I.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court should enter a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction prohibiting
from advertising, proceeding with or taking any other action with regard to attempt
to foreclose on certain Deeds of Trust executed by (the " ") on lands located in
Counties, Mississippi. Injunctive relief is necessary to maintain the status quo until the
issue of whether the promissory notes which the deeds of trust secure are due and payable or
whether Whitney has agreed to forbear collection of the notes.
The issue of whether the notes are due and payable or whether has agreed to forbear
collection of the notes is currently the subject of two legal proceedings between and the
- one on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Circuit from the
United States District Court for the District of Mississippi and the other presently before
the United States District Court for the District of . However, neither court has
ruled whether or not is entitled to demand the immediate payment of the amount claimed
to be due from the and these foreclosure proceedings are an attempt by to obtain
prejudgment seizure and attachment of the ' property and to otherwise unfairly gain an
advantage over the prior to a determination of the parties' respective rights in the two
federal court cases.
Mississippi courts have long held that land is peculiar in nature and foreclosures of the
' property in Counties, Mississippi, will result in immediate and substantial
irreparable harm, damages and losses to the . The do not have an adequate remedy
at law. Moreover, attempt to foreclose on the ' property prior to a determination of
liability constitutes an attempt to obtain a prejudgment seizure and attachment in violation of the
due process provisions of the Mississippi Constitution. Courts have also long recognized that
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the violation of a person's constitutional right constitutes irreparable harm for which there is no
adequate remedy at law.
The should be required to post only a minimal security bond upon the issuance of
injunction relief. Rule 65(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides that while
security must be given upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction, the amount of such security is at the discretion of the court. In a case such as this,
where the creditor is oversecured and where the collateral is real property which is appreciating,
rather than depreciating, in value, only a minimal security bond is necessary because as a
practical matter the damages which may be incurred or suffered by should it be found to
have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained would be insignificant.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
For over years, the have been in the business of acquiring, developing, investing
in, and selling properties and other assets which include mineral interests, oil and gas leases, oil
and gas wells, real estate and timberland. The nature of this business is speculative and requires
long-term loans, long-term financing, and long-term forbearance from a lending institution
which is willing to loan money long-term on and for speculative properties and to await the
development or sale of the properties to be paid.
The began doing business with in . The relied on 's assurances
that would provide the with long-term loans, financing, and, most importantly, the
necessary forbearance which the would need over a long period of time in order to
acquire, develop, and sell properties at the most optimum prices available. Since , the
have been one of the substantial customers of . has provided the with
long-term loans, financing, and the necessary forbearance for the ' acquisition,
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development, investment, and sale of various properties. Pursuant to written and verbal
agreements, including modifications and amendments of notes, and the long-standing course of
dealing between the parties, , e.g. , has loaned money to the , has advanced monies to
the in anticipation of sale, has encouraged the to acquire properties, has paid debts
owed by the and has rolled the payments into the ' account, and has paid down the
' account with proceeds received from time to time from the ' income producing
properties and the ' periodic sales of properties. has repeatedly waived the strict
enforcement of the default provisions of the written agreements between them and the
have relied to their detriment on these agreements. For example, the are presently
involved in a sale of approximately acres of in on which holds a
second mortgage. The have at all times kept fully apprised of the ' efforts to
sell the and of the proposed sale, with the agreement and understanding that the
will use a portion of the sale proceeds to bring current the accrued interest on the ' debt to
the Bank. This course of dealing between the and the has been followed since
.
The relationship between the and has been a long-standing fiduciary relationship of
mutual trust and confidence for the mutual benefit and profit of both the and .
has exercised a degree of control and influence over the ' business activities. The
and have both benefitted from the relationship. Since , the have paid
over $ in interest and $ in principal in connection with loans made by
to the .
The have secured with various mortgages, deeds of trust, and security interests in
properties located in , , and Counties, Mississippi. These properties include
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mineral interests, real estate, oil and gas leases, oil and gas wells, and timberlands. The value of
these properties more than secures the ' debt to .
Although the are not in default, , in breach of its agreements with the and its
fiduciary duties and its duties of good faith and fair dealing, has demanded that the
immediately pay the Bank $ in claimed principal and interest. On , , the
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Mississippi against
for various claims including, breach of contract and a declaratory judgement that the
indebtedness to is not due (the "Mississippi case"). A copy of the complaint filed
by the in the Mississippi case is attached to the Verified Complaint filed herein as Exhibit
"B" and incorporated by reference. Subsequently, sued the in the United States
District Court for the District of for recovery of the amount claimed to be due (the
" case"). A copy of the complaint filed by in the case is attached to the
Verified Complaint filed herein as Exhibit "C" and incorporated by reference. The Mississippi
case is presently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Circuit. The
case is still active in the district court. Neither the court in the Mississippi case nor
the court in the case has ruled as to whether or not is entitled to demand the
immediate payment of the amount claimed to be due.
's demand for immediate payment is a breach of the agreements between the and
for to provide the with long-term loans, financing, and the necessary
forbearance while the , e.g., develop and sell various properties, so as to apply the
proceeds received to reduce the ' debt to . is estopped to deny, dispute,
renege on or breach its agreements with the and from demanding or receiving the
immediate payment of the ' outstanding account, an account which is fully secured by
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various deeds of trust, mortgages and security interests and has waived strict enforcement of the
default provisions of the written agreements between them.
As a portion of the security for their indebtedness to the , the on ,
executed a certain Land Deed of Trust to , Trustee, for the benefit of , which is
recorded in Book , Pages , Record of Mortgages and Deeds of Trust on Land,
County, Mississippi, Judicial District and in Book , Pages , Record of
Mortgages and Deeds of Trust on Land, County, Mississippi. By instrument dated ,
, , as owner and holder of the said Land Deed of Trust substituted , as
Substituted Trustee, in place of and in lieu of , which instrument is recorded in Substituted
Trustee Book , Pages , on file in the office of the Chancery Clerk of County,
Mississippi, Judicial District, and in Substituted Trustee Book , Pages , on
file in the office of the Chancery Clerk of County, Mississippi.
On , , commenced foreclosure of said Land Deed of Trust by posting a
"Substituted Trustee's Notice of Sale" on the main bulletin board at the County
Courthouse in , Mississippi, and by commencing publication of said "Substituted Trustee's
Notice of Sale" in . The "Substituted Trustee's Notice of Sale" was published by said
newspapers on , 20 . A copy of the "Substituted Trustee's Notice of Sale" is attached
to the Verified Complaint filed herein as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by reference.
II.
ARGUMENT
The Are Entitled to Injunctive Relief to
Prevent Irreparable Harm and Maintain the Status Quo
Pending a Decision on the Issue of Whether the '
Indebtedness to Is Immediately Due and Payable
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The are entitled to entry of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
against , , enjoining and prohibiting said Defendants from advertising and taking
any other actions in an attempt to foreclose on the Deed of Trust executed by the on lands
located in Counties, Mississippi as security for their indebtedness to . Such
injunctive relief is necessary to maintain the status quo pending resolution of the question of
whether the promissory notes which the deeds of trust secure are due and payable.
As the court noted in Rochelle v. State , 75 So.2d 268 (Miss. 1954):
The true object and purpose of an interlocuto ry injunction is to
hold and preserve in status quo the subject matter upon which the
decree is to operate until the court is able to finally adjudicate the
rights and duties of the parties. Griffith Miss. Chan cery Practice
(2d ed. 1950), Secs. 4 42, 443.
Rochelle , 75 So.2 at 270. When granting a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction, the status quo which courts try to preserve has been almost uniformly defined as the
"last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy." Miss. Power & Light v.
United Gas Pipeline , 609 F. Supp. 333 (D.C. Miss. 1985). In the present case, the status quo
can only be maintained by a preliminary injunction which prohibits any further efforts by the
Defendants to foreclose on the ' properties in Counties, Mississippi.
The issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are governed by Rule
65 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 65, the circumstances in which a
preliminary injunction may be granted are not described, but are a matter of the trial court's
discretion, to be exercised in conformity with traditional equity practices. See Moore v. Sanders ,
558 So.2d 1383, 1385 (Miss. 1990). In the present case, equity requires that the Defendants be
prohibited from proceeding with foreclosure.
Under Mississippi jurisprudence, irreparable injury is the only finding a court must make before
it may issue a TRO or preliminary injunction. If the status quo is not maintained, the will
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undoubted ly suffer irreparable harm for which they have no adequate remedy at law. However,
in order for a remedy at law to be deemed adequate, the remedy must be as effectual and speedy
as the remedy and equity. Rockett v. Finley , 184 So. 78, 80 (Miss. 1938). As the court stated in
Moss v. Jourdan , 92 So. 689 (Miss. 1922):
The term "irreparable" has acquired in the law of injunctions a
meaning which, perhaps, is not quite in keeping with the
derivation of the word or its literal signification. There are injuries
incapable of being repaired which a court of equity does not regard
as irrepar able. And, on the other hand, there are injuries that may
be repaired which it will, nevertheless, treat as irreparable, if the
person inflicting or threatening them be insolvent or unable to
respond in damages. As ordinarily used, the term means that
which cannot be repaired, restored or adequately compensated for
in money, or whether compensa tion cannot be safely measured.
Moss , 92 So. at 690, quoting R.C.L. pp. 346-47. Hence, the essential features of an "irreparable"
injury are:
(1) That the injury is an act which is a serious change of, or is destructive
to, the property it affects either physically or in the charac ter in
which it has been held and enjoyed. (2) That the
property must have some peculiar quality or use such that
its pecuniary value, as estimated by a jury, will not fairly recom -
pensate the owner for its loss.
Hood v. Foster , 13 So.2d 652, 654 (Miss. 1943).
However, where the subject matter of the injunctive relief is real property, the courts have
recognized that "land is per se property of peculiar value, and will be protected by injunction
without reference to its quality, use or value." Id. It appears that courts have made land a
subject for protection by injunction for the same reasons that land is a subject for specific perfor -
mance without reference to its quality, use or value in cases of contracts. Moss , 92 So., at 691,
quoting , 5 Pomeroy's Equity § 495.
In addition, 's institution of these foreclosure proceedings on the ' properties in
Counties, Mississip pi is an effort by to obtain prejudgment seizure and attachment
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of the property and to otherwise unfairly gain an advantage over the prior to a
determination of their rights by the Federal Courts, in violation of the right to due process
under Section 14 of the Mississippi Constitu tion. If the Defen dants are not prohibited from
foreclos ing, the will suffer substantial and irrepara ble damages and losses as a result of a
violation of their state constitutional rights.
The Mississippi courts have long recognized that a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order is appropriate in situations similar to the case at hand. For example, in
Barcroft v. Armstrong , 21 So.2d 817 (Miss. 1945), Armstrong brought an action to enjoin
foreclosure of his deed of trust in favor of the Allied Trust Company, Ltd. The defendants were
P. B. Barcroft, individually and as trustee in the deed of trust, C. F. Williams, an agent of the
defendant, Alliance Trust Company, Ltd., who was beneficiary, and two newspapers, The
Natchez Democrat Printing and Publishing Company, Inc. and The Woodville Republican .
Armstrong raised a number of claims in its suit, including the allegation that the balance due was
less than that claimed by the mortgagee or beneficiary; that the balance was to be computed in
the light of an alleged agreement with the mortgagee to reduce the interest rate to six percent
(6%); that the attempted foreclosure was premature; that the foreclosure was for an excessive
amount; and contemplated foreclosure of lands not properly a part of the security. Id. , at 818.
Upon the filing of the suit, the court immediately issued a preliminary injunction restraining any
advertisement or other proceeding toward foreclosure until a final hearing could be held by the
Chancellor to fix the rights between the parties. Id.
Like the plaintiff in Barcroft, the are entitled to injunctive relief to prevent and enjoin the
Defendants from advertising or taking any other proceedings regarding foreclosure of the
property in Counties, Mississippi. Until an adjudica tion in one of the federal court cases
that the indebtedness to is immediately due and payable, is not entitled to
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foreclose. Allowing the Defendants to proceed with foreclosure will undeniably result in
irreparable harm to the . Equity requires that a TRO and preliminary injunction be issued.
III.
ONLY A MINIMAL SECURITY BOND SHOULD
BE REQUIRED FROM THE
Upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction in this matter, the
should only be required to provide a minimal security bond. While Rule 65(c) under the
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides that security must be given upon the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, the amount of such security is at the
discretion of the Court. International A.B.S. & O.I. v. H. L. Byrd Building Service, Inc. , 284
So.2d 301, 304 (Miss. 1973). A Chancellor's decision regarding the amount of security required
will not be disturbed on appeal except upon an abuse of discretion. Broom v. Hattiesburg
Building & Trades Council , 206 So.2d 184 (Miss. 1967).
In the present case, the collateral which the have pledged to as security in its
indebtedness, exceeds the amount of their debt to and is therefore over secured.
Moreover, the security is real property which continues to appreciate, rather than depreciate in
value. In such a situation, it is clear that a minimal security bond should be required. Any
damages which might incur or suffer as a result of a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order, should it be determined that such injunctive relieve was wrongfully issued,
would be insignificant. In this situation, the should only be required to post a minimal
security bond.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The Court should enter a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction prohibiting
from advertising, proceeding with or taking any other action with regard to and
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attempt to foreclose on certain Deeds of Trust executed by on lands located in
Counties, Mississippi. Injunctive relief is necessary to maintain the status quo until the
issue of whether the promissory notes which the deeds of trust secure are due and payable or
whether has agreed to forbear collection of the notes.
The issue of whether the notes are due and payable or whether has agreed to forbear
collection of the notes is currently the subject of two legal proceedings between and the
. Neither court has ruled that is entitled to demand the immediate payment of the
amount claimed to be due from the and these foreclosure proceedings are an attempt by
to obtain prejudgment seizure and attachment of the ' property and to otherwise
unfairly gain an advantage over the prior to a determination of the parties' respective
rights in the two federal court cases.
Mississippi courts have long held that land is peculiar in nature and 's foreclosures of the
' property in Counties, Mississippi, will result in immediate and substantial
irreparable harm, damages and losses to the . Moreover, 's attempt to foreclose on
the ' property prior to a determination of liability constitutes an attempt to obtain a
prejudgment seizure and attachment in violation of the due process provisions of the Mississippi
Constitution. The do not have an adequate remedy at law.
The should be required to post only a minimal security bond upon the issuance of
injunction relief. Rule 65(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides that while
security must be given upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction, the amount of such security is at the discretion of the court. In a case such as this,
where the creditor is oversecured and where the collateral is real property which is appreciating,
rather than depreciating, in value, only a minimal security bond is necessary because as a
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practical matter the damages which may be incurred or suffered by should it be found to
have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained would be insignificant.
THIS, the day of , 20 .
Respectfully submitted,
_______________________________________
Attorney for
Of Counsel:
Telephone:
MSB #
Attorney for
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