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On approval bill format for Security

all right panelists we are now live on both Facebook and zoom and you can switch your cameras on hello hello hello welcome welcome to our panelists welcome to Folks at home who are joining us um good afternoon thank you for joining us thank you for tuning in this is understanding Bill C70 Beyond a National Security State I'm Bianca maeni with Canada China focus and I'll be moderating today's discussion uh so today we're joined by Senator Yen p uh Professor madori ogasawara uh Tim murle uh National coordinator at the international civil civil civil liberties monitoring group um we'll also be hearing an introduction from Canada China Focus board member professor John Price uh who's going to be kicking off this this critical discussion about why we should all be concerned uh and paying very very close attention to the countering foreign interference act uh which was recently rushed through Parliament um and for legislation with such far-reaching uh significant implications it has received remarkably uh little scrutiny so all the more important to have this event today so uh just a little bit of housekeeping before we begin uh Canada China Focus um is the host and organ organizer of today's event um and CCF aims to provide a space for conversations on critical issues that are related to Canada China relations um and I've put uh I've asked uh relle who's also joining us from CCF um to put uh those links in the chat um to to the website um this event is also uh SP sponsored by the Canadian foreign policy Institute um and you can find out more about them at foreign policy. so for my part I'm based in Montreal or joj which is on the territory of the ghang Gaga people um and uh the who were the keepers of the Eastern door of the hodon Confederacy and I want to thank folks again um for joining us this is such an important discussion um so speakers are going to give their remarks and this will be followed by a discussion um among speakers and then in the time that remains we'll be taking questions with the audience so please do put your questions in the Q&A um as always please keep your comments respectful um and there's lots to discuss so let's get to it um to begin our event we're going to hear from CCF board member John Price ameritus professor of history at the University of Victoria and author of orienting Canada race Empire and the transpacific welcome John thanks so much Bianca I'm speaking from the traditional and unseated lands of the musim Squamish and slay withth Nations thank you so much to our panelists and to the many people attending this afternoon's event I also want to acknowledge uh the support that Canada China Focus has received from the center for Global Studies at the University of Victoria and from the Canadian foreign policy Institute we wouldn't be here with you supporting uh Canada China Focus Bill C70 or the countering foreign interference act received Royal Ascent on June 20th uh this year our panelist tonight will delve into some of the details of that legislation and how we might deal with the impacts I will be very brief and want to underline two points that might be relevant to tonight's topic the first is that the passage of be Bill C70 and much else going on in this country Point towards the emergence of a national security state in Canada this term was first applied to the United States and one researcher defined the National Security State there this way it channels all its efforts into meeting current and future military or security threats the creation of the CIA the Department of Defense The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council at the onset of the Cold War gave impetus to a state mentality geared to permanent preparedness for war the construction of threats is thus essential to its well-being making intelligence agencies privileged Tools in accomplishing this task so my question is this not in fact what we are seeing happening today in Canada with CIS taking on an unprecedented public profile and now also being endowed with powers never be seen given to an intelligence agency in this country I'm not going to dwell on this I I want to put it out there uh but I want to get on to my second Point despite the rather dire circumstances uh that we see today there's also resistance the Coalition that began to coales in opposition to C70 that Senator woo and Tim mcarley were so instrumental in bringing together was an important step in breaking down the isolation that is too often a Hallmark of resistance the movement in solidarity with Palestine is also bringing hope as people of every generation of many faiths and uh of many communities persist in demanding an end to the slaughter of innocent Palestinians so though we live in a moment of peril the voices of resistance are coming together and my hope for today's discussion is that it will further add to the momentum that is out there and once again I thank our panelists uh for taking the time to be with us today uh and to all the people uh participating in the webinar thank you so much thank you thank you John um thank you for that critical opening um just laying out some of uh some of the some of the the the the base concerns that we have um I also want to let people know that John is one of the founders of uh CCF um which is a project of uh the University of Victoria's Center for Global Studies as well as cfpi and it's an organization that aims to provide uh a space a safe space for conversations on critical issues related to Canada China relations um so uh it is now my great pleasure to introduce Senator Yuen Pao appointed to the Senate of Canada in November 2016 The Honorable y Pao sits as an independent representing British Columbia he's been the facilitator of the independent Senators group since 2017 and was reelected for a second 2-year term in December 2019 Senator woo has worked on public policy issues related to Canada's relations with Asian countries for more than 30 years from 2005 to 2014 he was president and CEO of the asia-pacific foundation of Canada where he continues to serve as distinguished East Asia fellow welcome Senator woo thank you Bianca uh good afternoon to all of you to my fellow panelists to our viewers I want to thank uh CCF the cfpi UVic Center for Global studies at University of Victorian all the others who have made this webinar possible this is a timely discussion and a very important one and one that requires a response uh not just from parliamentarians like myself but from the broader Canadian Society we have to involve Canadian Society more broadly in part because the parliament has if if I may be blunt failed in its responsibility to properly scrutinize and review the bill C70 that we are now discussing the first thing that has to be said about this bill is that it was rushed through the parliament of Canada it was rushed because of a climate of fear I might even say hysteria uh stoked by opportunistic politicians and self-serving media that made it very difficult for my colleagues to express any reservations or concerns they might have had with the bill and hence we saw the bill get unanimous consent to be rushed through the House of Commons we saw a hearings process that was uh essentially a validation of what the bill proposed with relatively little space and time given to people who had concerns about the bill when it came came to the Senate the situation was even more dire my institution is supposed to be the place where there is sober second thought and where we are not captive to short-term political and popular and populist considerations but we rushed it through the Senate even more quickly than the House of Commons and just to underscore the timeline that are involved in the case of the House of Commons the bill received second reading on May the 29th it passed the chamber on June the 13th that's just under two weeks and this is calendar time not sitting time sitting time would be even less in the Senate we had first reading on June the 13th and the bill was passed at third reading on June the 19th all of uh all of six days so uh the rushed nature of this bill exposes I think many of its flaws and there are many to discuss but I will touch on what I see to be some of the biggest flaws in Parts two and part four of the bill let me start with part four which is on the creation of a foreign influence transparency uh and accountability uh act or registry uh this has been discussed for a long time there are foreign agent Registries in a number of other uh Western industrialized countries and Canada is said to be late in coming to having a similar registry I actually support having a registry that is an expanded version of the lobbyist registry one which can capture uh individuals and groups that are uh on contract or have material arrangements with a foreign government to Lobby the government if you represent a foreign government and have some kind of arrangement that um uh requires you to um Lobby public policy you should you should have to register but this registry goes beyond the requirements that the lobbyist registry would have in having a definition uh of um of uh requirement to register that is vague uh what it says is that it ensures persons who under an arrangement carry out activities in relation to a political or government purpose in Canada uh have to uh register and an arrangement is defined as one under which a person undertakes to carry out under the direction of or in association with a foreign principal I okay with the term an arrangement with a foreign principal and I understand that arrangements are not always just contractual Arrangements sometimes they have to do with crit quit Pro calls or uh quiet understandings between the government and their representatives we should require individuals and organizations who have these kinds of Arrangements material arrangements to register but the term in association with is very problematic it is not clear clear what this means and I fear that the test of an association with Will boil down to what your views are and who you associate with that's in fact the term in association with and I hope everyone can understand that we have a Charter of Rights and Freedoms that protects the freedom of uh expression and the freedom of Association and that uh it should not be the case that someone have has to register as a foreign agent or representative simply because their views align with a foreign principle or simply because they uh have relationships with foreign principles there's a lot more to be said about the registry but let me move quickly uh to the other part of the bill part four which uh underscore how problematic and dangerous the registry is because of the in association with Clause there different aspects to part four uh the the good part of part four and I'll touch on it very quickly is the introduction of new uh criminal offenses that have to do with what's broadly called transnational repression I've been an advocate of dealing with transnational repression through the criminal code rather than through proxy uh indicators such as a registry I think the bill does a decent job in identifying new ways in which uh law enforcement can go after individuals who are acting on behalf of a foreign state to intimidate to threat to coers to bully Canadians we should not tolerate that and the first part of uh part two of C70 introduces those new uh laws but the second part of part two is very problematic and it has to do with uh laws that counter uh political foreign interference in a political process on behalf of a foreign entity now let me be clear it is not illegal to participate in a political process in Canada on behalf of a foreign entity the law does not make that illegal it only makes it illegal if you're doing it surreptitiously secretly or deceptively but the need but the ability for the law enforcement to identify someone who is participating in a political activity on behalf of a foreign entity serup iously or deceptively is by determining if they are have an arrangement with a foreign entity or are in association with a foreign entity which means that Canadians who want to get involved in Canadian democracy nomination campaign elections School Board even or any kind of public policy discussion any Canadian who wants to get involved in that kind of activity and has innocuous ties with a foreign entity could be deemed in violation of the law and subject to criminal penalties under those new Provisions in C70 and get this the maximum penalty for participating in Canadian democracy surreptitiously or deceptive on behalf of a foreign entity because you were deemed in association with the maximum penalty is life imprisonment I can only conclude we we'll have to wait to see how the commissioner defines an association with but the term is there in the law parliamentarians had the chance to remove that language from the law I moved an amendment in the Senate to get rid of those three words it was defeated in the Senate so we lost that opportunity and now it will be up to the commissioner to Define how that's used but any definition that is expansive could well capture and and snare Canadians who want to get involved in Canadian democracy but who uh may be tagged as foreign agents and they will run the risk of life imprisonment what this will do then is that it will suppress participation in Canada's democracy particularly among immigrants and among Canadians who have ties abroad and that surely is uh contrary to the very purpose of C70 let me stop there Bianca and pass it back to you thank you thank you so much uh Senator woo um thanks for your leadership on this as well and for today digging deep with us into this bill um your your Nuance scrutiny um particularly the vague language and in association Clause um and the penalties um and the chilling effect uh that I imagine um will be accompanied by those uh wishing to as you as you mention participate in Canadian democracy so I look very forward to hearing more from you uh in the discussion and Q&A just a quick note to our audience that we will be rebroadcasting this uh discussion to YouTube so please do subscribe to our YouTube channel relle has put that information in the chat also a reminder for you to place your questions in the Q&A box for uh the session we'll be having later so next we'll be hearing from Tim murle Tim murly joined the international Civ civil liberties monitoring group as the coalition's national coordinator in November 2016 previously Tim was the coordinator for the media Co-op Independent Media Network and the Dominion magazine he also served as coordinator for voices VA Coalition defending the right to descent and protecting Democratic rights in Canada welcome Tim thanks so much Bianca it's great to be here thanks to you and everyone at CCF and uh really great to be here with Senator woo and uh madori and and and Professor price it's really great to uh have the opportunity to share the work that we've been doing and I'm I'm you know very cognizant and and appreciative of the all the work that all of you have done to to shed a light on Bill C70 and and and these concerns that we have around um uh issues uh of the government's response to to foreign interference um I like to start just by saying a little bit about the organization I work for um the international civil liberties monitering group is a coalition of 46 Canadian organizations um we started in 2002 as a response to the government's adoption of the First anti-terrorism Act in 2001 and what we saw at the time as being again a piece of naal security legislation being rushed through Parliament very little room for debate in a context of of uh nationalism of xenophobia of fear um the need to think about how we protect the security of people but that the the rush to bring about these security laws as Professor price was saying the idea of a security state of responding to things so quickly by expanding and relying on uh national security agencies um with very concerning at the time and very worrisome and um it was seen by multiple groups in in in in Cil Society in Canada that there wasn't one organization working at that time that really was specializing in looking at anti-terrorism and civil liberties issues and so that led to the founding in 2002 of the of the lmg um so you know our Focus hasn't being necessarily on uh foreign interference um as such in in our work and so um we watched with concern around some of the initial uh developments and and um and ways of government was reacting to accusations of foreign interference and saw some parallels around the the work that we had done around the you know the war on terror so-called war on terror and anti-terrorism laws um I want to just say that one of those parallels was that we had seen very in very real ways um how governments uh transnationally or domestically um you know intimidate as Senator wuo was saying intimidate harass imprison uh human rights Defenders uh critics of their governments um and we've always supported the idea that the Canadian government needs to protect and and act on those issues to protect human rights and protect civil liberties but to do so in a way that doesn't Also Serve to undermine those same civil liberties and human rights um and to do so again uh as Senator was saying through the criminal code and one of our primary arguments and concerns with the anti-terrorism act and anti-terrorism laws in Canada is that it builds this exception around um politically uh around the idea of uh crimes that may be politically motivated um but that really brings in this ambiguity around who they're applied to and that's what we've seen with anti-terrorism laws in terms of for example studies that have shown 98% of those in Canada who have been charged with anti-terrorism laws under antiterrorism laws are Muslim men um and so um this has been a key component of our work and we see a lot of parallels with how uh we the respon how we've seen the response from the government to um foreign interference and that's why we start paying more attention to it through our our our Coalition as well um one of the areas before I get into the legislation um one of the areas that we saw that was around these questions of of secrecy and transparency and of leaks and there was a very worrisome parallel to the early 2000s where um there were cases of leaks to journalists of uh leaks um to politicians who then spoke without citing their sources with very uh serious accusations against against people in Canada and Canadians that led to Serious impacts on their lives including some who were uh eventually uh Mahar who was renditioned and tortured to others who were um who were uh illegally arrested in uh in other countries including abdulah Al Mali and other who who who faced um uh imprisonment and torture based on information that later was proven to be false um or that uh security officials had promised journalists that they would provide them with evidence later on about the involvement of these men in terrorism and that that evidence didn't exist um you know we we're lucky actually with some journalists we've spoken to and and this is to the credit that you know there's a lot of journalists who don't go for that and we spoke with journalists who are offered you know these these exclusive stories but without being provided the evidence and and they refused to run them um unfortunately there are also times where the stories are run and they cause irreparable harm and I and and we've seen similar concerns come out um in in the discussions and and issues around foreign interference one of the issues we've been looking at and and will be on a panel uh in Montreal next week um is around the uh Montreal community centers of Chinese community centers in Montreal um that face serious allegations of being Chinese um um uh police uh branches and yet now we're told that all those have been shut down but these organizations still are under investigation but there's no uh development no further information about anything they've done wrong but they're hanging they're suck under this cloud of of accusation and it's had serious impacts so that's one way that we've seen the parallel the other way is that we is is what we've seen in terms of powers and I'll try to summarize a little bit of some of the concerns we've seen um in in terms of the the powers and and changes that bu C sem have brought around I won't belabor the point Senator wo made a very good point about that how it was rushed I was going to speak about that but I don't think we need to say much more I'll just add that it made it incredibly difficult for civil society organizations to do their work to be able to do research to prepare briefs to get them to committees um it might not be apparent but uh it takes weeks if not months for those briefs to be written and then once they're submitted to committee they have to be translated before they can even be officially submitted which itself takes its own time and so um the fact that even some briefs you know we have to be we're very grateful to the work of parliamentary staff that they were able to translate some and get them in front of senators and and and and MPS but um but it was a very challenging very limited uh process um and something that for the scope of Bill C70 it's completely unacceptable and something that we rarely if ever have seen apart from I'd say um uh the original bc36 the First antiterrorism Act and some degrees Bill c-51 the uh the anti-terrorism act of 2015 um I wanted to touch on in terms of the bill itself two uh parts of the bill um one being the part one which is um that changes to the cus act and then part three which is uh way sensitive information handle but primarily changes to the Canada Evidence Act um it's a it's a vast bill so I'm I'm I'm also you know trying to uh I've tried to decide on which what some of the most important parts are to highlight one thing with cus I'd like to highlight and that I think um encapsulates some other parts of the bill as well is that um we saw Bill C70 bring in powers that aren't directly related to um foreign interference their powers and changes that we've actually seen security agencies arguing for in other pieces of legislation that didn't move forward or um uh or um proposals that never became legislation um and that you that may have an impact on investigating for an interference but aren't necessarily related to it and we and that was a big concern to us so for example um in uh changes to the cus act there were changes made to the cesis data set regime which is how cus since 2019 has been able to collect vast data sets of information and analyze them in order to identify intelligence priorities and threats to Canada that in itself was very controversial and remains controversial at the time because of the amount of information that's collected what it means for privacy rights and what it means for how cus is using data analytics and you know what kind of algorithms are being used who's being identified as a threat um but the uh the changes to the powers of the datet regime followed a very SC report from ner the National Security intelligence review agency that essentially called out CIS for doing for going beyond the scope of the data set regime and yet Bill C70 brought in changes to essentially allow CIS and justify CIS going outside the scope um retroactively and we've seen this before and um up until the point of this bill foreign interference have never been mentioned in terms of arguing for the data set powers and it's clear that access to this kind of information could help to identify threats of foreign interference but overall it's a justification for a power that was never developed and never argued for in that for in terms of foreign interference in in the first place um another area that cus was granted new powers or expanded powers that have been previously arreed for um is changes to its warranting powers so cus has a very strict or had a very strict warrant process um but it was uh an honorous process one that cus had complained about um and when that independent reviewers had found that cus derided and saw it as a necessary evil and didn't want to necessarily follow the warranting process and through that even misled the courts in applying for warrants um by withholding information by sharing information they knew to be illegally um and unlawfully gathered um in order to simplify the process and again instead of seeing a clear solution to that we see CIS given expanded warranting power that facilitate um them being able to seek out um uh warrants be able to S search uh individuals and and and um and their personal electronic devices for example or to be able to conduct surveillance overseas but from within Canada um so we're concerned that these kinds of powers that were previously argued for for example in the original proposal for the online harms act before the bill C63 was introduced last spring in 2021 this was part of that package um but it was so criticized as not being related to online harms that it was removed but from the eventual legislation but now we see it included in um Bill C70 um finally on on CIS um a big part of the discussion around foreign interference has been how can the government properly disclose information around foreign interference both to those who who are um making decisions around policy and also those who are facing threats and we think this is a really important conversation and something that needs a solution unfortunately we're concerned about the solution that was in Bill C70 because the solution is to expand cis's ability to share information uh under different degrees of information uh to under different processes so for example private information can be shared more broadly now with the approval of the minister um but then on top of that more general information can be shared uh with Civil Society organizations um individuals who face threats and our concern isn't so much that there this information is being uh shared but rather that cus has a history of politicizing how and what information they share and so we're concerned that this is being managed through a security agency and not perhaps through another body that is less intent on identifying security threats but rather on upholding democratic values and and and things like that and and not to say that individuals that CES us aren't doing that and that you know it it isn't it's more of a systemic issue that we see security agencies their mandate is to look for threats and to share this information based on threats and um what we've seen in the past is that for example um uh cus has been involved with information sharing around threats to uh natural resource development in Canada but some of those conversations are around um indigenous uh people's protesting the building of pipelines and resource extraction on their lines which is legitimate but it's being shared in in in behind closed doors with private uh corporations um with cus present and with the RCMP present and without any information being shared with uh you know the indigenous land Defenders who are are standing up um and and protecting the their land and and pushing back and and their allies and so it's a very one-sided process and we're concerned that this may exacerbate the one-sided process without more rules around what kind of information is shared how it's shared any kind of recordkeeping around what information is being shared and about who and so we think that there needs to be a serious rethink around how how this is carried out um the last thing I uh that I wanted to touch on is part uh three of the ACT um around the changes to the Canada Evidence Act um and this is a this part in particular didn't receive a lot of uh scrutiny and I think we think deserves it um but it but it's a little difficult to parse but at the heart of it um since the establishment of uh law of Canada's anti-terrorism laws there's been a growing use of um secret evidence and secret information and it in the courts so for example if we look at the security certificate regime under the immigration and Refugee protection act um there's provision to be allowed to for uh the government to share information in secret uh with judges regarding the individual who's being placed under security certificate and facing um deportation from Canada that that individual is not able to um uh is not able to access this has been litigated um it was found eventually constitutional we still have major concerns around the constitutionality of this process and there's still individuals who are stuck under under security certificates without a a without the prospect of of achieving Justice um but beyond that there's other um other administrative tools to counter terrorism that have integrated similar um uh approaches to withholding evidence so the the foreign um sorry the terrorist entities list uh the the passenger protect program where the No Fly list um rules around Charities and the newly established Bill c41 system for um approving um and authorizing human um not humanitarian aid but International assistance to areas that may be controlled by a terrorist organization um and so what this the changes to the Canada Evidence Act does is takes all these kind of disparate regimes um that would uh that basically say and and set out the rules for when a judge can refuse the disclosure of sensitive information information that's sensitive for National sec security reasons or National Defense reason or even International Affairs reasons and that they don't that they the go they can rule that the government does not need to disclose those to the defense but that they can still be considered in deciding whether or not these individuals can be listed or denied or or or things like that and it takes them all and essentially creates a um a standardized system uh across uh for all um for all administrative proceedings and appeals proceedings arising from those administrative proceedings it doesn't touch the criminal code but sets this up so that um there's a standard process across the system which is okay which on one hand is a good idea because um it it provides Clarity uh to the to for defendants in terms of how this will proceed but on the other hand it also simplifies the process so that now instead of when we're bringing in New pieces of legislation that the government needs to explicitly say okay for this piece of legislation we're going to allow the courts to you know to explicitly refuse the the disclosure of the information on these grounds they can now refer just back to these sections of the Canada Evidence Act and we're concerned that this normalizes the process and will eventually allow for the expanding of this process and we actually saw this um just to end on very uh in a very small way that um the uh security certificate system that I mentioned in large part is excluded they said is excluded from this new standardized process the process that's built into that law into era stays the same except they're now expanding the kinds of information that can be withheld from those accused under security certificates to go beyond simple National Security issues but to include National Defense and international Affairs so again we see that in bringing in this stand process um it also facilitates the expansion of the process and I think that this is going to raised serious concerns um and that we're only going to know what the problems are once it affects people and they have to go through the course to challenge it and I think I think I went a little long but thanks for for giving me that that that space Bianca and um and I hope I hope this you know has been you know valuable information for everyone and I'm looking forward to the conversation that we're going to have later on thanks very very valuable I'm also looking forward to hearing more from you Tim in uh in the Q&A period um and just want to thank you for taking us through many aspects of this legislation so expertly um and also great to understand some some of the relationships to pass problematic bills it is so alarming to hear uh about these major changes the expansion and scope of National Security Powers the problematic process the impact that the rushing had on civil society's uh ability to participate to respond to engage and also the background that these agencies have been trying to acquire these powers for many years so we'll talk more about all of this in the Q&A and discussion you can find out about Tim's important work at lg.ca so we're now moving on to our next esteemed panelist um Professor madori ogasawara um who is currently professor in the sociology department at the University of Victoria she has worked as a staff writer for Japan's national newspaper the Asahi Shimon and was engaged in investigative journalism on surveillance Technologies Japan's sex slavery during the second world war and US bases in Okinawa uh welcome Professor madori ogasawara thank you Bianca thank you for including me to this uh panel I had been uh I had been I have been very concerned about the bill C70 uh I guess since that time the Cs started the campaign about the the so-called China's uh the interference to the uh Canada's national election uh I have been closely looking at their information what the CES disclosed and then don't disclose and I was always like a puzzle like what where is the evidence evidence of the foring interference and then uh it's been a year and a half since then because they started kind of public campaign last year uh um in February uh but uh there are many reports by now um um the Senator Wu uh the uh published also the wonderful piece uh the article called on familiar spirit I have here and uh you said that there are the four official reports about The China's so-called the forign interference act but uh then probably I like to ask you a question about that but uh basically uh it's really difficult to have the open conversation about this because the as a public part of the public we don't have the clear information about it and then that ceases the discretion always you know how much uh they disclose the data or the information and um because I'm a um the surveillance uh researcher uh I've been looking at you know how the different uh the government has been using surveillance Technologies to watch over the world population essentially uh especially after uh during the war on Tera and then also Al I've been looking at the Canada's legislation how the Canadian government has been pushing the boundary of the legal and then illegal surveillance activity by the uh intelligence agency and then police uh agents um police agency and then uh in the last 20 years uh unfortunately I have to say the Canadian government has been expanding uh the power of the surveilling the people in Canada basically um so I published an article called legalizing illegal Mass surveillance uh and then I uh talk a little bit about my interview with uh Edward Snowden uh it's um um and then uh he's Edward Snowden is The Whistleblower from the American National Security Agency and then he uh disclosed to the public uh the how um white uh the the how gigantic uh network of s uh electronic surveillance the American government uh established on during the war time uh sorry during the war on Tera so uh under that regime uh Canada uh as a part of the 5i countries uh five I five I countries referred to the United States UK uh Canada Australia and then New Zealand uh how they United States all also pushing this legal boundary of the mous activity uh and then in other countries and then they not often use the term the harmonization trying they trying to harmonize the standard of the uh the legalizing uh previously illegal mous activities in that country so he Snowden uh disclosed the Japanese case in my interview so since then I got that perspective especially in the uh among the 5i countries how they um made make the the surveillance system resemble to each other and then in incorporate the American surveillance Network um the each system incorporate each system into the American uh the uh worldwide surveillance system so I would uh situate this bill C uh 70 now the coun countering um for interference Act is part of this um move of the legalizing illegal surveillance here in Canada and then as um the senator U referred Australia America the United States and then Australia they have the UK as well they have the very similar system of the foreign registry and so uh the mainstream media can say Oh Canada is behind we have to catch up you have to modernize the tool of the surveillance you we have to give the propa two to Cs and then uh they always push this type of campaign and we seen that already during the U the war on terror era uh but there is another uh really radical step forward to legalize uh the illegal uh M surveillance um system so uh I like to uh a bit because I'm a sance re researcher I like to step back a little bit uh because um what well to to say uh to tell the meaning and then also the social consequences of of the registry because registry foreign registry system just registration or just you know give your personal data register with the government many people would think you know it's nothing it's just a neutral system give the name you know we do this you know everyday life you give your name or photo upload to the social media maybe it's not the big deal some people may think you know it's just objective uh the way to have the uh to to have the to to give the data however uh there is a historical pattern how government has been abusing the power by using the personal data registered with them um there is a historical patterns uh in this country as well and then I like to start with uh the Chinese Exclusion Act of the 1923 under this law the Chinese Canadians people in uh in Canada who has the Chinese ancestry they are required to register and they uh there is a historical records you know how much um it's a really fearful system for them uh it's just uh probably you know in some people's eyes it's just to give the uh the uh pieces of the personal information but that means government can locate you anytime uh what you are doing there who uh uh who you are communic ating with and so just the personal information can actually open up all the monitoring system to the next stage so registration is not just a a neutral thing it always a set with the identification and then also the tracking the monitoring uh comes always comes with the registration system and in uh during the war time the World War II in Canada um they are the government also started the wartime registration system all the people in Canada basically required to register and then then some people don't want it to be registered uh with the government and then those people cannot receive the social assistance or the any public support uh by the governments so any people who are trying to avoid the registration then they will get the disadvantage and then um um as well also another example uh Japanese Canadians uh that during the second world war they are also required to register with the government and then it was not only about their um the personal information including their uh properties personal belongings and then all the uh these registration data are used to sell these people's properties uh during du war time and then also the Japanese Canadian people inter to the interior uh B BC um not only the BC but the wat San uh they were uh spread uh to the um they were forced to spread um in in Canada so the they originally most of them lived in the west coast of uh uh Canada but they are removed based on that data registered with the government and then uh uh indigenous people it's probably the longest history in Canada uh who needed to give the uh data their data as well as they are placed under the very uh the severe surveillance by the government uh reservation system uh residential school system both uh definitely require the data about uh the indigenous people and then their movement were restricted um based on the past system uh in since the late 19th century toward the beginning of the 20th century um so uh registration um is not just a neutral observation uh it uh it is the government to intervene uh the personal lives of these uh the vulnerable uh the communities so I have to say looking uh after looking at these historical patterns um the racialized communities uh um uh often the target uh of the state surveillance and then uh and then it's it's it's not a coincident CS um um the intelligence agency often Target these uh racialized and and vulnerable communities as the threat of the of the country uh so uh these population uh I'm I'm very deeply concerned you know these population can be uh can continue to be the uh the the the targets uh by the intelligence agency as the Nationalist national security threat however at the same time these category of the people as the threat to a risk are very sleepily it can always expand toward the general population and uh um uh every crisis or the National Security um the issue can expand the area of the sance as well as the population the target the population subject to um surveillance so uh you some people may think oh this is only about the Chinese Canadian people or the the people you know from other countries so it's nothing to do with uh nothing to do with me no not really because we are we all are under the mass surveillance uh the since the war Terror the same thing we may think you know this is just the small system uh however this system can expand any time toward any kinds of the people once the intelligence agency Define uh those people are the threat or risks to this country so these are the uh the most uh concerning Parts uh to me thank you thank you thank you so much uh Professor okaara really really important to hear from you and to understand um more clearly and deeply the role of surveillance um in the foreign registry particularly the impact on marginalized communities um I I really do feel like you've helped us to understand in particular the seriousness um uh of a registry right and um the historical cases too I think uh are very important so I just want to um take a moment before we move into our discussion period to let you know that um CCF has another event um next week called 100% tariffs on China's EVS is this Canada's just transition and we'll be joined by uh Elizabeth May co-leader of the green party uh and author Sam ginden um also former research uh head of uh the Canadian Auto Workers Union and they're going to be discussing the Liber the liberal government's recent imposition of a 100% tariff on chinese-made electric vehicles um so if you're interested in finding out what's at stake in this move please do join us on September 19th 7M Eastern Time uh also we're now on Twitter so please do follow us there for news analysis uh and upcoming events um and also if you go to our website you can um find out how to how to get our newsletter as well an excellent newsletter that comes out twice a month so that concludes our presentations thank you thank you thank you so much to our panelists we're now moving on to the discussion portion um of the evening and of the afternoon rather and the first question I have for all all all panelists is I'm curious to know whether anything came up uh for you as you listened to the presentations yeah well if I could start I really uh enjoyed and learned a lot from Mr maol and Professor gasa wara from from Tim you know I hadn't fully understood how opportunistic C70 was in that uh the government with with really the connivance and support of all of the opposition uh inserted uh certain Provisions new laws that are only at best tangentially related to foreign interference but which have been I guess priorities for our intelligence agencies and this is another example of how Parliament dropped the ball because this is what parliamentarians should be observing and pointing out as part of our job of scrutinizing scrutinizing legislation and we quite simply failed to do that uh Dr aaa's historical perspective is extremely important she reminds us of the Chinese Exclusion Act which of course was directed only at Chinese people and you know uh it it should be obvious from what she said but because only Chinese people and all Chinese people had to register between 1923 and 1947 the authorities could come up to any Chinese person at any time and demand proof of having registered and uh not registering or not being able to uh determined to to demonstrate that you are exactly what the document says could subject you to fines to prison or to deportation and what I want to say is that you know there's a bit of a debate today it's the 100th anniversary right of the Chinese Exclusion Act 101 years now since it was implemented and I I have I have been saying to Canadians that we must be careful about modern exclusion we had Chinese Exclusion 100 years ago and we we probably will never have that same kind of exclusion that same kind of racism because societies evolve but society's ability human nature the the ability of humans to come up with ever new creative and Insidious ways of exercising racism and prejudice and discrimination is is a Marvel it's a sad Marvel and I really worry that we are uh approaching a new form of exclusion it's in the first instance directed at Chinese not at all Chinese but at the idea that there are some good Chinese and there are some bad Chinese and the way in which modern exclusion is going to determine whether you're a good Chinese Canadian or a bad Chinese Canadian is based on your views and based on who you associate with and that is a fundamental affront to our our Charter of Rights and Freedoms but not many people see that thank you Senator other thoughts I like to respond to uh Senator Wu is that okay yeah oh thank you for yeah commenting on that um I think that um the you know good Chinese or good uh bad Chinese or good citizens or bad citizen you know that itself is the function of surveillance you know selfs surveillance people started to surveil themselves you know in the eye of of government or CS uh it doesn't really have to be the government I think it's the eye of the spy agencies uh am I look okay like what I'm doing on the social media on on the street is that safe enough and then it caus like a whole chilling effect for sure yes so it's not Democratic and then um and then uh the team uh referred to the secret uh evidence and then secret Court you know these are should be the really rare case or an exception uh exceptional case in the democratic government however it's been expanding so much and then I would say the secret evidence is not evidence secret court is not Court either it it should be like open to the public and so the whole conversation about the bc70 always Carri that same issue in that sense uh I would like to ask actually uh the senator Wu so uh here are like a four official report about the foreign interference activities by now but are they written in the clear language there is no like a deduction or uh yeah how how how clearly they identify the evidence and then I I have one more question so just to let me see say uh so it's called a registry but no one will just you know come forth and say hey I'm the Spy I'm doing you know for interference here then how CS can register those people that's that's a fundamental contradiction to me if you can respond I would appreciate shall we let Tim come in first U Bianca if he had anything to to comment I'm happy to respond to uh Senator woo yes go ahead shall I go ahead okay just quickly then um one of the big challenges in all of the reports that have come out you know um the uh David Johnson report the um initial report of the commissioner the ener report the ncop report is that all of them are taking the so-called intelligence from CIS and csse and others uh um not sharing very much in the report but I sense that they're taking it all at face value um and when I look at the specific question of the so-called evidence of uh interference in GE 44 the 2021 general election there are two that stand out you know it's repeated all the time one is the foreign interference against Kenny Chu Richmond mp uh candidate and the other one is the interference against Arin OU the leader of the conservative party but when I look at the evidence it's totally uh insubstantial uh and unsupported in fact the intelligence doesn't even say that it was foreign interference what it says is that we cannot determine whether it was foreign interference and so I worry my general worry is that all of these reports uh are not applying a critical eye to what the intelligence agencies are telling us they are taking them at face value and they are doing so in part I think because the if the immense immense political pressure on them and on the Canadian political class to find serious problems of foreign interference in our country and don't get me wrong if we need to find if there are serious problems of forign interference but the there's another risk and I think that's a greater risk today which is an overreaction to exaggerated or false or spous claims of foreign interference that harm the fundamental rights of Canadians and let me just say one more thing because you talked about the EV session that you're having next week this is a really interesting question the your panelists are not good going to be tagged as foreign agents they they're powerful people no worry about that but you know what if uh what if some ordinary Canadian know a Canadian who happens to be maybe an immigrant from China goes public and says you know we really should not have tariffs on Chinese EVS because they are good cars and they will help reduce emissions blah blah blah doesn't matter what the arguments are suppose they come out and say that and they have ties with China they grw up in China maybe they drive in in China will they have to register will somebody in the community say oh this guy is arguing in favor of Chinese companies and that person has ties with Chinese organizations why isn't isn't he registering and if that person then happens doesn't register because he feels that he's just expressing an opinion if that person then gets involved in a political process let's say he runs for a school board where his kidss go to school and the the RCMP decides that he is participating in a political process surreptitiously or deceptively because he did not register in the foreign agent registry what's going to happen to him maximum penalty of life imprisonment who's going to want to be involved who's going to want to speak out on public policy issues let me stop there it sounds like a trap all right um Professor price Tim yeah I'd love to just make a couple comments you know I I think that last point that you made Senator W is is very important and I think that's going to be the the the big question around how these foreign interference laws are are applied um and that's and that's the suspicion and the level of scrutiny and and I think you know um madori that what what you raised around how this fits into a Glo a larger question of global surveillance and and and surveillance activities by the government you know people don't think of a registry as surveillance but I think that you know your point is is an incredibly important one and one that needs to be remembered is that this is how governments surveil it's by collecting information about individuals and and forcing them to to to register um and we can be told you know we've been told uh you know often that it'll be a benign registry if you register it's not doesn't mean it's an influence registry it doesn't mean that you are interfering or that you've done anything wrong it's just for for clarity similar to the the the the lobbying act um and that brings me to I think you know one of the most a key thing that you Rose uh that you mentioned Sarah woo was that there are other proposals that we could be looking at and that simply weren't considered because it R was rushed including expansion of of of the lobbying act which is an understood process that has clear limitations had and uh and yet that wasn't even considered and couldn't be considered because because of the rush process um but just to go back to to what you were you were saying Midori about um issues around surveillance and those questions and you know the information that's collected either through the registry or that um will be collected in order to facilitate the investigation of these new um of these new foreign interference crimes raises serious you know concerns around the the of new surveillance tools and information that will be gathered and what can what will be shared with foreign Partners as well and I think that's why also you know what you're saying about the the global surveillance system is so important um something I didn't mention was part of the S part of the new disclosure powers that cus has is that they're able to disclose they will be able to disclose data sets to foreign partners and that under the terms of the changes to section 19 of the Cs act that deal with disclosure of information it broadens it so that the information with the approval of the minister isn't limited to being shared with other Canadian departments but also could be shared with with anyone and that includes foreign entities and so the the concern is that we're going to see um The information collected uh under the investigation of these new crimes um so let alone just the the the prosecution and and the impact of of these new laws themselves but that the information collected in terms of investigating and whether or not a crime has been committed commed will be able to be collected and and shared more easily not just within Canada but internationally and that raises you know serious concerns and what we didn't see um you know because having those laws there is bad enough but what we didn't see is the implementation of any restrictions or any disclosure any reporting um other pieces of legislation around information sharing require very strict recordkeeping about why the information was shared with whom and that if the receiving agency receives that has information realizes that they don't need it that they need to destroy it and return or return it to CIS or the disclosing agency we see nothing like that in Bill C70 um and so you know the these you know I I think it's so important this question of of of surveillance and um you know I I hope that gets more out there as we discuss you know the um you know the impacts and and how to push back against uh you know how these laws are going to be implemented thank you thank you Tim thanks very much bian and thanks the thank you the all of the panelists for great presentations I want to raise a couple of questions um that haven't really been focused on much and that is the Sol even though the language of much of the legislation is neutral it talks about foreign entities Etc um we know for in fact that uh the focus has been on China uh and sometimes perhaps on Iran or occasionally Russia um but you know how do we deal with this uh supposedly neutral language when we know that countries such as the um United States are actively actively interfering in Canadian Affairs um and people like Gordon laxer have talked about foreign funded oil companies and what they're doing we also know that for example a foreign company are well represented in the uh Business Council of Canada and the Business Council of Canada has been one of the most active lobers in to reinforce the powers of cus and they have relied for instance TC energy uh the the president of TC energy uh is uh on the subcommittee of the uh Business Council uh that is looking at National Security uh and uh that subcommittee is co-chaired by the uh head of MasterCard Canada uh these are you know entities that are closely tied to foreign corporations foreign oil companies as well um and they have been uh behind the lobbying and we know that they PC energy for example is relying on geopolitical information provided from their Washington office by operatives who were uh two out of three uh employed by the Trump Administration in the past so how can this not be construed as foreign interference and others and in the chat it's being raised uh what about in cases such as Israel that has clearly been interfering in Canadian Affairs for a long time through things like the Jew uh the um the National Fund the Jewish National Fund and other funds uh that have in fact received charitable status that you know so these these questions you know this how do we broaden the discussion to get away from what they want us to look at uh and to look at some of the underlying issues thank you thank you so much John unless anyone has a direct response uh to John's comments I think we are going to move into the Q&A for the remaining period of time that we have is there any is there anything else uh on your minds uh panelists before we move on okay wonderful um okay so we have quite a few questions um going to try and group them together um this uh the first group actually uh sort of addresses what John uh had had uh had touched upon um but perhaps we can broaden this discussion out a bit since there are so many questions about it in the chat so fose asks could the panel discuss the role of the Jewish National Fund in similar institutions which funds illegal settlements in Palestine um the likelihood of pro-israel funders being subject to the provisions of the bill for an influence on candidates election Etc are these organizations required to register and then uh John also in the chat says would anyone care to comment on the US Ukraine or Israel in the context of C70 and satoko in the chat in the Q&A box addresses foreign interference um and CIS and says five eyes countries um as madori had stated coordinate their surveillance system so should cus register themselves first so uh continuing on from the discussion that uh that John had started I'd love to hear some of your thoughts uh panelists could we start with you uh Dr aawara sure yeah I think that's that's a strong uh H line the Cs should register themsel with the foreign interference uh entity uh yeah I I agree with that um yes uh so the although the the law is written in the universal language practice is different it's always you know have the certain targets uh the response in response to the political climate so right now uh the Cs is seeing China as the the major threat Potential Threat right and then uh but and then this is because uh the United States has been uh the raising the tension and then um the in the the folding uh diplomatic relation with the the People's Republic of China so then uh the all the the technological Pony you know the the United States has been championing since the the World War II and then they feel now they are threatened because China is kind of outside of the control of their massas Network and then of course it's not only China other countries as well and then this is you know the things always happen and of course not everything under the American control however to them it feels a threat so that is why they trying to justify and bring the data information to convince the public basically why these uh the the countes at the Potential Threat or the the enemies potential enemies to our country so that's the practice based on the data always depend on the political climate that is why the system seems small at the moment but it can expand any time and then the surveillance Elevate always to the next level in the time of Crisis you can see that example clearly in the time of pandemic uh and then also the war on terror the Muslim people uh disproportionately there is no proportionate level however they are dis proportionately targeted by CS and there the clear human rights violation issues a lot and we haven't really fixed it and then even before the hog committee's final report CS was so inclined to push this uh the break it push it through the parament so um I think uh it's it's really um nice to hear the senator U uh the as a part of the the candidat departmental system you know someone in the parament uh feel the responsibility and I try to closely you know look at the registration and then that is the function and it should be the Supreme level of the discussion deliberate to discussion about the legislation right that's the that's the parament the role of the parament however the how fast it was pushed through yeah can tell uh always this type of the uh the National Security legislation uh is a um it's not it's not Democratic in process in practice either so that's uh um something uh um I like to uh respond to the to the questions and then as well as the Joe uh John's Point uh there are many actors it's not only like a Chinese or any other voting governments actually within the democr democratic system of Canada there are many interference right uh like a democratic system that people wants to like for example public relations uh by the oil companies and then the uh manipulation of the data false data misinformation disinformation all kinds of uh the things are happening so I think in the end this becomes the issue of the Power Balance so the people who already have lots of money and power uh they can do through their private channels interfere the election results or use their networks um and then then change the the push the certain um the candidates in the election situations and then on the other hand uh the uh who people who don't have that much um that much the private and the personal uh resources to do that you know they are all under surveillance you can't really do the uh the protest on the street anymore because can be seen as uh uh seen working for the other governments or the Align because it's in aligned uh with uh alignment with the falling uh claims so it's very sleeply um situation and then uh it's father um widen the gap of the power between the people and Authority thank you thank you so much madori um anyone else care to comment before we move on to the next set of questions I think yeah if I can just add to that you know it I think madori raises really important points about who who this will be applied against even though in the Parliamentary debates there was actually proposals that it should be restricted to only bad actor countries which would be a more obvious way of approaching it right and being very clear on what the goal of this is um but that was rejected by government officials the very basis you know that the goal isn't to Target particular countries it's supposed to be country agnostic but in reality you know I think the questions that people are asking today raises those concerns that very legitimate concerns will this be country agn