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Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison August 1979 NTIS order #PB-301397 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 79-600145 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 FOREWORD In June 1978, the Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce of the House of Representatives Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee requested the Office of Technology Assessment to conduct “a detailed comparison between conditions prevailing in railway safety in the United States and a review of safety operations in Canada. ” Responding to this request, this OTA report identifies the similarities and differences between the U.S. and Canadian railroad systems and Government/rail relationships. It establishes a base from which the overall comparability of safety between the two systems is made. The report surveys the safety activities of Canadian railroads, Government, labor, and other organizations and compares those efforts with counterpart safety activities in the United States. This report represents a significant cooperative effort on the part of Canadian and U.S. Government agencies, railroads, and labor groups in creating mutual understanding of railroad safety policy and programs. JOHN H. GIBBONS Director Canadian Review Group Mr. E. W. Eastman Acting Director Railway Transport Committee Mr. J. H. Johri Bureau of Management Consulting Mr. Charles Pike Chief Mechanical Officer Canadian Pacific Rail Mr. E. J. Bradley Director of Rules, Accident, and Damage Prevention Canadian Pacific Rail Mr. R. G. Messenger Assistant Vice President for operations Canadian National Rail Mr. W. T, Mathers Director of Accident Prevention and Safety Canadian National Rail Mr. Ed Abbot Executive Secretary Canadian Railway Labour Association OTA Railroad Safety Comparison Advisory Panel Joe Adams Assistant General Attorney, Law Department Union Pacific Railroad Company Robert Parsons Associate Administrator for R&D Federal Railroad Administrate on Lawrence M. Mann Attorney for Railway Labor Executives Association William Harris Vice President, Research and Test Department Association of American Railroads James P. Romauldi Director of the Transportation Research Institute Carnegie-Mellon University OTA Railroad Safety Comparison Project Staff Eric H. Willis, Assistant Director Science, Information, and Transportation Division Robert L. Maxwell, Transportation Group Manager Lucia Turnbull, Project Leader Jim Leach Joel Miller Debi Chertok Paula Walden Linda McCray Contractors Newman and Hermanson Company Judith A. Hermanson Constance B. Newman Lawrence McCaffrey, Jr. Editor and Production Ralph Hoar, Editor Marese A. Miles, Typist OTA Publishing Staff John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer Kathie S. Boss Joanne Heming ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report, “Rail Safety: A U.S.-Canadian Comparison, ” was undertaken by the Office of Technology Assessment at the request of the Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee of the House of Representatives. In conducting the analysis, OTA utilized information and data generated in the previous OTA Evaluation of Railroad Safety published in May 1978, and additional information on U.S. rail safety provided by Government, industry, and labor sources. Data, information, and assistance regarding Canadian railroad safety was provided by the Canadian Transport Commission, Labour Canada, the Canadian Pacific (CP) Railway, the Canadian National Railway (CN), and the Canadian Railway Labour Association. The study was conducted by OTA staff with the contractual assistance of the Newman and Hermanson Company, Mr. Ralph Hoar as editor, and his. Marese Miles as typist. Special assistance was provided by Jim Leach and Joel Miller within OTA. Advice and assistance was provided by a U.S. advisory panel comprised of representatives from the Federal Railroad Administration, the Association of American Railroads, the Railway Labor Executives Association, the Union Pacific Railroad, and Carnegie Mellon University. In addition, numerous other persons provided valuable insight and information regarding safety for the study effort. A detailed list of the persons interviewed is included in appendix A. This study sought to give a general overview of the similarities and differences between the U.S. and Canadian rail systems, Government structures, accident and casualty pictures, and rail safety policies and programs. Time and data limitations did not permit detailed comparisons of such items as operational data and codes, specific accident comparisons, Government economic policies, and rail resource allocations. Special thanks are extended to the Canadian Transport Commission and the Railway Transport Committee, Labour Canada, CN Rail, CP Rail, the Canadian Railway Labour Association, and to the numerous persons who assisted in the study effort. Appreciation is also extended to the U.S. advisory panel, the Newman and Hermanson Company, Ralph Hoar, and Teri Miles for their excellent support. vi SUMMARY The major findings of a comparative analysis of U.S. and Canadian rail systems and safety practices are: 1. The Canadian and U.S. rail systems differ substantially in size and structure. The Canadian system is comprised of two primary railroads, the Canadian National (CN) and the Canadian Pacific (CP). CN has been Government-owned since 1923 and CP is privately owned. Both lines are transcontinental. In contrast, the United States has approximately 56 m a j o r railroads, none of which are transcontinental or Government-owned. The Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) is the only U.S. freight carrier that has recently received sizable Government subsidies or investments. In general, the U.S. rail system and related Government structure is considerably more complex than the Canadian. The extent to which that difference in complexity may account for the relative effectiveness of safety measures in the two countries could not be determined for this report. 2. The U.S. rail fatality rate, on a train-mile basis, was an average of 47.6 p e r c e n t higher than the Canadian for the Ii-year period 1966-76. This higher U.S. fatality rate, especially in grade-crossing and trespasser fatalities, seems to reflect the fact that, since the U.S. population and rail system are considerably larger than the Canadian, the level of exposure to rail hazards is much higher in the United States. 3. On the whole, the U.S. derailment rate is much higher than the Canadian. However, derailment rates vary widely among U.S. carriers. The average derailment rates of the nine largest (in ton-miles) U.S. carriers were similar to those of the Canadian railroads for 1976 and 1977. However, the average derailment rates for the second 10 U.S. railroads are significantly higher than the rates for the Canadian railroads for those same years. Derailments in the United States are continuing to increase, while derailments in Canada have stabilized. 4. The continued rise in U.S. derailment rates seems to be a result of deferred maintenance and increased axle loadings on freight equipment. U.S. derailment rates will probably continue to climb until the economic condition of some U.S. rail carriers improves. The stabilization of Canadian derailment rates seems to stem from a combination of factors, which include the priority railroad management gives to track maintenance, the economic health of the industry and the availability of capital for it, and favorable Canadian tax structures. 5. In Canada, the National Transportation Act of 1967 changed Government economic policy to encourage greater balance among transportation modes. Under the new policy, railroads gained greater control over their rate structure. Although no direct correlation can be made between this change in policy and rail safety records, the change does appear to have strengthened the economic position of the rail industry in Canada and may be one of the underlying causes of improved rail safety. 6. Several Canadian approaches to rail safety appear to work well and may be worth considering for the United States. They include: Emphasis by railroad management on safety accountability and adoption by management of a systematic approach to safety that includes training, the development and use of accident data, and a high priority placed on track maintenance. Creation of a no-fault system of insurance compensation for work-related injuries. Government use of risk analysis to guide railroad inspection. Government use of risk analysis in the allocation of funds for grade crossings. vii Government use of stop orders rather than penalties as a means of enforcing safety standards. q Mandatory use of the Hazardous Information Emergency Response form, which outlines the basic information q Viii q needed for immediately responding to accidents, in all shipments of dangerous commodities. Participation and cooperation between labor and management in a Government-sponsored forum. CONTENTS Chapter I. U.S.-CANADIAN RAIL SAFETY: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS. . . Rail Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Accident Picture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Government Structures and Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Government, Industry, and Labor Approaches to Safety . . . . . . . . . . . II. CANADIAN RAILROAD SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Canadian Rail System Physical Plant and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Railroad Financial Picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.S.-Canadian Rail System Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND RAIL SAFETY . . . . . . . . . . Government Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Laws Directly Affecting Rail Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. THE ACCIDENT PICTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RTC Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comparisons with the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Labour Canada Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Railroad Accident Data and Reporting Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v . THE RAIL SAFETY INQUIRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Events Leading to Safety Inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Safety Inquiry: Process, Findings, and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . VI. GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Canadian Transport Commission Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Labour Canada’s Occupational Safety and Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Railway Safety Advisory Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII. RAILROAD SAFETY PROGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Supervisor Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preventive Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Participation in Regulatory Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII. RAILROAD LABOUR AND SAFETY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Labour/Railroad Relations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . Labour/Government Relations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3 3 4 8 12 19 19 19 21 24 27 31 31 33 41 45 45 50 56 58 65 65 66 71 71 85 86 89 89 89 90 95 99 99 100 103 APPENDIXES Appendix A: Persons Interviewed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107 Appendix B: Canadian Accident Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......108 Appendix C: Hazard Information Emergency Response Form. . ...............109 ix LIST OF TABLES Table No. Page 1. Selected Comparative Characteristics United States—Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Fatalities in the United States and Canada, 1966-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Trespasser Fatalities in the United States and Canada, 1966-76. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Grade-Crossing Fatalities in the United States and Canada, 1966-76. . . . . . . . . . . . 5. Employee Fatalities in the United States and Canada, 1966-76. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. Collisions/Derailments in the United States and Canada, 1966-74 . . . . . . . . . . . . 7. Derailments in the United States and Canada, 1975-77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8. U.S. Derailments by Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . 9. Mainline/Branchlike—Derailments by Year and Railroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10. Canadian Derailments by Cause . . . . . . . . 11. U.S. and Canadian Safety Regulations . . . 12. Railway Trackage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13. Locomotive Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14. Freight Rolling Stock. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15. Intercity Freight by Mode of Transportation in Canada (excluding pipelines), 1944-68 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16. Commodities Accounting for More Than 2 Percent of Rail Ton-Miles in 1969 and 1974 in Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17. Canadian Pacific Rail Financial Fact Sheet. 18. Maintenance Expenditures for the Canadian Pacific Railroad, 1973-77. . . . . . 19. Capital Expenditures for the Canadian Pacific Railway, 1973-77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20. Capital Expenditures—U.S. Class I Carriers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21. Canadian Casualties by Type of Accident, 1966-77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22. Casualties, 1966-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23. Canadian Accidents by Type, 1966-77. . . . 24. Statement of Canadian Derailments According to Major Causes, 1966-76 . . . . . 25. Canadian Incidents Involving Dangerous Commodities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26. Casualties, 1966-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27. Fatalities in Canada and the United States, 1966-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 8 10 21 23 24 25 25 26 26 26 28. Employee Fatalities in Canada and the United States, 1966-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 29. Grade-Crossing Fatalities in Canada and the United States, 1966-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 30. Trespasser Fatalities in Canada and the United States, 1966-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 31. Statement of Derailments According to Major Causes in Canada, 1966-76 . . . . . 54 32. U.S. Train Accidents by Class, 1966-74 . . . 55 33. U.S. Train Accidents by Class, 1975-77 . . . 55 34. Mainline/Branchlike—Derailments by Year and Railroad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 35. U.S. Derailments by Contributing Cause, 1966-74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 36. U.S. Derailments by Contributing Cause, 1975-77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 37. Labour Canada Work Injury Experience for Industries Under Federal Jurisdiction, 5-Year Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 38. Accidents Resulting From Transportation Problems or RuleViolations . . . . . . . . . . . 59 39. Engineering (Track) Responsibility . . . . . . .59 40. Equipment Responsibility Accidents for CN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 41. Entrain and Yard Accidents by Cause, 1972-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 42. CN5-Year Disabling Injury Ratio . . . . . . . 61 43. FRA Comparative Statistics--Train Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 44. FRA Comparative Statistics--Employee Disabling Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 45. CPT rain Accidents on FRA Basis . . . . . . . 62 46. U.S. and Canadian Railroad Safety Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 47. Canadian Incidents Involving Dangerous Commodities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 26 47 48 48 LIST OF FIGURES 48 Figure No. 49 52 53 Page 1. Transport Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 2. Relationship of Ministry "Family" to Transportation Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3. Rate of Disabling Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Chapter I U.S.-CANADIAN RAIL SAFETY: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS Chapter I U.S.-CANADIAN RAIL SAFETY: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS Rail safety problems and policies in Canada and the United States have been shaped by a number of factors including: Government structure and policy, geography and national resources, economic systems, technologies, and the role various transportation modes played in each country’s history. Differences in several of these factors between the United States and Canada have produced some differences in each country’s rail system and rail safety. This chapter provides a comparative analysis between the U.S. and Canadian rail systems, rail accident pictures, and major rail safety policies and programs. The primary sources of information for this report include the Office of Technology Assessment’s Evaluation of Rail Safety and interviews and documents provided by the Canadian Government, railroads, and labor organizations. RAIL SYSTEM The U.S. and Canadian rail systems differ significantly in size and in structure. The U.S. rail system is considerably larger and has many more individual railroads than the Canadian. Table 1 .—Selected Comparative Characteristics United States—Canada Year Two transcontinental railroads, the Canadian National (CN) and the Canadian Pacific (CP) dominate the Canadian rail system. CN is a Government-owned crown corporation and CP is a privately owned railroad. By contrast, the U.S. rail system is comprised of approximately 56 major railroads, none of which are transcontinental. No U.S. carrier is entirely Government owned, although the Government does have a very sizable ownership interest in the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail), as a result of its recent investments. The United States has over nine times the population of Canada. Although the two countries are similar in land mass, the great portion of Canada’s land mass lies in arctic and subarctic regions and only one-third is populated. Selected characteristics of the two countries’ rail systems are shown in table 1. The rail technology employed by the two countries is 1976 1976 1976 1975 Characteristic Population (million) ., Land mass (sq. miles) Number of railways (major) Mainline/branchlike (miles) ... . . 1975 Y a r d / s i d i n g s ( m i l e s ) 976 Total freight fleet (cars) 976 Total locomotives (number 976 Average capacity per freight car ., ., ., 975 Total passenger fleet (car) 976 Freight train miles (million 976 Gross ton miles (billion) 976 Passenger miles (billion) 1976/ 77 Average number of e m p l o y e e s 1976 Operating revenues (billion). . . . . . 1976 Operating expenses ( b i l l i o n ) * Percent expenses to r e v e n u e s 1976 Net income (ordinary) (million) ., United States Canada ‘1 5,000,00( 3,000,000 1,851,800 3,615,100 2 56 United States/ Canada (ratio) 9.3 . — 199,400 124,800 1,699,000 27,600 43,900 16,100 193,400 4,008 4.5 7.8 8.8 6.9 73.8 tons 6,471 424.5 1,996 103 64.6 1,855 686 273 1.8 12 35 6.2 7,3 57 496,500 107,000 4.6 185 3.1 5.8 150 29 51 80% 91% 358 36.9 9.7 “The differences between Canada and the United States (n the percentage of expenses 10 reve nues may be explalned In part by the capital Investment that IS nol Included as an expense Item In the Umted States 3 4 . Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison similar. However, the United States carries a slightly higher weight per train as evidenced by a larger freight car capacity. The freight car capacity for both countries has increased in the last two decades. The United States has over four times as much mainline/branchlike trackage as Canada and over eight times the equipment fleet. The U.S. system travels six times the amount of freight train miles and seven times the gross-ton mileage of the Canadian rail system. In the United States, passenger miles were 5.7 times higher than that of Canada, and the United States hired an average of 4.6 times more railroad employees than Canada. In light of the differing sizes of the two countries and the nature of their economies, the differences in the sizes of the rail systems are to be expected. ACCIDENT PICTURE Fatality rates (based on train miles) in both countries for the 1966-76 period declined. However, the United States had a 47.6 percent higher fatality rate (or 1.5 times higher) than Canada. Grade-crossing and trespasser fatality rates are considerably higher in the United States than in Canada, whereas employee fatality rates are similar. These data probably reflect the fact that, since both the U.S. population and rail system are much larger than the Canadian, the U.S. general public has a higher level of exposure to rail hazards. For the 1966-76 period, the U.S. rail fatality rate was an average of 47.6 percent higher than that of Canada. Total U.S. rail fatalities declined by 37 percent between 1966 and 1976 (table 2). The U.S. fatalities per train mile declined by 27 percent. In Canada, the total fatalities declined by 54 percent for the same period, and the rate per train mile declined by 50 percent. A proportionately larger number of trespasser fatalities occur in the United States than in Canada (table 3). On the average, over the 1966-76 period, the trespasser fatality rate for the United States was 67 percent higher than for Canada. The reasons for the differences in trespasser fatality rates between the two countries could not be specifically ascertained. However, factors such as location of trespasser death (urban or rural), population densities, and rail traffic exposure could influence the number and rate Table 2.—Fatalities in the United States and Canada, 1966-76 Canada Year 1966 . . . . 1967 . . . . 1968 ., ., . 1969 ... 1970 . . . . 1971 ., ., , 1972 . . . 1973 ... . 1974 ... 1 9 7 5 1976 . . . . . Fatals 318 297 230 218 195 208 253 228 201 187 145 Per million* train miles 3.31 3.15 2.64 2.53 2.24 2.39 2.81 2.57 2.07 2.11 1.66 2,50 average rate United States Fatals 2684 2483 2359 2299 2225 1010 1,945 1,916 1,908 1,560 1,684 Per million** train miles 4.18 4.08 4,04 4,03 3.04 3.09 3.73 3.38 3.27 2.92 3.02 3.69 average rate “U S tram miles used for Ihls table were derwed from comb rung Iocomotwe males (whtch In eludes freight and passenger males, and motor Iraln miles) q *Canadian tram males for 1972-76 used m this table included Ilolor tram miles, and freight and passenger miles SOURCE Bureau of Management Consulhng, Sfa(/sf/cd/Arra/ ys/ of Ra/lway AccdeMs, /956-73, p 12, Railway Transport, pt 1, Comparahve Summar I, 1972-76, table 9 U S Federal Ratlroad Admlmsfratlon Accldenf Bullehn, no 14 and 45, p 1 of deaths. This data was not available for this report. * Between 1966 and 1976, both countries showed a decline in the number and rate of deaths resulting from grade-crossing accidents (table 4). The decline in the United States was more consistent over the period than in Canada. On a per million train-mile basis, the Ii-year average grade-crossing fatality rate in the United States is 62 percent higher than that of *The Railway Transport Committee (RTC), the Canadian Government agency responsible for accident data collection and analysis, gathers data on mainline and branchline accidents that result in $750 or more in damage to rail property, equipment, and lading. (continued) Ch. 1 U.S.-Canadian Rail Safety: Comparative Analysis Table 3.—Trespasser Fatalities in the United States and Canada, 1966-76 Year 1966 ., . . 1967 ., ., 1968 1969 1970 . . . 1971 1972 . . 1973 1974 1975 1976 ...,. Canada Per million Fatals train miles 74 .77 57 .60 53 .61 53 .61 50 .57 56 .64 66 ,73 48 .54 55 .57 59 .67 32 .37 .61 average rate Fatals 678 646 628 627 593 551 537 578 565 524 458 1.06 1.06 1,08 1,10 1.08 1.07 1,03 1.02 .91 .98 .82 1.02 average rate SOURCE Bureau of Marragement Consulfmg, SfaMocd&ra/ys(s o/ Radway Acc/derr(s, f956-73 Radway Transpofl, pt 1, Comparative Summary, 1972-76 U S Federal Radroad Admmtstrahon Accident Bulletins Canada. This rate difference appears to reflect a higher level of exposure of the U.S. population to such hazards than in Canada. For example, Canada has 34,000 public crossing sites compared to 219,000 in the United States. For the 1966-72 period, the United States had an average of 105,288,000 motor vehicle registrations compared to 8,238,000 in Canada. However, in order to determine accurately the exposure levels, more detailed data is needed. The employee fatality rates for the United States and Canada are quite similar (table 5). Both countries have shown a relatively stable *(continued) The U.S. Federal Railroad Administration currently collects accident information on mainline, branchlike, and yard accidents that result in $2,300 or more in damage costs. In the United States, prior to 1975, the threshold value for reporting accidents was $750. It was raised to $1,750 to account for inflation in 1975, and to $2,300 in 1977. Mainline and branchlike accidents for the United States could only be separated from yard data for the years 1975, 1976, and 1977. Hence, qualitative comparisons with RTC data could only be made for those years. Although the reporting threshold for derailments is lower in Canada for the 1975-77 period, this should not preclude comparison of derailments between the United States and Canada for that period for mainline and branchlike derailments. RTC collects data on injuries for operating employees, however, data on injury causes were not available. The United States did not begin collecting injury data for injuries resulting in “one or more” days off or requiring medical attention until 1975. Prior to 1975, injury data were collected for only those injuries resulting in “more than one” day off. The primary difference in accident data collection systems between the two countries is the fact the United States collects yard accident data whereas Canada does not, and the def initions and procedures used to collect injury data have differed. 5 Table 4.—Grade”Crossing Fatalities in the United States and Canada, 1966=76 United States Per million train miles q Year 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 ., . . . . . . ., . . . ., ., ..... ..... . . . . ... . . . . ..,.. ... , Fatals 186 197 121 120 116 121 150 150 109 99 108 Canada Per million train miles 1,94 2.09 1.39 1,39 1,33 1.39 1,65 1.69 1.12 1,12 1.24 1.49 average rate United States Per million Fatals train miles 1,780 1,632 1,546 1,490 1,440 1,356 1,260 1,185 1,220 978 1,168 2.77 2.68 2.65 2.61 2.61 2.63 2.41 2.09 2.09 1.83 2.10 2.41 average rate SOURCE Bureau of Management Consulting, .Slaflsflca/ Ana/ysis of r?a{/way Accderm, 1956-73, Radway Transport, pt I Comparatwe Summary 1972-76, U S Federal Railroad Ad. mmlstratlon Accident BulletIns rate, with the exception of a dramatic decline in employee deaths for Canada in 1976. In both the United States and Canada, rail grade-crossing fatalities represent the most significant rail-related safety problem. Grade-crossing fatalities are the largest category of rail-related deaths in Canada and in the United States. In both countries, these deaths account for between 60 to 65 percent of all rail-related fatalities. In both countries, trespasser fatalities accounted for the second largest safety problem in number of deaths. Canadian railroads with gross ton miles similar to the top-nine ton-mile carriers in the United States have derailment rates similar to those of the U.S. carriers. However, the averages of accident rates for the next 10 (ton mile) U.S. railroads as a group in 1976 and in 1977 are significantly higher than the Canadian railroads. In the aggregate, the U.S. derailment rate is significantly higher than that of Canada. In both countries, derailments are more significant for the property losses and service dislocation than for the fatalities they cause. Derailments measured on a gross ton-mile basis increased for both countries over the 1966-74 period, as shown in table 6. After 1974, derailments stabilized for Canada, whereas they 6 q Railroad safety—U.S. -Canadian Comparison Table 5.—Employee Fatalities in the United States and Canada, 1966-76 Canada Year 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 United States Per million train miles Fatals ., ., 26 ., 29 ., 28 26 21 ., 18 32 ... 21 . . ., 24 . . . 23 8 .27 .31 .32 .30 ,24 .21 .35 .24 .25 ,26 .09 .26 average rate Fatals 168 176 150 190 172 123 133 161 144 113 109 Per million train miles .26 .29 .26 .33 .31 .24 .25 .28 .25 .21 .20 .26 average rate SOURCE Bureau of Management Consulting SfafNlcaJ Analysts of Ratlway Accjdenk, 1956-73, Railway Transport, pt 1, Comparatwe Summary, 1972-76, U S Federal Railroad Admlmstratlon Accident Bulletins Table 6.—Collisions/Derailments in the United States and Canada, 1966-74 Canada Year 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Collisions 55 ., 39 ., ., 49 . . . . 41 . . 46 ., ., 45 . . 44 56 . . ., 46 United States Derailments* 230 209 228 246 276 265 323 299 420 Collisions Derailments** 1,552 4,447 1,522 4,960 1,727 5,487 1,810 5,960 1,756 5,620 1,529 5,131 1,348 5,509 1,657 7,389 1,551 8,513 Table 7.—Derailments in the United States and Canada, 1975.77* Year Canada United States 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330 301 312 3,600 4,123 4,010 “ Malnllne/branchlike only for both countries. Transport Committee, Summary Accident Data, Federal Rail. road Administration, Accident Bullet Ins, SOURCE Railway Table 8.—U.S. Derailments by Cause Gross Gross Gross Gross ton ton Misc. ton ton miles Equip- miles and miles miles Year Track (000) ment (000) (000) Total (000) — 1966* . . 1,388 1,501 1,550 4,447 1967. . . . . 1,800 1,611 1 ,549 4,960 1968. , ., 2,062 1,745 1 ,681) 5,487 1969, ., ., 2,400 1,697 1,863 5,960 1970, . . . . 2,393 1,602 1,607 5,602 1971 . . . . . 2,194 1,5411 1,389 5,131 1972. ., . . 2,481 1,344 1 ,684 5,509 1973. ..., 3,477 2,157 1,755 7,389 1974. . . . . 3,196 1,967 2,350 8,513 Percent of total . . (40%) [30%) (30%) 1 9 7 5 * * 1 , 6 3 3 .88 1976. , ., 1,921 .96 1977. . . . . 1,844 .92 (46%) 1,242 1,405 1,324 (34%) .67 .71 .66 725 797 842 (20% ) .39 .40 .42 3,600 4,123 4,010 1.84 2.07 1.99 I ‘Mamllne only q *Mamlme and yard combmed S O U R C E B u r e a u o f M a n a g e m e n t C o n s u l t i n g , .SfatNica/ Analysls of Rahay Accdertk, 1956-73, Radway Transport pl 1, Comparatwe Summary 1972-76, U S Federal Ratlroad Admlmmstratlon Accident Bulletins have continued to increase in the United States (tables 7 and 8). While the total derailment picture for the United States appears less favorable than that of Canada, derailment rates among U.S. carriers range from 0.28 to 12.50 on a billion gross-tonmile basis for the 1976-77 period. Table 9 lists U.S. and major Canadian carriers by their gross ton miles and by their derailment rates. As evidenced from this table, derailment problems vary among individual carriers. From the information provided by table 9, the average accident rates for the nine largest (ton mile) U.S. railroads in 1976 and in 1977 are not significantly different from the values for either CN or CP in those years. However, the averages of the ac- “1966-74 for mamllne/branchlme and yard derailments “” 1975-77 for mamllne/branchllne only (prior to 1975 deradmerts could not be Isolated by locatlon otmamllnev yard) S O U R C E F e d e r a l Ratlroad Admmlstratlon Acc!dent Bulletln am Assoclatlon of American Ratlroads, Economics and Finance Department cident rates of the next 10 U.S. railroads in 1976 and in 1977 statistically are significantly higher than the values of either CN or CP in those years. The differences in the accident rates between the years 1976 and 1977 for the individual carriers are not statistically significant. The variation among the carriers is highly significant, but the variation from year to year is not significant. In the United States, track-caused derailments represent a slightly higher portion of total mainline/branchlike derailments than they do in Canada. Between 1966 and 1977, trackcaused derailments accounted for roughly 40 to Ch. I U.S. -Canadian Rail Safety: Comparative Analysis 46 percent of all U.S derailments (table 8). * In Canada, during the same period, equipmentcaused accidents represented the largest number of derailments between 1966 and 1970 whereas track-caused accidents represented the greatest portion of accidents between 1970 and 1975 (table 10). The slower introduction of roller bearings in the Canadian freight car fleet may account for the slightly larger portion of equipment-caused accidents. By 1976, track and equipment causes together accounted for roughly 74 percent of all Canadian derailments with the split between track and equipment causes being almost equal or approximately 37 percent each by 1977. In the United States, 1.7 percent of rail-related fatalities for 1966-76 occurred in derailments. In Canada, 1 percent of fatalities for 1966-76 occurred in derailments. Derailments appear more significant for their resulting property losses and service dislocations. As suggested in the previous OTA Evaluation of Railroad Safety, the reasons for the increases in track-caused train accidents may result from a combination of factors including increased axle loading on freight equipment, deferred maintenance, and the unstable economic condition of some U.S. carriers. Data was not available to correlate directly the financial viability of the individual rail carriers with their derailment picture. Around 1974, Canadian Government and railroad officials showed a growing concern about increased axle loading on freight equipment. Railroad management states that, as a result of this concern, CN conducted research on the problems, Both railroads decided to increase track expenditures. Although sufficient data 50-171 0 - 79 - 2 7 Table 9.—Mainline/Branchline — Derailments by Year and Railroad (in billions of gross ton miles) Gross ton miles 1976 Railroad Conrail. . . Burlington Northern: 204.6 170,3 Southern Pacific 160.1 Union Pacific . 144.7 S a n t a F e (CN 139.4) 1130 S o u t h e r n 114,9 Norfolk &Western. 1149 Chessie ... ., 108,2 Missouri Pacific (CP 101.0) 812 Louisville & Nashville. ., 799 Seaboard Coast Line 626 Illinois Central Gulf 57,1 Chicago & Northwestern 504 M i l w a u k e e , St, Louis-San Francisco. 38.3 Rock Island . 347 26.2 St.Louis-Southwestern. 20.7 Denver Rio Grande. 18.4 SooLine, ., 147 Kansas City Southern ., 13,4 Western Pacific ., 11.6 Missouri-Kansas-Texas ., 9.1 Grand Trunk Western 8.3 Delaware & Hudson. 6,2 Boston & Maine ., ., 59 Clinchfield . . . . 4,7 Colorado & Southern . 4.8 Ft. Worth & Denver 42 Florida East Coast Long Island . 38 Bessemer & Lake Erie 3.8 32 Detroit, Toledo, & Ironton Duluth & Missabe Iron R a n g e . , 3.6 Richmond, Fredericksburg, & Potomac 2.7 Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 2.5 Duluth, Winnepeg, & 2,4 Pacific ., . ., ., Maine Central 20 1,8 Elgin, Joilet, & Eastern 1,5 Toledo, Peoria, & Western 1.4 CP-U.S. Lines ., 1,4 G e o r g i a . , 1.2 Northwestern Pacific ., Illinois Terminal Co. 12 1.2 Bangor & Aroostock. Chicago & Illinois Midland 9 .7 Central Vermont ., Detroit Toledo Shoreline, 5 Derailment Gross ton Derailment rate, 197E miles 197i rate, 1977 2392 2.47 1,44 221 7 1,16 1 25 1,09 173.3 169.1 .86 .97 .73 159.8 (1 .34) (1.36) (141 7) 121 3 1.03 .92 .71 108,0 .86 110.8 330 380 111 8 1.02 .98 (1 02) (106.2) ( 97) 339 3.03 843 1.77 1.55 84.5 337 386 601 510 5.90 58.8 7.33 6.45 48.8 1 52 198 38.8 8.06 6.97 35.1 26.7 .61 ,72 21.2 2,59 315 20.5 1 79 3.40 16.2 1.59 209 13.8 4.15 440 12.3 2.21 3.96 9.5 472 4.94 8.9 3.23 6.1 3.28 3.39 6.7 358 2.73 4,26 6.6 2.21 3.54 6.8 48 5.0 .80 1.05 1.05 3.8 1.58 .81 3.7 5.63 2.94 34 .28 2.3 1.48 8..80 2,6 2,5 2.08 950 1.11 3.33 214 2.14 4.17 750 12,50 5.56 714 12.00 2.6 2.0 17 1,4 1.5 1.4 1.2 1,2 1.2 7 .7 .5 SOURCE Federal Railroad Administration Accident Bulletin and Association of roads q Prior to 1975, in the United States, derailments occurring in the yards could not be separated from mainline and branchlike derailments. Therefore in the range of 40 to 46 percent of derailments caused by track for the 1966-77 period, 40 percent represents track-caused derailments for mainline) branchlike only, and 46 percent represents track-caused derailments occurring on mainlines/branchlines and in the yards from 1966-74. q 222 9.20 500 1,76 5.00 .67 714 12,50 6.67 429 1,43 800 American Rail- was not available to document fully the trends in allocation for track maintenance, the Canadian accident data tends to support statements made by the railroads. 8 q Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison Table 10.—Canadian Derailments by Cause I Year 1966 . . . . . 1967 ..., . 1968, ... 1969. , . . . 1970 . . . . . 1971 ... 1972 . . . . . 1973 . . . . . 1974, . . . . 1975 . . . . . 1976 ...,. 1977, ..., Gross Gross ton ton miles Equip- miles Track 000) ment (000) 70 .32 125 .57 53 .25 82 .38 50 .24 100 .47 73 .34 128 .60 119 .51 108 .46 107 .44 .36 89 134 .53 .40 103 115 .45 .41 104 157 .56 130 .46 136 .53 103 .40 .42 106 .41 107 111 120 .43 .39 36% 38% Misc. and other 35 74 78 45 49 69 86 80 133 91 88 81 26% Gross ton miles (000) Total Gross ton miles 000) .32 .31 .29 230 209 228 246 276 265 323 299 420 330 301 312 1.17 1.08 1.10 SOURCE Railway Transport Committee, Summary Accident Report, 1977 GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES AND STATUTES In the history of both Canadian and U.S. railroads, there has been Government involvement in the railroads, but that involvement—in terms of both economic and safety regulations and economic subsidies for the railroads—has differed in several ways. Canada’s early rail system was tied directly to the political union and economy of the country. The first transcontinental railroad, the Canadian Pacific, was stipulated by the British North America Act of 1867. This Act formed the Canadian confederation by joining British Columbia to the other provinces, particularly to Montreal. CP received substantial initial Government subsidies, land grants, and tax credits. However, it has always been maintained as a private enterprise system. The Canadian Government has been involved in rail economic regulation since the late-1800’s. In 1897, the Canadian Government entered into the Crow’s Nest Pass Agreement with CP. The agreement established rates for hauling grain for specified routes in exchange for subsidies needed by CP to build additional lines. The Crow’s Nest Pass Agreement was later extended to include all grain-hauling routes for CP, and those for other rail lines as well. In 1903, the Canadian Government enacted the Railway Act, which consolidated a number of existing rail policies and added economic and safety regulatory measures. The U.S. Government has been involved with economic, safety, and other aspects of its rail system since the late-1800’s. The United States provided substantial land grants for building the rail system to foster growth in the West. The Federal Government became involved in the economic regulation of the railroads when it created the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887. The Government also became active in railroad safety with the creation of a number of specific safety laws between 1900 and 1920. In Canada, CN was established as a Government owned and operated crown corporation in 1923 following the financial collapse of several major private railroads. These were consolidated with previously owned Government lines. As in Canada, the U.S. railroads experienced financial difficulties in the early 1900’s. During World War I, the U.S. Government operated the rail system. However, after the war, the railroads returned to private ownership with Government regulation. The U.S. railroads later received substantial loans from the Reconstruc- Ch. I U.S.-Canadian Rail Safety: Comparative Analysis • 9 tion Finance Corporation during the Depression. Most of these loans were paid back by the end of World War II. Conrail is the only major carrier that has received sizable Government subsidies in recent rail history. Today in Canada, CN represents one of several divisions included in the Canadian National Crown Corporation. Its other divisions include trucking, shipping, U.S. rail lines, and hotels. However, CN accounts for the largest source of revenues to the corporation. Although publicly owned, CN’s financial position was greatly improved by the Capital Revision Act of 1977-78 which removed substantial CN debts (approximately $2 billion). The remaining CN debt after this Act is approximately $250 million. Canadian Pacific is also part of a larger conglomerate, CP Limited, which has assets of $5 billion. CP Limited enterprises include air, trucking, shipping, mining, forestry, real estate, telecommunications, and other investments. Rail accounts for 22 percent of the annual revenues of CP Limited. The structures of the two Governments and their current rail policies differ in several substantial ways. Canada has a parliamentary form of governthat combines legislative and executive functions. The Minister of Transport, a member of Parliament, serves as the chief executive for the Department of Transport (Transport Canada), the governmental agency with umbrella transportation authority. ment In Canada, there are two primary Government entities with rail safety responsibilities; Transport Canada (Department of Transport) and Labour Canada (Department of Labour). Labour Canada is the equivalent of the executive branch Labor Department in the United States. In Canada, the central Government has exclusive jurisdiction over the interprovincial rail carriers, whereas, in the United States, Federal Government jurisdiction preempts but does not exclude State jurisdiction over rail carriers. Canadian authority for economic and safety regulation of all interprovincial railroads, as well as for economic regulation of other modes, is vested in one primary agency, the Canadian Transport Commission (CTC). CTC reports to Transport Canada. Within CTC, the Railway Transport Committee (RTC) has direct responsibility for rail regulatory activity. CTC was created by the National Transportation Act of 1967 (NTA), which sought to establish a balanced transportation policy. NTA established a national transport policy for the purpose of achieving maximum efficiency from all available modes at lowest cost. With the 1967 Act, Canada removed a number of Government rail economic policies in an effort to allow rail to compete more effectively with other modes. NTA established an appeals process to resolve potential rate disputes in captive markets and to safeguard the public interest. NTA also established the framework for Federal regulation of trucks, historically a function of the provinces. This section, although passed by Parliament, has never been activated. Hence the provinces still exercise regulatory authority over trucking. 1 Within CTC, the Railway Transport Committee is responsible for implementing Federal rail policies. Its functions are several: administration of rail economic policy, administration of rail subsidies, and administration of rail safety policies involving train operations. RTC rail safety functions include: regulation, inspection, accident reporting and investigation, and gradecrossing and dangerous commodities safety-related activities. ‘A major study in 1977 of the impacts of rail economic and pricing changes resulting from NTA was undertaken by the Centre for Transportation Studies at the University of British Columbia, a research organization sponsored by the Canadian Ministry of Transport. The study is entitled Railway Pricing Under Commercial Freedom: The Canadian Experience by T. D. Heaver and J. C. Nelson, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, 1977. While this OTA report does not seek to examine the impacts of Canadian rail economic policies, the previous source gives information regarding the implications of rail economic deregulation in Canada resulting from policies established by NTA. The study concludes that: The dynamic compet]t}on provided by the 1967 NTA has proved workable in promoting efficient transport, sophisticated and efficient prlcmg of railway services, adequate service for the most part, competitive rate levels, and some lessened discrimination in pricing as well as ma]ntalning the commer]cal and financial viability of the Canadian railways. Further the competition spawned by the Act has stimulated shippers and ra]lways to make needed institutional changes. 10 q Railroad Safety— U.S.-Canadian Comparison In the United States, authority for development and implementation of rail economic policies, including regulatory functions, and rail safety policies and programs is vested in several different Federal agencies. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) within the Department of Transportation has responsibility for administering rail subsidies, and developing safety regulations and other programs including research. In addition, FRA shares jurisdictional responsibility with the Federal Highway Administration for grade-crossing safety, and with the Materials Transportation Bureau for hazardous materials safety. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) has economic regulatory responsibilities for rail. Unlike Canada, the United States has continued to maintain sub- stantial Federal regulation of rail economic policies. Trucking regulation is maintained at the Federal and State levels in the United States, unlike Canada where Federal jurisdiction has not been exercised. The objectives and responsibilities of CTC appear comprehensive and substantiall y stronger and wider in scope than those vested in ICC and FRA. In particular, CTC can establish rules and seek penalties for violation of its laws and rules from both rail companies and rail employees. It has jurisdiction over construction and operation of railroads. Its inspectors can issue orders to stop train operations or remove a car from a train. CTC decisions are binding within its jurisdiction and may be reviewed only on ap- Table 11 .—U.S. and Canadian Safety Regulations Subject Hazardous materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ambient noise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 40 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 U.S. provision CFR 172-174, 178-179,209 CFR 20 (EPA); 49 CFR 210; CFR 171,211 CFR 171,211 CFR 212 CFR 213 CFR 215 CFR 216 CFR 217 CFR 218 CFR 220 CFR 221 CFR 225 CFR 228 Procedural rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . State/Province participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Track safety standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Freight car safety standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Special notice, emergency orders . . . . . . . . . . . Operating rules—general . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Operating rules— specific (blueflag, etc.) . . . . . Two-way radios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rear-end marking devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Accident reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hours of service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Locomotive design, performance and inspection standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 CFR 230 Safety appliances. . . . . . . . . . . . . Power brakes and drawbars . . . . . . Signals and related devices. . . . . . . Occupational Safety and Health. . . . 49 49 49 29 . . . . .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mixed passenger/freight equipment — vestibule doors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Testing employees—sight, hearing. . . . . . . . . . Loading open top cars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Special equipment regulations (mailcars, snow plows, grain cars). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Air pollution and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fire extinguishers and emergency tools in passenger cars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fire prevention from railroad causes. . . . . . . . . Grade crossings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Railroad design (plans, profiles, etc.). . . . . . . . . Utilities on or near rail line. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CFR CFR CFR CFR 231 232 233-236 1910 Canadian provision Gen. Order no. 0-29 to O-34 N/A Gen. Order. no. M-2 None None None None Gen. Order no. 0-8 Gen. Order no. 0-8 None None Gen. Order no. 0None Gen. Order no. 0--1 to 0-14,0-16 to 0-19,0-21 Gen. Order. no. 0-10 Gen. Order no. 0-20 (air brake only) Gen. Order no. E-12 and E-13 SOR 71-30,71-480 ,71-481,71-584, 71-605,71-616,72663, 72-13,72-23, 72-66,72-666,72-171, 72-288, 73-679, and 78-559 None None None Gen. Order no. 0-6 Gen. Order no. 0-9 Gen. Order no. 0-15 None None applicable exclusively to railroads Gen. Order no. 0-22-0-24 Gen. Order no. O-26 None None None None None None Gen. Order no. O-27 Gen Order no. 0-28, E-16 Gen. Order no. E-3 and E-9 Gen. Order no. E-1 and E-2 Gen. Order no. E-10 and E-12 Gen. Order no. E-17 Ch. I U.S. -Canadian Rail Safety: Comparative Analysis peal to the Supreme Court of Canada or the Governor-in-Council. The Canadian railroads and the U.S. railroads have been subject to similar statutory safety requirements since the early 1900’s. The regulations of similar areas or categories of safety by the two countries contain comparable provisions. However, each country regulates categories not covered by the other. The 1903 Railway Act established a broad range of requirements and restrictions on the formation, construction, operation, and safety of Canadian railroads. As in comparable U.S. laws, a number of the provisions contained in the 1903 Act are specific in content and are designed to address specific problems. A number of the regulations resulting from the statutes in both Canada and the United States are similar. For example, the safety appliances, hazardous materials, and locomotive inspection regulations are similar. However, Canada has adopted a Uniform Code of Operating Rules, a subject left to the U.S. railroads for the most part, although the Association of American Railroads has a suggested code. By contrast, the United States has track and freight car standards, a subject for which there are no Government standards in Canada. Canada does not consider hours of service as a safety regulatory matter. Table 11 indicates the rail safety regulations adopted by each country. As in the United States, responsibility in Canada for the safety and health of railroad employees is divided between transportation and labor agencies. In Canada, the safety of some railway employees, primarily those in operating positions, is within the jurisdiction of CTC; other railway employees are within the jurisdiction of Labour Canada. In the United States, the safety of railroad operations employees is under FRA, while the occupational safety and health of employees rests with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) within the Department of Labor. However, unlike CTC in Canada, FRA collects all accident and casualty statistics for both OSHA and FRA. q 11 Labour Canada has developed regulations to cover employees working in industries under their jurisdiction, including those working for the railroads. Labour Canada has not promulgated occupational safety and health regulations for hazards specific only to railroads. CTC, to date, has not promulgated occupational safety and health regulations covering employees under its jurisdiction. In the United States, there is no gap in the statutory authority to deal with occupational safety and health hazards since OSHA can exercise it to the extent that FRA does not. However, FRA has not exercised any substantive jurisdiction in this area for a variety of reasons, and has basically left the matter to OSHA for functions not involving rail operations. To date, OSHA has not issued any regulations exclusively applicable to railroads. Canadian compensation laws are established by the provinces, rather than by the central Government. Compensation for work-related injuries is no-fault in concept. These plans are viewed by both management and labor as providing fair treatment and compensation. In contrast, in the United States, compensation for workrelated railroad disabilities or injuries is under the authority of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA). The employee must sue the railroad and prove negligence in order to receive disability compensation. These compensation suits are handled in the Federal court system. Results from these suits may differ according to the court in which the case is tried. There are 10 separate compensation and rehabilitation plans in Canada—one for each province. In general these plans provide full medical treatment, and disability benefits for unlimited time periods. * Rehabilitation boards at the provincial level make determinations regarding needed medical treatment and rehabilitation programs. The railroads pay into no-fault insurance funds maintained by the provinces, or *For examp]t?, one plan providm tor a maximum di~ability cc)mpensatiOn at $20,000 annually. Widow\ m a y recci~e $250 p e r month unt i] cleat h or remarriage J nd $5-I per dependent up t c) age 18. 12 q Railroad Safety—U.S.-Canadian Comparison pay the employees directly according to the provincial plans. In the United States, compensation for disability or injury incurred by railroad employees in the line of work is under Federal jurisdiction by the authority of FELA. In order to receive disability compensation, the U.S. rail employee must sue the railroad and prove railroad negligence. Thus, the U.S. system is a legal one that adjudicates responsibility for the injury. FELA proceedings are handled in the Federal court system. Results from lawsuits may differ according to the court in which the case is tried, or according to the railroad’s history of case settlements. The Canadian system, unlike that in the United States, does not attempt to adjudicate responsibility for the injury. Decisions on whether and how much disability compensation should be awarded are made without involvement in the legal system or in an adversary environment. Injured employees are assured of compensation and rehabilitation payments. Canadian injury compensation and rehabilitation programs are reported as acceptable to both labor and management and are not an area of dispute in Canada. However, in the United States, FELA has long been a divisive force between management and labor. U.S.-CANADIAN GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY, AND LABOR APPROACHES TO SAFETY In both countries, Government concern for safety was heightened in the early 1970’s by a series of accidents and by increases in dangerous commodities. In the United States, the Government’s response to the increases in accidents was a series of hearings and the enactment of the Railroad Safety Act of 1970 and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act. The 1970 Safety Act gave the Department of Transportation regulatory and administrative powers to deal with safety and hazardous materials transportation problems. Prior to the enactment of the Railroad Safety Act of 1970, track-caused train accidents were increasing. After the passage of the Safety Act, a series of regulations have been promulgated by FRA and new inspection programs to ensure compliance with those regulations have been introduced. The primary regulations dealing with substantive, rather than procedural, safety concerns that have resulted from the 1970 Safety Act and from the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act include: track standards, equipment standards, and standards for component designs and performance of tank cars. The Canadian rail safety inquiry, begun in the early 1970’s, was a Government effort that investigated several major accidents and was later expanded to investigate the effectiveness of Government and industry rail safety policies and programs. The inquiry included testimony of the railroads and labor regarding safety issues and problems. The inquiry lasted over 3 years. It was followed by an in-depth analysis of safety problems and Government programs. The resulting reports were intended to establish and quantify the need, if there was a need, for increased Government safety activity and programs to reduce accidents and injuries. One of the results of the Canadian inquiry was that the railroads increased their own safety efforts. They expanded their data collection and analysis procedures for safety, ir creased communication with employees by utilizing safety committees more effectively, established rehabilitation programs, and began to explore trackrelated problems in greater detail. Today accident and casualty data are used by the railroads to establish safety targets, to identify areas in which safety problems exist, and to examine and apply possible corrective actions to such problems. Both U.S. and Canadian Governments use inspections as a part of their railroad safety programs. However, the two Governments Ch. I U.S.-Canadian Rail Safety: Comparative Analysis differ somewhat in their approaches to inspection and allocation of inspection resources. The Canadian RTC combines safety inspections with other routine responsibilities of its field personnel. Canadian inspection practices are based on the premise that safety is an integral part of efficient rail operation and should be viewed as such. Responsibilities of the Rail Services Branch of RTC are divided among safety inspection programs, branchlike rehabilitation, evaluation of passenger services, and station retirements. RTC officials estimate that about 35 percent of the professional staff time spent in the field involves safety matters. The Rail Services Headquarters Branch has about 29 staff members to carry out its responsibilities, Estimates of the extent to which safety is a part of headquarters work of the Rail Services Branch were not available. Allocation of inspection resources to a particular type of inspection results primarily from priorities established by RTC officials and the requirements of statistically based sampling. The inspection programs conducted by RTC include: track, car, locomotive, operations, dangerous commodities, fire prevention, stationary mechanical equipment, and structures and signals including grade crossings. Highest Government priority for inspections are on: developing an improved accident investigation procedure, grade-crossing inspections, and safety inspections administered by the Rail Services Branch, particularly equipment inspection. RTC with the assistance of the Bureau of Management Consulting developed an approach to equipment inspections that utilizes risk factor analysis and inspection sampling as the primary method for equipment inspections. This system was recently employed. Its effectiveness has not yet been determined. RTC views the Government’s role as one of monitoring railroad activities. As in the United States, Canadian Government inspection programs do not appear to have measures by which the effectiveness of inspection programs can be ascertained. In the United States, a significant portion of the FRA safety resources is dedicated solely to safety inspections. FRA conducts inspections in five major areas: track, operating practices, q 13 motive power and equipment, signals and train control, and hazardous materials. The basis FRA has used in establishing and assigning levels of effort to the five inspection programs is not apparent. As of 1977, inspection resource allocation did not coincide with the accident patterns in the United States. FRA has recently reviewed existing regulations and is currently proposing changes. The extent to which these regulatory changes will alter the inspection process in the United States is not yet known. In the United States, the Government has a shared Federal/State inspection program. This contrasts with Canada where interprovincial railroads are under the sole jurisdiction of the central Government. In both countries, transportation of dangerous commodities by rail has become an increased concern for the Governments and the railroads. The approaches taken in each country to dangerous commodity transportation is largely the same, with the exception of the use of emergency information forms in Canada. In the early 1970’s, dangerous commodity shipments became a heightened concern in the United States and Canada. In both countries, the increased concern was prompted by several major accidents and increases in hazardous materials shipments. Risks brought about by dangerous commodity transportation in Canada have been addressed by: a) adoption of U.S. tank car standards, b) development of a Hazardous Information Emergency Response (HIER) form that accompanies each shipment of dangerous commodities, and c) voluntary industry actions. These same types of programs have been undertaken in the United States with the single exception of the use of the HIER forms. In addition, both countries have almost identical hazardous materials regulations. The Canadians adopted the recent U.S. tank car standards requiring head shields and shelf couplers although the timetable for implementing the standards will be slower and retrofitting will be voluntary in Canada. Canada requires the HIER forms to accompany all tank car shipments carrying dangerous commodities from origin to destination. The 14 q Railroad Safety— U.S.-Canadian Comparison form contains the name of the commodity, the danger classification of the commodity (i.e., explosive, gas, etc.), potential hazards, and immediate action information. The purpose of the form is to aid people in response procedures in case of an accident. Use of the form was made mandatory by RTC. In the United States, there is no specific equivalent to the Canadian HIER form, although some information is required on the waybill. Some U.S. railroads have more extensive response procedures for dangerous commodities than others. A committee of the Association of American Railroads is currently studying the Canadian system, although no conclusions have been reached regarding its adoption. The major objection voiced by some U.S. railroads to the form is that it increases the paperwork carried for freight shipments at a time when the railroads themselves are trying to move to more automated systems. Grade-crossing safety is the most serious rail-related safety problem in both Canada and the United States. While primary authority for grade-crossing improvements rests with the central Governments in both countries, the Canadian Government appears to have broader powers and more detailed controls over grade crossings than in the United States. In contrast, in the United States, major funding authority for grade crossings, though vested at the Federal level, is split administratively among a number of different entities and basically administered by the States. The Railway Transport Committee within CTC has jurisdiction for grade-crossing safety improvement programs. In contrast, the U.S. Federal Highway Administration has primary jurisdiction at the Federal level for gradecrossing improvement programs. Today, Canada has detailed information on over 34,000 public crossing sites. The Canadian Government attempts to match the grade crossing with the most appropriate and cost-effective warning device. Onsite investigations of the crossing are one method used by RTC to determine the relative risks of the site. Further, RTC is developing a model they hope to use to set priorities among crossing sites requested by the road authorities (Federal, provincial, and municipal) to receive funding. The Canadian Government has broader powers and exercises more detailed controls than the United States over grade crossings. Canada and the United States both have problems with grade-crossing program administration. There are fewer public crossing sites in Canada than in the United States. Canada has 34,000 and the United States had 219