues but vaccination to kill may be implemented as an aid type 3 is a large regional probably stamping out of some herds would be discontinued they would allow to be allowed to recover vaccination would be dependent on type pores of whites better national outbreak where we wouldn't depend on vaccination type 5 is a catastrophic us outbreak and type 6 catastrophic North Ameri
an outbreak but it gets to type 5 it may be that the emergency response would be discontinued and there would be a transition to a control program long-term control program to bring the disease under the under control and eventually work towards eradication controlling SMB beyond type 1 really does depend on having vaccine availability the information from the FMV vaccination strategies in the US indicates that we don't currently have enough vaccine to control anything really beyond type 1 or maybe type 2 so there is a need for FMV vaccine a very important part of secure food supply plans is is working to encourage vaccine availability working with the livestock industry we've developed the white paper on search taski needs for vaccine the industry has been working with the Senate and the house to encourage Congress to provide funding for an adequate vaccine supply and the USDA in March this year sent out a request for information from FMD vaccine manufacturers on availability and costs of vaccine asus would like to have a minimum of 25 million doses for each of the ten high-risk strains available if funding becomes available so for vaccine availability for fmd and CSF we right now we can't count on vaccine being immediately available and when it is it will be in short supply for a period of time for a SS there is no vaccine anywhere in the world so vaccine currently is not currently a viable option for initial rapid control enlarged f.a.b outbreaks I've been on classical swine fever and you're sure you're aware we had that until nineteen seventy-eight when we eradicated it but outbreaks have been occurring in many areas of the world including Central and South America and Mexico so it's close to our borders african swine fever used to be limited to africa recent years it is spread and there's been a fifty percent increase in the number of countries with reported cases and those countries are having great difficulty in controlling african swine fever so we also developed phases and types of classical swine fever and african swine fever these are draft documents that are out for comment the website where you can read these documents are at the bottom of this slide and and we'd appreciate any any comments anyone might have on on these documents the faces and types are different basically the phases are quite similar but the types of outbreak are different because the diseases are different I a Cepheid CSF only affects wine only effect whereas a FMB affects all cloven-hoofed animals the lack of vaccine for african swine fever increases the importance of rapid action and aggressive measures to stamp out infected herds for foot and mouth disease and CSS if it gets out of control we can eventually get vaccine vaccinate to suppress the disease and then move to control program but without a vaccine for a SF we may as well just aggressively stamp it out until it's gone there are differences in variants of strains stability and the environment african swine fever can be quite stable in the environment and the rules the OIE rules on regaining disease freedom are very important so for the secure milk pork and be supplying plan we have working groups set up in the working groups consist of academic partners people from the industry disease experts from the industry and producers and state and federal officials the working groups are a little different between the plans but in general there are working groups on biosecurity on surveillance to demonstrate lack of evidence of infection to enable movement data collection management and sharing risk assessments are being completed some are already completed for these plans communications working group on especially communicating to the public on day one of the outbreak about the diseases and the clans managed movement working groups management of an infected premises working group if we get to the point where we don't stamp out infected premises and we have to manage them through the disease process and then packer and process for working groups because the package and processes are absolutely critical they they need to keep processing or or everything grinds to a halt so we need to work with them to see what information they need and their willingness to continue to process animals and products so the changes or updates to the plan that are being made based on lessons learned with avian influenza one is the the new approach to bio security that is being developed the experience with HP aai and commercial egg layers and turkeys has reduced some confidence in in bio security in those industries also there's reduced consonants of bio security and in the swine industry based on the swine and Terry coronavirus disease which is spread to 35 states in spite of the bio security and seneca valley virus and swine which is spreading in spite of biosecurity and it's very difficult to have effective bio security to prevent FMV infection in livestock dense areas in animals not totally confined indoors so we we are working on new approaches to biosecurity to optimize biosecurity recognizing that that vaio security is difficult the original securing supply plan had a prescriptive detailed Universal biosecurity checklist for all egg production premises and that checklist was based on current industry best practices I think there were 45 or six items in the checklist that 10 poultry veterinarians rank and those from a list of biosecurity practices from four large egg production facilities but the bio security for the egg industry did not work as well as we had hoped during the outbreak especially in Iowa so we're working on revising those plans the the checklist did not account for the increased biosecurity needed for a new highly contagious disease it did not account for premises specific variables and did not sufficiently emphasize the need for continuous on-site monitoring of compliance with bio security practices and this is data that many of you see I'm sure from the outbreak in Iowa in a two-month period we had we lost 31 and a half million poultry in Iowa mostly layers in confinement there were 77 infected sites that those 31 and a half million birds were on only six backyard sites were infected but 71 commercial sites and the evidence is that it did seem to spread between commercial sites because the bio security apparently wasn't adequate and we don't know if it was the 46 bio security steps that weren't adequate or if the compliance with those five security steps was not one hundred percent and bio security only works if everyone on the production site understands the importance and follows those protocols all the time which is probably the hardest part of bio security and bio security for a novel infectious disease has to be more stringent than bio security for endemic diseases bio security is expensive and it's inconvenient for everyone livestock and poultry producers implement the level of biosecurity needed to protect from endemic diseases they have to do that to stay in business and remain profitable however for endemic diseases there is herd or flock immunity to most of those diseases which means that there's low levels of passage and shedding in an immune heard or maybe no shedding and high levels of resistance so it takes a high dose of pathogen to infect a resistant animal the routine level of biosecurity may not be sufficient to protect from a newly introduced highly contagious disease like swine and tarek disease avian influenza ffb CSF or asf there's no herd or flock community so there's high levels of pathogen shedding and an inflection affected her to flop and low levels of resistance so it only takes a low amount of virus to infect an animal with no immunity so the bio security challenges are much more difficult for novel diseases than endemic diseases after the outbreak came under control last summer the USDA developed working groups and worked hard to be prepared in case the avian influenza virus came back with fall migration and part of that was to develop new biosecurity recommendations and by early fall 2015 those recommendations were available they emphasized concepts that should be strongly considered for implementation in all commercial operations key concepts were a bio security officer site-specific bio security plans line of separation for each building a perimeter buffer area and plans to mitigate all potential sources of virus crossing the line of separation not just specific high-priority individual steps that look for ways to mitigate all potential sources of virus and these plans for the poultry industry are now being considered for revision and incorporation into the National poultry improvement plan so the principles of bio security for all of the secure food supply plans it's the producers responsibility to keep their animals from becoming infected this is true for endemic diseases or new emerging diseases and this has always been true a site-specific bio security plan is needed and must be adhered to by everyone all of the time to be effective the bio security officer with expertise and infectious diseases and production animal agriculture and familiar with the facility should develop the plan and monitor to ensure that is continuously followed for animals house totally indoors the walls of the building should be the line of separation separating the animals from all possible for of infection for animals housed indoors the area around the buildings is the perimeter buffer area where human and vehicle traffic has taken steps to mitigate the potential for contamination so anything that enters the perimeter buffer areas should be clean and disinfected before entering animals with access to outdoors are more difficult to protect from infection but the line of separation contact can help you have a line of separation around the area of the premises where the animals are located and nothing should cross that line that can introduce infection but that is more challenging with outdoor house animals the we also developed a bio security self-assessment checklist with these items on the checklist and ask each premises to self-assess and whether they have these these bio security items in place in progress or not in place and we develop poultry bio security officer information manuals in English and Spanish that help provide some guidance for the bio security officer as they develop a site-specific bio security plan we're developing similar documents for the secure milk pork and beef supply plans also with the self-assessment checklist and the officer information manuals and those should be ready before too long ready for review the perimeter buffer area concept is aimed at reducing virus entering and contaminating production sites complete exclusion of the outdoor area virus from a outdoor is not possible especially when it can be carried by wild birds but reducing the virus load and the outside entire environment will reduce risk this shows a conceptual perimeter buffer area and line of separation for animals housed indoors the light blue area is the perimeter buffer area around the building the buildings are in green and the red line around the buildings is the line of separation here we have prime of our vehicles that might enter the premises to an entry gate as long as they don't cross the perimeter buffer area it's not essential to have them cleaned and disinfected so this driveway has to be considered to be contaminated any vehicle or person that accesses the perimeter buffer area would need to access through an access point where the vehicle can be cleaned and disinfected or the person can change into clean site-specific clothes so that I can greatly reduce the need to clean and disinfect routine traffic onto the premises if you keep them out of the perimeter buffer area and cleaning of vehicles and trucks can be quite difficult especially in the Upper Midwest in the winter the employees that walk through the perimeter buffer area may still become contaminated on their boots or clothing so before they cross the line of separation they have to enter through a bio-secure entry procedure where they change boots and outer clothing step across the bench or have some mechanism where they then put on barn specific boots and clothing wash their hands before they enter the building now for outdoor facilities as i mentioned that's a much greater challenge this shows an outdoor livestock operation with the red line around it as the line of separation and the production site should treat that line of separation as perhaps like the walls of a castle with the moat don't let anything across that line of separation that might introduce introduction the production site controls that line of separation they can't control the traffic on the roads but they can control the line of separation to attempt to protect their herd some infection for the poultry plan the University of Minnesota group is working on the concept of pre movement isolation period with enhanced biosecurity for a period of days prior to movement and that's being discussed to be incorporated in secure poultry supply plans and when that's ready for discussion I'm sure we'll learn more about that another lesson learned was the consequences of delayed stamping out because the outbreak spreads so fast and the facilities were so large it wasn't possible to stamp out the the infected poultry very very quickly but after the outbreak the USDA state and industry officials have agreed that stamping out of HPA I should be accomplished within 24 hours of diagnosis to prevent hi virus loads and and I'm at least fairly confident that's it if that can be a camp accomplished we shouldn't see huge outbreaks like we had last year however in a large FMB outbreak stamping out in 24 to 48 hours of very large livestock premises may become impossible and that means that we may allow the herds to recover and return to productivity but the virus loads will be very high during that infectious period so we we will need rapid bio containment response to attempt to to bio contain the virus on those premises during that period of very high virus shedding another important development during the HPA AI outbreak is that the national association of state animal health officials developed a consensus statement to facilitate uniformity between states one of the characteristics of our emergency response system is that each state has authority over the premises in their state and for issuing permits for products and animals to come in and out of their state and the NASA ho group developed a consensus document that helped to make it more uniform between states now there are differences in state laws and so forth that also have to be considered and then for the other secure food supply plans the NASA ho group has appointed a working group of 11 state animal health officials that have agreed to review and provide comments on the revised secure food supply plans to help make those more consistent as we revise and finalize them surveillance is also a problem especially for fmd for any disease you cannot prove that a flock or herd of animals is free of a disease you can only establish lack of evidence of infection it could be infected but not yet detected for aidan influenza sampling a 5 of every 50 dead birds daily by pcr provides ninety-five percent confidence that the flock is negative mrs. work that was conducted and validated by SIA hpai is usually rapidly fatal so sampling dead birds increases the chance of finding the infection early the NASA ho group came to a consensus that they would prefer to see sampling of 11 out of every 50 dead birds to increase the confidence above ninety five percent that if movement permits are issued that that herd is highly likely to be negative optimal surveillance to give confidence for negative SMB disease status is more challenging for PCR testing for SMD testing of suspect animals is valuable to detect the presence of infection however PCR testing is less valuable for providing a high degree of consonants that it heard is not infected there is no sampling scheme of cattle or swine that has been validated which would provide ninety-five percent confidence that a catalyst swine herd is negative for FMD oral fluids and swine shows holds promise a bulk
ank sampling of milk from dairy cows holds promise for detecting infection and cows that contribute to that bulk tank however those haven't been validated yet so individuals allowing the movement signing the permits for movement we can't say that there's ninety-five percent confidence based on PCR testing alone so the secure food supply plans have added the potential of observation by an accredited veterinarian prior to loading animals onto trucks to ensure absence of abnormal clinical signs and daily active observational surveillance by trained herd health monitors to provide evidence that there's no unusual disease activity in that herd on a daily basis to add to the confidence that we heard is not infected so the for the livestock industry with foot and mouth disease we are recommending that they plan for extended periods with restricted animal movement because of the increased challenges of biosecurity with herds that have access to outdoors the challenges with providing surveillance and 95-degree confident ninety-five percent confidence that herd is negative it may be a while before producers with negative herds maybe they may be reluctant to receive animals from a control area so if ass line producer wants to move nursery pigs out of the control area to a negative premises will the producer in the negative premises be willing to take those animals until there is more evidence as the outbreak progresses that those animals there's a high degree of confidence those animals or negatives and will slaughter facilities be reluctant to accept animals from the control area until there's a higher to of confidence there's the secure food supply plans are recommending that slaughter facilities continue to process all animals with no evidence of infection but facilities outside of the control area may be reluctant to take animals from the control area because other producers may be reluctant to send their animals to that slaughter facility if they're concerned it may be contaminated so before those reasons producers should be prepared to to hold in place for a period of time if they're in a control area and then we need to be prepared to manage infected premises that are not good populated so we need to be able to manage infected herds and recovered herds the herd becomes infected they will shed virus for 7 to 10 days and then immune animal stop shedding virus the whole herd should become immune and stop setting virus after a couple of weeks and return to productivity and we need to be prepared to transition from emergency response to a long-term control program if the disease is out of control as pressure builds due to the spread of disease reduced availability of products for consumers and the need for humane euthanasia increases due to Scott movement and at some point there needs to be a design for long-term control programs if we are if the disease gets out of control and we stop stamping out so we're working hard on the milk pork and beef supply plans to revise those plans to develop concise summary documents while security self-assessment checklist five security officer information manuals and we're hoping with the swine plan to get it out within a week to a 50s and the sajo working groups for their input and then to make revisions and send it out to the secure food supply working groups the milk and beef supply plans we hope will follow those within a short time within very few weeks to have those plans ready to go out for revision and comment also this is the secure food supply team we have here at Iowa State University I'm very proud of this group individuals they're dedicated you can see that they're a happy group which is also a positive thing and they're working hard on these plans and enjoying the planning process you can get more information on these plans at each of these websites and they'll they'll be continually updated as new information becomes available and if you have any comments or questions don't hesitate to contact me my information is at the bottom of the slide thank you and I think Liz now we can open it for questions ok I'm dr. Zach do you have any comments clarifications Corrections based on what I presented well first after all I just want to thank you for covering on a lot of territory and covering it very well um I guess I would just like to first hear any questions from the audience ok thanks yes this is more our misery Department of Agriculture you talked about on the document that it would show that they were understand documents will there be a tag there where you can automatically highlight it or have automatically click on it to go to those documents or we have to go out of the thing to go out of the Sun and go to the other side to look up the document so in the summary plans that we're developing if you're accessing those electronically you'll be able to click on a link to all of the other documents that are available to make it to that's what I was hoping you'd say okay yep that's the plan ok no just to follow up on that by popular request you know the original you know version her first evolution of the completed secure egg supply plan filled the whole binder and that did not include you know a thick stack of proactive risk assessments so as one of the customer feedbacks we got was you need to have the grabbing grub grab and go summary information it's kind of like you know VMO proofs and age he proof but folks can grab it in a crisis and rapidly see through either concise narrative and or figures what needs to be done for the background science and the other background information you know that's what dr. Roth is talking about if folks want to dig deeper you know if you got the adding thomas's on the science or you know folks want to review something we want to have that information available we don't want to lose it but we really want to concentrate on that grab and go for both an exercise and God's a bit of real world event where folks are going to turn to these plans you know what a crisis hi doctor offices barb at Porter Spalding and I really want to say thank you for your wonderful presentation and obviously you know I'm very interested in allowing vs folks to also dig into more of the details you know plan by plan but my question for you is sort of what is the vision of the different picture supply planning groups as far as piloting and implementation you know to try and really get some real-world practice out there on the ground to see whether they'll those plans will will work I know the pork supply planners have been through one round of implementation sort of pilots and they really like to try and do more what what do you see as far as the other plans and visions for piloting and exercising those teacher plan well thanks barb and piloting them will be very important Mike the first step will be as I mentioned getting out these summary plans and and the bio security documents and getting feedback and make sure everybody's on the same page and then also the guidance on permitting and so forth so once we get general consensus on the components of the plan I think it would be very important to have either table tops or some type of exercises for those plans we also anticipate for at least for the bio security activities to develop example site-specific bio security plans to help people to see how they might set up their own site specific plan so we do want the pilot them we don't have any pilots lined up right now once the plans are more finalized than then we hope to pilot them just to follow up on that dr. oz I think that you know depending upon the commodity depending upon the disease you know we need to have as you said science base you know risk based approaches but for the industry and the states and the tribes anybody actually have to you know they also have to be logistics and operations operationally durable the other part of these is the policy and politics so you know what works for eggs you know very well we're for pasteurized unpasteurized wash the sanitized bags you know certain commodities you can define the risk very well but as you suggested some of the live animal movements for some defeat diseases you're not going to have that confidence for the the risk so I think you went over very well you know the different types of diseases and outbreaks and the different phases of an outbreak where you know how you would permit whether it was a general permit specific permit continuity business permit um it may vary by commodity and outbreak and I think for everybody at home that's ever played in one of these you all know that you're better off starting with somebody that's done a lot of homework on these issues ahead of time rather than starting out with a blank piece of paper so I think that the most advanced of these of plans and is actually implemented is the secure you know egg supply you know coming into focus as a overall secure poultry supply plan that would include some of those harder movements to include live poultry um you know a huge key component here is stakeholder engagement and by stakeholder we need the you know deal that producers the owners the growers the company's um the processors the states the tribes you know everybody that has a stake in Animal Disease Control and that everybody has a stake in animal agriculture business because you know what we're really talking about here is how to best manage highly contagious or far animal disease outbreak where you have to manage not only the infected premises but you also have to manage any premises that's caught up in a control area which is a regulatory intervention which is very disruptive here's a written question can you comment on the recently signed agreement on the sharing of FMD vaccine I assume that's referring to the agreement between us I think Canada Mexico Australia New Zealand dr. Zach do you have any information on that oh yes I think the big picture view is that the currently there is a North American smv vaccine bank that shared between the United States Canada and Mexico and strategically with our you know quad partners or know some of our allies around the world there's been an agreement that in an outbreak you know we would consider sharing some of our vaccine if they needed it and they would consider some of their vaccines if we needed it it's not a guarantee it's not a contract but it is a good step forward for you know international cooperation amongst our allies and it potentially could give us access to some other quantities of SMB vaccine I would just say it's a very very you know strong positive development in terms of our overall planning though i don't think the quantities and those vaccine banks come near solving you know the United States problem in an outbreak let alone the North America problem hi Jim thank you so much for your information you've prevented you've presented this is Laurie Miller regarding the challenges with bio security and you know getting a hundred percent compliance as well as pilot studies I just wanted to let you know that there's a small pilot going on this week it's a an off-the-shelf wheel wash system that's being installed at a feedlot in Texas funded by department homeland security and the thinking at this point is that the relatively low cost of the unit is going to pay for itself in the sort of feedlot not having to do truck washes as frequently so stay tuned we're looking forward to seeing how that works out as it's being installed this week all right thank you re for that information that's great to know and as a reminder this I think was recorded and will be available on an asus website and on our CSS ph website when it's ready I understand some people join and trouble joining and joined late so it is recorded and will be available yes that's correct Azeroth yay for saying that soon as we get the recording will send out that information to everyone any other questions well it's not we I am the other secure food supply number teams and individuals are happy to have comments questions Shin on these topics my informations on the bottom of the slide feel free to contact me anytime for input and doctor I want to thank dr. Roth today for a great presentation also for any of the audience members down the road if you got if you have any other topics related to continuity of business or moving and permitting they would like to see in a future webinar you know please let us know we are planning to do a lot of outreach on the actual overview of permitting and permitting on specifics in the near future as well but if there's any other topics you would like us to visit you know please let us know against a high tree Joe yes nice dr. Roth and please let me know if there's any other webinars you'd like to have if you certainly like to host one from PDF so thanks again everybody inside you all able to come and listen to his webinar thank you
