Fill and Sign the Governments Proposed Jury Instructions and Verdict Form

9.1 On or About - - Knowingly - - Willfully You will note that the indictment charges that the offense was committed "on or about "a certain date. The Government does not have to prove with certainty the exact date of the alleged offense. It is sufficient if the Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was committed on a date reasonably near the date alleged. The word "knowingly," as that term is used in the indictment or in these instruct ions, means that the act was done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake or accident. The word "willfully," as that term is used in the indictment or in these instructions, means that the act was committed voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTSUnited States v. Creamer, 721 F.2d 342, 343 (11t h Cir. 1983), " on or about" language upheld in case in which alibi defense was used by the Defendant; t he court " rejected the content ion that time becomes a material element of a criminal offense merely because the defense of alibi is advanced." See also United States v. Reed, 887 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 891 F.2d 907 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1080, 110 S.Ct. 1136, 107 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1990). United States v. Diecidue, 6 03 F.2d 5 35, 5 48 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946, 100 S.Ct. 1345, 63 L.Ed.2d 781 (1980), and cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912, 100 S.Ct . 1842, 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) approved these definitions of knowingly and willfully as sufficient instructions on issue of intent. See also United States v. Kerley, 643 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1981). United States v. Kelly, 615 F.2d 37 8 (5th Cir. 1980) approved refusal to amplify " willfulness" instruction for the purpose of emphasizing specific intent, criminal motive or guilty mind. United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 5 75 F.2d 5 24 (5th Cir. 1978), reh'g denied, 579 F.2d 644 (1978), cert. denied, 43 9 U. S. 935, 9 9 S.Ct. 33 1, 58 L.Ed.2d 3 32 (1978 ), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1104, 99 S.Ct. 885, 59 L.Ed.2d 65 (1979); United States v. Batencort, 592 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1979), instruction on "deliberate ignorance" as equivalent of knowledge may be given as a supplement to the standard charge in an appropriate case. See Special Instruct ion 8. United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934, 937 (11th Cir. 1993), reh'g denied, 19 F.3d 1448 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 111, 1 30 L.Ed.2d 58 (1994), " deliberate ignorance" instruct ion appropriate only when evidence in the record shows that the Defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning the truth. United States v. Arias, 984 F.2d 1139 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 979, 113 S.Ct. 2979, 125 L.Ed.2d 676 (1993), and cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 3062, 125 L.Ed.2d 744 (1993) approved deliberate ignorance instruct ion w hen drug couriers avoided knowledge of content of their parcels. See also United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1570-72 (11th Cir. 1991); Batencort, supra, and Special Instruct ion 8, infra. United States v. Corral Martinez, 592 F.2d 26 3 (5th Cir. 1979), Model Penal Code definition of knowledge held not to be plain error when given as an instruction, i.e. , " proof that Defendant was aware of the high probability that the substance he possessed was heroin [suffices to prove know ledge] unless he actually believes it was not heroin." United States v. Benson, 59 2 F.2d 257 (5t h Cir. 1979); United States v. Warren, 612 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956, 100 S.Ct. 2928, 64 L.Ed.2d 815 (1980) approved instruction in a tax evasion case and a currency reporting case, respectively, defining " willfulness" to mean the " voluntary and intent ional violation of a known legal duty;" United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 97 S.Ct. 22, 50 L.Ed.2d 12 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 987, 97 S.Ct. 510, 50 L.Ed.2d 600 (1976). See Special Instruct ion 9, infra. Other instructions are sometimes given concerning specific types of evidence as giving rise to an inference of guilty knowledge, and some such instructions have been approved (as indicated below), but the Committee recommends that, ordinarily, those subjects should be left to the argument of counsel and should not be addressed in the Court ' s charge. United States v. Stewart, 579 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936, 99 S.Ct . 332, 58 L.Ed.2d 332 (1978) approved instruct ion on flight and concealment as justifying inference of guilt y know ledge. Unit ed States v. Barresi, 601 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1979) approved instruction concerning proof of falsity of Defendant' s explanation as evidence of guilty knowledge; see also United States v. Broadwell, 870 F.2d 594, 601 n.17 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 4 93 U.S. 8 40 , 1 10 S.Ct. 1 25 , 1 07 L.Ed.2d 8 5 (1 98 9). United States v. Knight, 60 7 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1979) approved instruction concerning inference which might be drawn from refusal of Defendant t o obey order requiring submission of handwriting exemplar. United States v. Castell, 58 4 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 925, 99 S.Ct . 1256, 59 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979); Unit ed States v. Duckett , 583 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 19 78) approved instruction concerning inference of guilty know ledge which might be drawn from possession of recently stolen property. But, United States v. Chiantese, 560 F.2d 1244, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) disapproved instruct ion to the effect that, absent evidence to the contrary, a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his or her ac s.