Fill and Sign the Motion to Prohibit Electronic and Photographic Coverage Mississippi Form

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF       COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI STATE OF MISSISSIPPI VS. CAUSE NUMBER             DEFENDANT MOTION TO PROHIBIT ELECTRONIC AND PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE       , by counsel, hereby moves this Court, pursu ant to Article 3, §§ 14, 23, 26, & 28, of the Mississippi Consti tution and the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, for an order prohibiting the use of video or other cameras to photograph the court pro ceedings herein. In support of this motion,       states as follows: 1.       is before this Court charged with murder arising out of a highly publicized homicide in this community. The District Attorney has announced his intention to seek the death penalty. 2. There has been massive, highly pre judicial publici ty throughout this area regarding this case. 3. Members of the media have sought authorization for electronic and photo graphic coverage of these proceedings. Such coverage will deny the accused a fair trial, an impartial jury, and a fair, reasoned and impartial determination of his sentence. Electronic and photograph ic coverage implicates a number of fundamental constitutional rights of the accused. On the other hand, the media has no constitutional right to photograph and record the proceed ings herein. In Nixon v. Warner Communica tions, Inc. , 435 U.S. 589 (1977), the Supreme Court held: . . . there is no constitutional right to have [live witnesses] testimo ny recorded and broadcast. Nor does the Sixth Amend ment require that the trial - - or any part of it - - be broadcast live or on tape to the public. The requirement of a public trial is satisfed by the opportunity of members of the public and the press to attend the trial and to report what they have observed. Id. at 610; see also Chandler v. Florida , 449 U.S. 560, 569 (1981). The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the trial court must take appropriate steps to limit the press in order "to protect the defend ant's superior right to a fair trial." Richmond Newspapers v. Virgin ia , 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980). In Sheppard v. Maxwell , 384 U.S. 333 (1966), the Court held: Due process requires that the accused re ceive a trial by an impar tial jury free from outside infuences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communi cations and the difculty of efacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused. Id. at 362. To protect this due process right "the presence of the press at judicial proceedings must be limited when it is apparent that the accused might otherwise be prejudiced or disadvantaged." Id. , at 358; see also Estes v. Texas , 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965); Callahan v. Lash , 381 F. Supp. 827, 832 (N.D. Ind. 1974); Missis sippi Publishers Corp. v. Coleman , 515 So.2d 1163 (Miss. 1987). 5. In Estes , the Supreme Court held that television coverage of a criminal trial could, in certain circumstances, violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court docu mented numerous situations in which electronic or pho - tographic coverage of court proceedings can cause an unfair trial - - "some so subtle as to defy detection by the accused or control by the judge:" . . . From the moment the trial judge an nounces that a case will be televised it be comes a cause celebre . The whole community, includ ing prospective jurors, becomes inter ested in all the morbid details surrounding it. The approaching trial immediately assumes an impor tant status in the public press and the accused is highly publicized along with the ofense with which he is charged. . . . . . . Telecasting is particularly bad where the judge is elected . . . . The telecasting of a trial becomes a political weapon, which, along with other distractions inherent in broadcasting, diverts his attention from the task at hand - - the fair trial of the accused. . . . Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the defendant. . . . The inevitable close - ups of his gestures and expres sions . . . might well transgress his personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to concentrate of the proceedings before him - - sometimes the diference between life and death - - dispassionately, freely and without distraction from wide public surveil lance. A defendant on trial for a specifc crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, nor a city or nationwide arena. The heightened public clamor resulting from radio and television coverage will inevita bly result in prejudice. . . . Furthermore, tele - casting may also deprive an accused of efec tive counsel. Id. , 381 U.S. at 545 - 549. All of these considerations are present here. As the Supreme Court recognized in Estes , television and photographic coverage has a unique ability, not possessed by the other media, to transmit exceptionally prejudicial images through out the area. 6.       is entitled to notice of the request by news organizations for permission for electronic and photograph ic coverage and to an opportunity to be heard before such coverage is authorized. In Chandler v. Florida , 449 U.S. 560, 569 (1981), the Supreme Court upheld the Florida rule allowing tele vision coverage of trials in certain instances in part because "Florida requires that objection of the accused to coverage be heard and considered on the record by the trial court." Id . at 577. The Court found that this hearing "enables a defendant to advance the basis of his objection to broadcast coverage and allows the trial court to defne the steps necessary to minimize or eliminate the risks of prejudice to the accused." Id . 7. To allow ex parte orders which have the potential of denying a fair trial by an impartial jury in a death case is completely at odds with the fundamental requirements of pro cedural due process and the extraordi nary measures required by the Eighth Amendment in a death penalty case. "[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circum stanc es must begin with a determina tion of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been afec ted by govern mental action." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy , 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). "The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard." Goldberg v. Kelly , 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970); Grannis v. Ordean , 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). The hearing must be "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner," Armstrong v. Manzo , 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965), and "appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. , 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). In Mullane , the Supreme Court observed that the right to be heard "has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest." Id . at 314. 8. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has held that a state cannot deprive a person of his driver's license and regis tration without frst providing a hearing to determine whether there is a reasonable probability of a judgment being rendered against him due to an accident. Bell v. Burson , 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971). Nor can a person's wages be frozen without the opportunity for a hearing. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. , 395 U.S. 337 (1969). It cannot be said that a person has a right to a hearing before his driver's license is revoked, while another has no right to a hearing before the Court autho rizes electronic and photograph ic coverage in a capital trial, severely jeopardi zing any hope he may have of a fair trial. Accordingly, this Court must conduct a hearing on whether to allow photographic and electronic coverage before any such coverage is permitted. WHEREFORE, upon a full evidentiary hearing of this motion,       prays that his motion be granted.