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THE NO SUSPECT CASEWORK DNA BACKLOG REDUCTION PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Forensic DNA evidence has tremendous potential to improve the criminal justice system. Use of DNA evidence has solved numerous criminal cases that could not have been solved with traditional law enforcement techniques, and in a number of cases has exonerated persons charged with or convicted of crimes they did not commit. However, DNA currently is not being used to its full potential due to several factors, including a significant backlog of cases awaiting analysis in state and local laboratories and at law enforcement agencies across the country. A report submitted to Congress by the Attorney General in April 2004 estimated that over 540,000 criminal cases with biological evidence were awaiting DNA testing in state and local laboratories and at law enforcement agencies.1 Those cases include 52,000 homicides and 169,000 sexual assaults. To aid in reducing this casework backlog, the Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs (OJP), National Institute of Justice (NIJ), developed and is administering the No Suspect Casework DNA Backlog Reduction Program (Program), which provides funding to state laboratories. The purpose of this funding is to help the state laboratories identify, collect, and analyze DNA samples from evidence collected in cases where no suspect has been identified or in which the original suspect has been eliminated. Our audit examined OJP’s Program oversight and administration, Program participant’s compliance with requirements, and the allowability of costs charged to the Program. Background The Program’s mission is “to increase the capacity of state laboratories to process and analyze crime-scene DNA in cases in which there are no known suspects, either through in-house capacity building or by outsourcing to accredited private [contractor] laboratories.” The Program was 1 The report, National Forensic DNA Study Report, was the result of a study conducted by Washington State University and Smith Alling Lane, a Tacoma, Washington, law firm. authorized under the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, and was initiated with a Solicitation for applications to be submitted by September 2001. Due primarily to the events surrounding September 11, 2001, the Solicitation deadline was extended into FY 2002. Therefore, while the first year of the Program technically was FY 2001, the first grant applications were received and reviewed in FY 2002, and the first awards were issued toward the end of that fiscal year.2 OJP awarded approximately $28.5 million in this first year of the Program. A total of 25 states received awards in the Program’s first year (see page 5 for the complete listing of the grantees and award amounts). In many cases, these grantees teamed with co-grantees in their state (such as local laboratories or law enforcement agencies that received funding from the award to the Program grantee). Program grantees received funding for the analysis of over 24,700 no-suspect DNA cases in the Program’s first year. Each award was to be used for the processing and DNA analysis of no-suspect cases, defined by OJP as cases in which there is biological evidence from a crime but for which no suspect has been identified. Analysis could be conducted either “in-house” by the DNA laboratories within the grantee’s state, by outsourcing to state or local laboratories outside of the grantee’s state, by outsourcing to contractor laboratories, or some combination of these methods. In addition, Program funding could be used to purchase supplies and equipment and to pay overtime for the processing of no-suspect casework. DNA profiles that result from Program-funded analysis are to be entered into the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) so that those profiles can assist in solving crimes. CODIS is a national DNA information repository, maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that allows local, state, and federal crime laboratories to store and compare DNA profiles from crime-scene evidence and from convicted offenders. As of April 2004, the national CODIS database contained 1,762,005 DNA profiles. CODIS is used by participating forensic laboratories to compare DNA profiles, with the goal of matching case evidence to other previously unrelated cases or to persons already convicted of specific crimes. 2 Throughout this report, we use “FY 2001” to refer to the first year of the Program, since it was in that fiscal year that the Program was initiated. We acknowledge that the first year of the Program was primarily implemented during FY 2002. – ii – Audit Approach We audited the Program to evaluate the: 1) progress made toward the achievement of Program goals; 2) administration and oversight of the Program by OJP; 3) oversight of outsourcing laboratories by states receiving Program funds; and 4) allowability of costs charged to Program awards. While the Program will span multiple years, our audit focused on grants awarded during the first year of the Program. Grantee use of these funds, in many instances, is still on-going. We reviewed documentation at OJP, conducted audits of four grantees and various co-grantees within those grantee states,3 and examined procedures of three contractor laboratories.4 The four grantees that we audited had received approximately 47 percent of the FY 2001 Program funding to pay for analysis of approximately 10,900 additional cases. In addition, the three contractor laboratories selected for review received contracts to provide DNA analysis services for 13 of the 19 grantees that outsourced analysis of their no-suspect cases.5 At each of the four grantees that we audited, we reviewed policies and procedures, documentation of DNA profiles contained in CODIS, reports describing the required onsite visits that grantees made to their contractor laboratories, and other compliance documentation. We reviewed this information to determine whether each grantee and co-grantee: 1) had adequate policies for chain-of-custody, evidence handling, quality control, and data review; 2) was uploading completed DNA profiles to CODIS in a timely manner; 3) was adequately monitoring their contractor laboratories; 4) was in compliance with relevant sections of the Quality Assurance 3 We audited state and local laboratories in Ohio, Texas, New York, and Florida. 4 We examined procedures at The Bode Technology Group in Springfield, Virginia; Orchid Cellmark in Germantown, Maryland, and in Dallas, Texas; and LabCorp in Durham, North Carolina. 5 Six of the 25 grantees (Kansas, Missouri, Maine, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Delaware) did not outsource the analysis of their no-suspect cases to contractor laboratories. – iii – Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories (QAS) 6 effective October 1, 1998; and 5) was accredited or certified and had a technical leader on staff. We also audited each of these grantees’ Program awards to determine whether costs charged to each award were allowable and properly supported, and whether each grantee was in compliance with selected award conditions. Those conditions included accurate and timely reporting, utilization of drawdowns, budget management and control, and contractor laboratory monitoring. We issued four separate audit reports that detailed the results of these individual audits.7 At each of the three selected contractor laboratories, we reviewed chain-of-custody and evidence handling policies and procedures, conducted laboratory tours, and reviewed other documentation to determine if the laboratory was in compliance with key Program requirements. Those requirements include maintaining current accreditation, adhering to relevant sections of the QAS, having an onsite technical leader, and maintaining controls over billing. We also reviewed OJP’s oversight of the Program to determine if awards were made in accordance with applicable legislation, and whether OJP adequately monitored grantee activities and compliance with Program requirements. In addition, we assessed OJP’s efforts to monitor progress made toward achievement of the Program’s stated mission. The results of the various aspects of our auditing work are described in the following section. 6 The Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories (QAS) provide DNA casework (forensic) laboratories with minimum standards they should follow to ensure the quality and integrity of the data and competency of the laboratory. Recipients of Program funding must also certify that DNA analysis performed with that funding will comply with the QAS. Additional details on the QAS are found in Appendix III of this report. 7 See Appendix I for additional audit report information. – iv – Summary of Findings and Recommendations Assessment of Program Achievements In evaluating OJP’s progress, we concluded that while Program grantees were funded for analyses of over 24,700 backlogged no-suspect cases, current data does not reveal whether increased laboratory capacity to process and analyze no-suspect cases is being met, particularly for those states that are strictly outsourcing DNA analyses. Our analysis of data we collected from four grantee states indicated an increase in their forensic profiles uploaded to the national CODIS database during the period of their Program awards. However, this data did not distinguish between profiles from Program-funded no-suspect cases and other DNA uploads. For example, it is unclear from the data whether the increase in uploads is due to the Program funding, or whether it is because the laboratory hired, with its own funding, additional staff who helped increase productivity. Therefore, the data is inconclusive with regard to the achievement of the Program’s mission. In addition, we noted two issues that appear to affect the Program’s success and impact: 1) Only 41 percent or approximately $11.6 million of the $28.5 million of FY 2001 Program funds awarded were drawn down as of May 31, 2004, nearly two years after awards were made. In our judgment, significant delays in drawing down funding serve as indicators that state grantees are not using Program funds to increase their analytic capacity and reduce the backlog. Untimely implementation of each grantee’s planned activities hinders the entire Program from achieving its objectives. Further, funds obligated and not drawn down by Program grantees in a timely manner prevent other viable DNA programs or Program grantees with more immediate needs from utilizing the funds. 2) Several profiles that resulted from Program-funded analysis had not been uploaded to CODIS as of our review. This was caused –v– primarily by delays in conducting required quality control reviews of the data. In some cases, nearly a year had passed since completed DNA profiles were returned by the contractor laboratories, yet they still had not been uploaded to CODIS. The crime-solving potential of these profiles cannot be realized until they are uploaded into CODIS, where they can be matched to convicted offenders or other crime-scene evidence. We also identified some weaknesses in OJP’s development of Program goals and in its monitoring of progress toward the achievement of the Program’s mission. First, at the time our audit began, OJP had not developed formal goals or objectives for the Program. Subsequent to our inquiries, Program officials provided us with a list of newly established goals and objectives for the Program. Neither the performance measurements nor the new Program goals monitored uploaded profiles, statistics which we believe would be helpful to Program management in monitoring the Program’s progress. In addition, neither addressed the Program’s mission of increased laboratory capacity. While Program management did make an attempt to revise the measurements to better reflect the Program’s progress, we concluded that the proposed new measurements still would not have generated the type of data that would allow Program management to track the Program’s progress toward achieving its mission. We recommend that OJP: 1) ensure Program-funded DNA profiles are reviewed and uploaded to CODIS in a timely manner; 2) develop and follow procedures that will allow Program officials to more closely monitor grantee drawdowns, as a means to ensure that adequate progress is being made toward the achievement of each grantee’s goals, and objectives; and 3) develop Program performance measurements, goals and objectives that support and allow for the monitoring of progress toward the achievement of the Program’s mission. OJP Administration and Oversight of the Program We reviewed the OJP’s administration and oversight of the Program and determined that weaknesses existed in three areas. First, OJP issued second-year Program grants to states that had not drawn down, as of the time the awards were issued, any of their first-year – vi – Program grant funds. Specifically, in FY 2003 OJP awarded seven grants for the second year of the program, totaling $10.2 million, to states that had drawn down essentially none of their initial awards totaling $11.8 million. We question OJP’s awarding these additional funds to states that had not yet shown an ability to draw down their prior Program funds in a timely manner. Second, the requirements instituted by Program management for contractor laboratories performing no-suspect casework analysis were inconsistent with those required for state and local laboratories performing the same work. Specifically, contractor laboratories are required to be accredited or certified by specific independent organizations, and to have a technical leader onsite. These conditions are not required for state or local laboratories that participate in the Program. During our review, we found five laboratories in the states of Ohio and Texas that were performing Program-funded no-suspect casework analysis but did not meet one or both of these requirements. In addition, we were unable to determine from documentation maintained by OJP whether all co-grantees in six additional grantee states met these same requirements. We believe that the level of scrutiny placed upon the contractor laboratories should similarly be placed upon the state and local laboratories. Third, OJP has failed to ensure that the federal funds granted under the Program will benefit the national DNA database. Specifically, we identified one laboratory, the Fort Worth, Texas, Police Department, that was uploading Program-funded profiles to Texas’ State DNA Index System (SDIS, the state level of the CODIS system) but those profiles were not being uploaded to the National DNA Index System (NDIS, the national level of the CODIS system). Only profiles uploaded to NDIS are able to aid investigations across state lines. Therefore, failing to upload to NDIS limits the crime-solving potential of the profiles. Upon further inquiry, we were informed that Fort Worth’s profiles could not be uploaded to NDIS based upon a decision made by the FBI’s NDIS Program Manager. Specifically, the Fort Worth Police Department, due to the closure of their DNA laboratory, had hired two contractors, one to analyze the no-suspect cases, and one to review the data produced by the first contractor and upload that data to CODIS. In December 2003, the Fort Worth Police Department was notified by the NDIS Program Manager that its data analysis contractor did not have the authority to upload forensic profiles for them. Since OJP’s requirements for the Program only state that profiles are to be uploaded to CODIS (a term that encompasses the entire database system of indexes at the local, state, and national level), the Fort Worth Police Department was able to use – vii – Program-funded contractor services without violating OJP requirements, even though the resultant profiles could not be added to NDIS. We take issue with such an arrangement, and believe that viable profiles (complete and allowable) that result from federal funding awarded by OJP should be uploaded to the NDIS for comparison with DNA profiles from other NDIS laboratories. During our audit, the Fort Worth Police Department took action to remedy the arrangements it had for data review, to ensure the profiles could be added to NDIS. However, the failure of OJP to ensure that all viable profiles be uploaded to NDIS remains. We recommend that OJP: 1) more closely monitor previous grantees’ progress in drawing down grant funds prior to awarding them additional funding; 2) continue to pursue de-obligation of funds for Program grantees that have shown their inability to draw down their Program funds in a timely manner and that are unable to provide satisfactory evidence that they will be able to do so in the near future; 3) ensure that Program requirements in future years require all laboratories analyzing no-suspect cases to meet the same requirements; and 4) ensure that Program requirements encourage and clarify that the expectation for grantees is ultimately the upload of profiles to NDIS. Grantee Oversight of Contractor Laboratories In assessing the adequacy of grantee oversight of contractor laboratories, we identified four grantee/co-grantee laboratories that did not maintain adequate documentation to substantiate that their oversight of their contractor laboratories met certain requirements imposed by the QAS. Specifically, these laboratories could not substantiate that a complete onsite visit of their contractor laboratory had been conducted or that their contractor’s on-going compliance with applicable standards had been confirmed. In addition, six laboratories, including three grantee/co-grantee laboratories and three contractor laboratories, had incomplete or outdated outsourcing policies or procedures relating to chain-of-custody or evidence handling of no-suspect cases. For example, the written policies of each of the three grantee/co-grantee laboratories failed to describe fully the procedures currently in use for outsourcing no-suspect casework evidence. In each instance, the procedures staff used, as described to us, appeared sufficient to safeguard no-suspect casework evidence. In addition, two – viii – contractor laboratories’ procedures failed to address an aspect of facility cleaning and decontamination. Finally, one contractor’s procedures failed to describe methods to properly secure evidence after it had been received and logged in by the receptionist, but was awaiting the attention of technical personnel. Allowability of Grantee Expenditures We assessed the allowability of costs charged to Program awards by four grantees. While we found that they materially complied with most award requirements, we noted deficiencies at all four grantees and found some costs charged to Program awards that were unallowable and/or unsupported. As a result, we questioned costs of $111,297 out of a total of approximately $13.5 million awarded. In addition, we made nine recommendations addressed to OJP in separate audit reports we issued. Accordingly, these recommendations were not reiterated in this report. We also assessed whether selected grantees/co-grantees complied with Program requirements pertaining to costs paid to contractor laboratories. We found that one co-grantee was overpaying for services received from its contractor laboratory, and we questioned $44,640 in unallowable costs as a result. We recommended that OJP remedy these questioned costs. Our audit results are discussed in greater detail in the Findings and Recommendations section of this report. Our audit objectives, scope, and methodology, and a list of audited contractor laboratories, grantees, and co-grantees appear in Appendix I. Audit criteria applied during our work is described in Appendix III. – ix – THE NO SUSPECT CASEWORK DNA BACKLOG REDUCTION PROGRAM TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1 The Combined DNA Index System ........................................................ 2 Determining the National Casework Backlog .......................................... 2 The No Suspect Casework DNA Backlog Reduction Program..................... 3 Program Background ............................................................... 4 Program Structure .................................................................. 8 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................... 10 I. Program Impact and Achievement of Program Goals .....................10 Impact of the Program on Laboratory Capacity ......................... 10 Untimely Utilization of Program Funds...................................... 12 Profiles Not Uploaded to CODIS .............................................. 14 Program Goals and Performance Measurements ........................ 18 Recommendations ................................................................ 21 II. Administration and Oversight of the Program ...............................22 Additional Funds to Grantees not Drawing Down Initial Funds Timely ....................................................... 23 Inconsistent Requirements for Laboratories Performing No-suspect Casework Analysis ............................... 25 Failure to Ensure Program Funding to Support the National DNA Database ......................................... 27 Recommendations ................................................................ 29 III. Grantee Oversight of Contractor Laboratories ...............................31 Inadequate Contractor Oversight Documentation ...................... 31 Incomplete or Outdated Policies and Procedures........................ 34 Recommendations ................................................................ 40 IV. Allowability of Costs Charged to Program Awards..........................42 Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation............. 43 Texas Department of Public Safety .......................................... 45 Florida Department of Law Enforcement................................... 45 New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services .................. 47 Recommendations ................................................................ 51 STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS ............... 52 DNA Identification Act of 1994 ............................................................52 DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 .......................................53 STATEMENT ON MANAGEMENT CONTROLS ........................................... 54 OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY ........................................... 55 GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS ................................................ 62 AUDIT CRITERIA ............................................................................... 66 Federal Legislation .............................................................................66 Quality Assurance Standards...............................................................66 Solicitation Requirements ...................................................................67 OJP Financial Guide............................................................................68 OJP RESPONSE TO AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS..................................... 70 ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE REPORT78 INTRODUCTION A key objective of the Department of Justice’s (Department) strategic plan is to improve the crime fighting and criminal justice administration capabilities of state and local governments. The use of DNA profiles (computerized records containing DNA characteristics used for identification) has become an increasingly important crime-fighting tool, and the Department has created funding opportunities to assist state and local governments in implementing, expanding, or improving their use of DNA technology. The Office of Justice Programs (OJP), National Institute of Justice (NIJ), is the primary Department component disseminating these funds. The NIJ, through its Office of Science and Technology, supports research, development, and improvements in the fields of forensic sciences. The Office of Science and Technology’s Investigative and Forensic Sciences Division (IFSD) operates the DNA Backlog Reduction Program with the goal of eliminating public crime laboratories’ backlogs of DNA evidence. The NIJ’s DNA Backlog Reduction Program has two components: the Convicted Offender DNA Backlog Reduction Program, which provides funding to states to outsource analyses of convicted offender samples to contractor laboratories; and the No Suspect Casework DNA Backlog Reduction Program (Program), which provides funding to identify, collect, and analyze DNA samples from evidence collected in no-suspect cases. The NIJ defines a no-suspect case as a case in which there is biological evidence from a crime but where no suspect has been identified or the original suspect has been eliminated. Our audit focused on the administration and operations of the program relating to no-suspect cases.8 When no-suspect cases are analyzed, the resulting DNA profiles are compared to local, state, and national DNA databases to search for matches with profiles from other crime scenes or from convicted offenders. These comparisons are conducted through the national network of DNA databases, referred to as the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), which we discuss on the following page. 8 We previously audited the program related to convicted offender samples. For the results of this audit see Audit Report No. 02-20, The Office of Justice Programs Convicted Offender DNA Sample Backlog Reduction Grant Program, issued in May 2002. –1– The Combined DNA Index System CODIS is a national DNA information repository that allows local, state, and federal crime laboratories to store and compare DNA profiles from crime-scene evidence and from convicted offenders. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) oversees CODIS and provides participating laboratories with special software that organizes and manages its DNA profiles and related information. Through a hierarchy that encompasses national, state, and local indexes, CODIS identifies matches between DNA profiles from case evidence and a convicted offender or evidence from multiple crime scenes. DNA profiles are uploaded into the national index (the National DNA Index System or NDIS) from the state indexes (SDIS), and from the local indexes (LDIS) into SDIS. The forensic laboratories at each level of the CODIS hierarchy decide which DNA profiles to upload to the next level, and conversely the state and national levels determine – generally based upon applicable state and federal legislation – which profiles they will accept from the local and state indexes. Currently, CODIS contains two primary databases: the convicted offender database and the forensic database which contains the case evidence profiles. As of April 2004, NDIS contained 1,681,700 convicted offender profiles and 80,300 forensic profiles. The FBI measures the effectiveness of CODIS by tracking the number of investigative leads that have been provided through CODIS’ match capabilities. As of April 2004, the FBI reported a total of 16,695 investigations aided by CODIS.9 Determining the National Casework Backlog The current DNA casework backlog is significant. A report submitted to Congress by the Attorney General in April 2004 estimated that over 540,000 criminal cases with biological evidence were awaiting DNA testing in state and local laboratories and at law enforcement agencies across the 9 CODIS's primary metric, the "Investigation Aided," is defined by the FBI as a case that CODIS assisted by producing a match between profiles (i.e., linking two cases together, or linking a case profile to an offender profile) that would not otherwise have been developed. –2– country.10 Those cases include 52,000 homicides and 169,000 sexual assaults. However, determining the full extent of the backlog is complicated by the fact that there are more than 17,000 law enforcement agencies that potentially could be retaining untested forensic DNA evidence. Only about 10 percent of the estimated backlog of casework samples have been submitted to state or local crime laboratories. Further, even if law enforcement agencies submitted these cases to state and local crime laboratories, most of those laboratories lack sufficient evidence storage facilities for the resulting volume of evidence. In addition, state and local laboratories have been challenged financially, have had difficulty filling positions with qualified candidates, and already have a backlog of evidence awaiting analysis from cases already submitted. Police departments often retain evidence samples without submitting them because they believe that crime laboratories will not accept the samples or would be unable to analyze them. Because of the difficulty of quantifying the no-suspect casework backlog, our audit could not determine the impact that the Program had on reducing this backlog. The No Suspect Casework DNA Backlog Reduction Program The Program was developed to assist states in reducing the number of untested no-suspect cases so that the resultant DNA profiles could be uploaded to CODIS. The Program was authorized under the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000. According to the NIJ, the mission of the Program is “to increase the capacity of state laboratories to process and analyze crime-scene DNA in cases in which there are no known suspects, either through in-house capacity building or by outsourcing to accredited private [contractor] laboratories.” The Program was initiated with a Solicitation for applications to be submitted by September 2001. However, due primarily to the events surrounding September 11, 2001, the Solicitation deadline was extended into FY 2002. Therefore, while the Program was initiated in FY 2001, the 10 The report was based on a study conducted by Washington State University and Smith Alling Lane, a Tacoma, Washington, law firm. –3– first grant applications were received and reviewed in FY 2002, and the first awards were issued toward the end of that fiscal year.11 Sources of the Program’s $28.5 million in funding included a portion of $15.3 million transferred by the Attorney General from the Asset Forfeiture Fund Super Surplus,12 and a portion of $20 million appropriated in FY 2002 by Congress as part of funding for programs authorized under the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000. A total of 27 states13 applied for awards in the Program’s first year, and 25 received awards.14 Program Background The 25 states that received funding proposed to analyze over 24,700 no-suspect cases using grant funds. The following table details the total grant awards that each state received and the number of no-suspect cases that they proposed to analyze with the funding: 11 Throughout this report, we use “FY 2001” to refer to the first year of the Program, since it was in that fiscal year that the Program was initiated. We acknowledge that the Program was primarily implemented during FY 2002. 12 The Asset Forfeiture Fund Super Surplus in the Department contains excess end-of-year monies that the Attorney General can use for authorized purposes. 13 For the sake of simplicity, we use the term “state” throughout this report to include both states and U.S. territories, such as Puerto Rico. 14 Of the 27 states that initially applied for awards in FY 2001/2002, one state withdrew its application and another state decided to withhold its application until the second year of the Program. The remaining 25 states all received awards. –4– TABLE 1 PROGRAM GRANTEES AND FUNDS AWARDED Grantee State Maryland New York Texas Florida Ohio Wisconsin Michigan Arizona Massachusetts Alabama New Mexico Illinois Oklahoma Kansas Maine Missouri Indiana Kentucky New Jersey Nebraska Puerto Rico Delaware Connecticut New Hampshire Vermont TOTALS FY 2002 Funds Awarded $5,048,669 5,039,535 3,379,688 2,795,086 2,254,088 1,630,000 1,471,170 1,052,282 917,030 690,246 550,245 500,000 500,000 377,176 376,554 348,412 303,558 291,543 286,805 226,494 131,678 129,413 117,163 71,716 20,829 $28,509,380 Cases Funded15 3,704 3,146 3,160 1,500 3,068 850 1,359 1,729 1,000 463 785 400 500 450 300 513 203 400 420 100 60 48 300 250 30 24,738 TP PT Source: Office of Justice Programs Grantees could use Program funding to analyze no-suspect cases in several different ways: • “In-house” by DNA laboratories within the grantee’s state; • Outsource analysis to state or local laboratories outside of the grantee’s state; 15 This number represents the total number of no-suspect cases that grantees proposed would be analyzed with Program funds, through both outsourcing and in-house analysis. TP PT –5– • Private laboratories; or • Any combination of the above. The methodologies proposed by the states for the analysis of no-suspect cases are illustrated in the following graphic: FIGURE 1 Program Summary – FY 2001 Non-Participant PR In-House Analysis Only Outsourcing Only In-House and Outsourcing Source: Office of Justice Programs As shown above, six grantees chose to use in-house analysis only (Kansas, Missouri, Maine, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Delaware). For the 19 grantees that chose to outsource some or all of their DNA analyses, the following table details which contractor laboratories they selected: –6– TABLE 2 PROGRAM GRANTEES AND CONTRACTOR LABORATORIES Grantee State Contractor Laboratory Selected Bode TP 16 PT Orchid 18 17 LabCorp Cellmark TP TP Maryland PT Fairfax 19 Identity √ √ Texas √ √ Ohio √ Other TP √ √ √ √ √ √ Massachusetts √ √ √ Illinois √ Oklahoma √ √ Indiana √ Kentucky √ √ √ Nebraska √ Puerto Rico Vermont 16 √ √ New Mexico New Jersey √ √ Arizona Alabama PT √ Wisconsin Michigan 20 PT √ New York Florida TP √ PT The Bode Technology Group, Inc. is located in Springfield, Virginia. TP 17 Orchid Cellmark has U.S. locations in Germantown, Maryland; Dallas, Texas; and Nashville, Tennessee. TP PT 18 PT Laboratory Corporation of America has 31 locations in the U.S. TP 19 PT Fairfax Identity Laboratories is located in Fairfax, Virginia. TP 20 “Others” include Reliagene Technologies, Inc. in New Orleans, Louisiana; Identigene in Houston, Texas; Genelex Corporation in Seattle, Washington; GeneScreen in Dallas, Texas and Dayton, Ohio; DNA Reference Lab, Inc. in San Antonio, Texas; and University of Nebraska Medical Center in Omaha, Nebraska. TP PT –7– In addition to the direct costs of in-house analysis or outsourcing, Program funds also could be used for a number of other purposes in support of the analysis of no-suspect cases. These included paying for costs associated with oversight of contractor laboratories, purchasing supplies and equipment, or paying for overtime for the processing of no-suspect casework. Program Structure One stated objective of the Program was to foster cooperation and collaboration among all of the affected governmental agencies and departments, such as law enforcement agencies, crime laboratories, and prosecutors. According to the NIJ, the intent of this objective was to maximize the use of CODIS for solving no-suspect crimes. Therefore, states with more than one DNA laboratory were required to demonstrate that all of its laboratories were provided with the opportunity to participate in the Program. Consequently, while the awards were issued to one agency within each state, those grantees were required to coordinate and facilitate the participation of co-grantees as part of its award. Therefore, within this report and throughout our audit work we included co-grantees (i.e., local laboratories or law enforcement agencies that also received funds from the Program), within the scope of our review. The oversight of the funds distributed by the Program involved various entities. Specifically: 1) OJP awarded funds and administered the Program through the primary grantee in each state; 2) The primary grantee within each state oversaw the financial management of each award, including facilitating reimbursement to each of the co-grantees for their Program-funded expenditures, and collecting appropriate information from co-grantees to meet the required reporting obligations to OJP; and 3) Each of the grantees, whether the primary grantee or a co-grantee, was required to have oversight over their own Program-funded technical operations and activities, as well as those of any contractor laboratory they used as part of Program activities. –8– In several states, including Ohio and New York, the primary grantees formalized its relationship with each co-grantee in the form of a contract or agreement to ensure that each co-grantee understood their oversight and compliance obligations. Each of these layers of accountability is addressed within this report. Finding I assesses Program achievements. Finding II addresses OJP’s responsibilities of oversight, Finding III addresses each grantee’s oversight over technical operations, and Finding IV addresses financial management of the primary grantee. –9– FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I. Program Impact and Achievement of Program Goals We determined that the Program has been successful in funding the analysis of over 24,700 previously backlogged no-suspect cases, as projected by Program grantees. However, we were unable to determine whether the Program was achieving its mission of increasing laboratory capacity. Further, many grantees experienced lengthy delays in implementing their proposals and were not drawing down Program funds on a timely basis. We also determined that while the Program awards helped to increase the volume of no-suspect profiles uploaded to CODIS, all four of the individual grantees we audited experienced delays in uploading completed profiles. Finally, OJP had not developed substantive Program goals, and the Program’s performance measurements were not adequate to assess whether it was achieving its stated mission. Impact of the Program on Laboratory Capacity As stated previously, the mission of the Program is “to increase the capacity of state laboratories to process and analyze crime-scene DNA in cases in which there are no known suspects, either through in-house capacity building or by outsourcing to accredited private laboratories.” To accomplish this, OJP awarded approximately $28.5 million in funding to 25 states for the analysis of over 24,700 backlogged no-suspect cases during the first year of the Program. We found that measuring the Program’s progress was complicated by the lack of definitive data linking Program funding to trends observed in increased uploads of DNA profiles to NDIS from case evidence. For example, we collected NDIS upload statistics for each of the four grantees we audited to determine how the Program awards affected the number of complete21 21 A profile’s completeness is determined by whether it contains all of the points of information that the FBI requires for an NDIS profile to be considered. Therefore, we only included complete profiles in our productivity calculations. – 10 – profiles that those states were able to upload to NDIS prior to and during the award period. Those statistics are illustrated on the following graph:22 FIGURE 2 Forensic Profiles Uploaded to NDIS 4800 4,308 4400 4000 3,701 3,605 3600 3200 2800 2,503 2400 2094 2000 1,780 1600 1,528 1,334 1,055 1200 890 709 800 688 320 338 400 0 0 0 Ohio 2000 Texas New York 2001 2002 Florida 2003 Source: Program grantees As the figure illustrates, all four of the grantees demonstrated a marked increase in total complete profiles analyzed and uploaded to NDIS after receiving their Program awards. However, since these increases were inclusive of both the no-suspect cases funded by the Program as well as other DNA cases that the laboratories were analyzing with local funding, we cannot conclusively state the extent to which this data establishes that the Program met its mission. For example, it is unclear from the data whether the increase in uploads is due to the Program funding, or whether it is because the laboratory hired, with its own funding, additional staff that helped increase productivity. 22 Ohio did not join NDIS until November 2000 and had a major computer system malfunction in 2001, so no profiles went to NDIS in those years. However, profiles for Ohio uploaded to SDIS from 2000 through 2003 were 136, 558, 1099, and 2084, respectively. – 11 – When considered in conjunction with delays in the drawdown of funding and delays in the upload of profiles, two issues we discuss later in this section, it becomes even more apparent that without better data a concrete determination about the Program’s achievement of its mission is not possible. For example, for those of our four auditees that had not materially drawn down Program funding, we would conclude that the Program did not account for the increase in productivity demonstrated in the previous chart. Untimely Utilization of Program Funds During our audit fieldwork, we noted that many of the grantees had drawn down very little of their award funds, or in some cases had not drawn down any funds at all. As of May 31, 2004, only $11.6 million, or about 41 percent of the $28.5 million awarded from FY 2001 Program funds, had been drawn down by the 25 Program grantees. For the four grantees included in our audit, only $5.9 million of the $13.5 million awarded, or 44 percent, had been drawn down as of the same date. While these awards were made between July 2002 and September 2002, the largest grantee in terms of dollars awarded (Maryland), and two additional grantees (Delaware and Connecticut), had not drawn down any funds as of May 31, 2004. These three grantees received awards totaling nearly $5.3 million. The following chart illustrates the drawdown trends for this Program through May 2004: – 12 – FIGURE 3 Program Funding Drawdowns 28.5 25.7 22.8 20.0 17.1 14.3 11.4 8.6 5.7 2.9 0.0 O ct N 02 ov D 02 ec Ja 02 nFe 03 bM 03 ar Ap 03 r-0 M 3 ay Ju 03 n0 Ju 3 l-0 Au 3 gSe 03 pO 03 ct N 03 ov D 03 ec Ja 03 nFe 04 bM 04 ar Ap 04 r M -04 ay -0 4 (in millions) Dollars Awarded to Grantees October 2002 through May 2004 Date Monthly Drawdowns (All Grantees) Cumulative Drawdowns (All Grantees) While the drawdown amounts are not a definitive indicator of specific grantee Program activities, we believe that drawdowns are an important indicator of overall grantee progress toward the achievement of proposed objectives. For example, the award to the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) in the amount of $5.04 million, with a term of one year, was awarded in September 2002. Yet, as of May 2004, only $500,000 had been drawn down, or less than 10 percent of the award amount. According to grantee officials, multiple reasons accounted for their delayed drawdowns, including the time it took to establish separate contracts with the co-grantees across the state. In many cases, these contracts were not finalized until August 2003, nearly a year after the 1-year award was made. Further, grantee officials in New York stated that amounts drawn down may not be the best indicators of progress actually being made. Because funds may have been spent or obligated, but not yet drawn down, they believed that the amount of funds actually spent and obligated would provide a better gauge. However, as of April 2004, New York reported total funds spent and obligated of $2.2 million, which is still only 45 percent of the total awarded. – 13 – Further, one co-grantee in the state of New York estimated that its program will not be completed until December 2004, or 27 months after the initial 1-year award was made. In another example, the Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS), which had drawn down approximately $2 million of its $3.4 million award as of May 2004, cited delays in initiating contracts with the co-grantees in its state as a reason for delays in expending funds. Further, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), which had drawn down about $2 million of its $2.8 million award, stated that backlogs at its contractor laboratories (i.e., contractor laboratories’ inability to process all the cases it was receiving from various clients, delaying results back to those clients) were preventing it from expending its remaining award funds. The FDLE anticipated completing drawdowns in December 2004. Finally, as of May 2004, the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (Ohio BCI&I) had drawn down approximately $1.4 million of its $2.3 million award. Officials at the Ohio BCI&I cited delays in the submission of no-suspect cases by law enforcement agencies, and the screening of evidence by the laboratory for items that were most likely to produce viable DNA results. In sum, grantee drawdowns are one gauge of the overall progress being made toward achieving grantees’ proposed goals. Program awards were made for an initial period of one year, and the above examples illustrate that many grantees have not made timely progress in completing their proposed programs, and have had to obtain extensions from the NIJ. Not only does this practice hinder the timely achievement of the Program’s overall mission, but obligated funds not being utilized by this Program could have been used by other programs or grantees with more immediate needs for the funding. Profiles Not Uploaded to CODIS An additional factor that affects the overall success of the Program is whether Program-funded profiles are being uploaded to CODIS. During our audit work at various state and local laboratories, we observed that approximately 2,538 of the DNA profiles that had resulted from Programfunded analysis had not been uploaded to CODIS. Specifically, we noted various laboratories in all four grantee states had received back data from their contractor laboratories for cases analyzed by those contractors, but – 14 – that the resultant DNA profiles had not been uploaded to CODIS as of the time we reviewed the data. There is always a delay between when the data is received from a contractor and when it is uploaded by the state to CODIS. This time lag is due to the fact that, after receiving the contractor data, states must address the requirements of the Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories (QAS), effective October 1, 1998, prior to uploading the data to CODIS. The QAS require that a forensic laboratory ensures that the data it receives back from its contractor meets certain quality standards. As part of this, the laboratory must conduct a technical and administrative review for each case analyzed by the contractor. However, as detailed below, grantees varied in their ability to address the QAS requirements in a timely manner. To assess the reasons that might account for our observation of profiles not being uploaded to CODIS, we analyzed data provided by the grantees and co-grantees. As of April 2004, 2,538 profiles from Program-funded cases returned to the grantees had not been uploaded to CODIS. We reviewed the reasons provided by the grantees and co-grantees for this delay and summarized in the following figure.23 23 Due to the unique circumstances regarding the Fort Worth Police Department’s inability to upload profiles to NDIS, we excluded their results from this analysis. This issue is further discussed in Finding II of this report. – 15 – FIGURE 4 Reasons Profiles Were Not Uploaded to CODIS Various Other Technical Reasons 4% Awaiting Data Review 36% No DNA 34% Already in CODIS 1% Mixture* 4% Insufficient Data 9% Only Victim Profile* 12% Source: Program grantees and CODIS reports * “Mixture” refers to profiles that reflect DNA from multiple persons and are too complex to be appropriately included in CODIS. “Only Victim Profile” refers to those profiles where only the victim’s DNA was found on the evidence. Victim DNA profiles are not permitted in NDIS. The most common reason provided for profiles not being uploaded was “Awaiting Data Review.” In its Solicitation for the No Suspect Casework DNA Backlog Reduction Program (FY 2001) (Solicitation), the NIJ required that profiles be “expeditiously uploaded into CODIS.” While no standards or criteria govern how much time grantees are permitted before they should upload analyzed data to CODIS, profiles that have not been uploaded to CODIS cannot be compared and matched to other forensic and offender profiles, limiting the crime-solving benefits that those profiles can have. We further examined this issue for seven grantees and co-grantees. We judgmentally selected 25 cases and, as part of a larger review of those cases, determined the length of time it took to upload the profiles once the DNA results were returned by contractor laboratories for each case where resultant profiles were uploaded. The results of that analysis are summarized as follows: – 16 – FIGURE 5 Average Days for Data Review 200 187 Ohio BCI&I 180 Fort Worth, TX Police Dept 160 140 Jacksonville, FL FDLE Lab 122 120 Palm Beach, FL Sheriff's Office 100 76 80 60 70 68 New York State Police Monroe County, NY Public Safety Lab 40 12 20 Nassau County, NY Medical Examiner 9 0 Source: Grantee case files and CODIS reports These results illustrate the vast differences between the various grantees and co-grantees. For example, the Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office and the Ohio BCI&I were able to conduct the reviews required by the QAS necessary for upload to CODIS within an average of 9 days and 12 days, from the time the analyzed data was returned by the contractor laboratory. However, it took the FDLE’s Jacksonville laboratory and the Fort Worth Police Department24 an average of 187 days and 122 days to conduct these reviews and upload the data to CODIS. Further, we noted many additional cases where data had not been reviewed and profiles had not been uploaded that exceeded the times illustrated above. For example, we noted cases for the FDLE’s laboratories in Jacksonville and Tampa Bay where analysis results were returned by the contractor laboratories in June 2003 and August 2003, but the profiles had not been uploaded to CODIS when we conducted our review in March 2004. 24 The Fort Worth Police Department contracted with the University of Northern Texas for the data review and upload to CODIS. – 17 – We believe that these data review delays are excessive and not in accordance with the intent of the Program. DNA profiles not reviewed cannot be uploaded to CODIS and therefore cannot be linked to other crime-scene evidence or offender profiles, undermining the mission of the Program. The second most common reason, “No DNA,” is the result of insufficient DNA being detected during the screening process of the evidence to yield a viable sample for DNA analysis. This reason is not a problem to be addressed, particularly with old evidence from unsolved crimes, since the DNA present on the evidence may have deteriorated over time and may not be of sufficient quantity to yield a DNA profile. As discussed in the following section, the lack of program goals and objectives, combined with the previously discussed delays in utilizing Program funding and in uploading profiles to CODIS, led us to question whether OJP had established adequate performance measurements to monitor the Program’s progress. Program Goals and Performance Measurements In response to the Government Performance and Results Act, which requires agencies to develop strategic plans that identify their long-range goals and objectives and establish annual plans that set forth corresponding annual goals and indicators of performance, OJP developed one performance measurement for the Program. The stated mission for the Program is “to increase the capacity of state laboratories to process and analyze crime-scene DNA in cases in which there are no known suspects, either through in-house capacity building or by outsourcing to accredited private laboratories.” This mission directly supports the following Department strategic plan goal and objective: • Goal: To prevent and reduce crime and violence by assisting state, tribal, and local community-based programs. • Objective: To improve the crime fighting and criminal justice administration capabilities of state, tribal, and local governments. We reviewed OJP’s progress toward achieving the single performance measurement established for the Program: Number of DNA samples/cases processed in cases where there is no known suspect. For this measurement, – 18 – OJP had set a goal of 24,800 samples/cases for FY 2002. However, due to various factors, including the events of September 11, 2001, disbursement of funding for this Program was delayed and not completed until September 2002, and OJP did not meet this measurement. The Program funded the analysis of 24,738 samples or cases in its first year. According to information provided by the NIJ, only 10,609 cases had been analyzed as of December 31, 2003. In FY 2003 and FY 2004, OJP established goals of 33,850 and 43,000 samples or cases, respectively. Even though the targets established for the Program in FY 2002 were not achieved, we sought to further analyze the established performance measurement as it relates to the Program’s mission. While its mission is to increase the capacity of state laboratories to process and analyze crime-scene DNA in no-suspect cases, the Program’s performance measurement merely tracks no-suspect samples or cases that have been “processed.” We concluded that this measurement does not gauge whether the Program is making progress toward the achievement of its stated mission. In discussing the performance measurement with Program management, they stated that they had attempted to add the following data points to their performance measurement in FY 2003: 1) number of profiles entered into CODIS; 2) number of profiles entered into NDIS; 3) number of investigations aided; and 4) number of cases solved. According to documentation provided by Program management, the OJP’s budget office informed them that they could not make changes to their performance measures since they had already been entered into the "Performance Measurement Table" and been approved. However, while these measurements may have assisted Program management in monitoring certain Program achievements, these revised performance measurements still would not generate the type of data (i.e., laboratory capacity prior to and during the Program) that would allow Program management to track the Program’s progress toward achieving its mission of increasing laboratory capacity. In addition to assessing whether OJP had met the performance measurement it had established, we assessed whether there were other performance measurements that could be established that would provide decision-makers within the Department and Congress information on whether the Program was meeting its goals and mission. We concluded that the Program performance measurement does not address whether the – 19 – Program is aiding in reducing the national backlog of no-suspect casework samples awaiting analysis. While reducing the backlog is not part of the official mission of the Program, monitoring this information would be useful in determining whether Program funding is having a positive effect on the national no-suspect casework backlog, or whether a decrease in the national no-suspect casework backlog has the beneficial effect of increasing laboratory capacity across the country. In a report issued in November 2003, the General Accounting Office (GAO) cited concerns that performance measurements for many NIJ programs, including this Program, were inadequate to assess results.26 The report stated that the Program’s one performance measurement was not outcome-based; rather, it was merely an intermediate measure. GAO recommended that the NIJ reassess the measures used to evaluate the Office of Science and Technology’s progress toward achieving its goals and focus on outcome measures to better assess results where possible. Further, in a prior report issued by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), deficiencies were noted relating to the adequacy of data being collected by OJP to monitor performance measurements for another DNA-related program.27 25 TP PT TP TP PT PT In addition, when we began our audit work in November 2003, we asked Program officials for the goals and objectives established for the Program. OJP officials responded that management personnel for the Program had recently changed, but those officials were unaware of any formal goals and objectives for the Program. In response to our inquiry, OJP officials developed the following goals and objectives for the Program: • Ensure that state and local forensic casework laboratories receive funding to reduce their no-suspect case backlogs; • Make future awards in a timely manner; • Ensure consistency among applicants; 25 Effective July 7, 2004, the General Accounting Office (GAO) became the General Accountability Office. The acronym remains the same. TP PT 26 GAO Report No. 01-198, titled Better Performance Measures Needed to Assess Results of Justice’s Office of Science and Technology, dated November 2003. TP PT 27 The prior OIG audit report, titled The Office of Justice Programs Convicted Offender DNA Sample Backlog Reduction Grant Program, Report No. 02-20, was issued in May 2002. TP PT – 20 – • Ensure funding drawdowns meet program and application goals; • Provide better award monitoring; and • Collect and report accurate statistics and performance measures. In our judgment, none of these goals and objectives allow OJP to assess whether the Program is making progress toward achieving its mission of increasing the capacity of state laboratories to process and analyze no-suspect DNA from crime scenes. Some examples of such goals and objectives could include: 1) To increase grantee laboratory capacity by a certain percentage, and 2) To reduce grantees’ no-suspect backlogs by a certain percentage. Recommendations We recommend that OJP: 1. Develop and implement procedures that will allow Program officials to more closely monitor grantee drawdowns as a means to ensure that adequate progress is being made toward the achievement of each grantee’s goals and objectives. 2. Ensure that timely uploads of Program-funded profiles are performed by all grantees. 3. Develop Program goals and objectives that support the achievement of the Program’s mission of increasing laboratory capacity, and implement a system to track these goals. 4. Develop performance measurements that allow the monitoring of progress toward achieving the Program’s mission, such as monitoring laboratory capacity prior to, during, and at the conclusion of the Program. – 21 – II. Administration and Oversight of the Program We reviewed OJP’s administration and oversight of the Program, and determined that weaknesses existed in three areas: 1) OJP issued second-year Program grants to states that had not drawn down any of their first-year Program grant funds by the time the new awards were issued; 2) the requirements instituted by the Program for contractor laboratories performing no-suspect casework analysis were inconsistent with those required for state and local laboratories performing no-suspect casework analysis; and 3) OJP failed to ensure that the federal funds granted under the Program will benefit the national DNA database. These weaknesses hinder the ability of Program management to maximize Program accomplishments and ensure consistent operational quality of laboratories funded for no-suspect casework analysis. In August 2001, OJP developed and issued Program requirements in the Program Solicitation. The Program Solicitation specified general grant guidelines and restrictions, as well as more specific requirements. Grantees were required to ensure that all analyses of no-suspect cases under the Program complied with the QAS, and that any profiles resulting from these analyses be uploaded expeditiously to CODIS. Further, the grantees were to ensure that their contracting laboratories:28 TP PT • are accredited by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB), or certified by the National Forensic Science Technology Center (NFSTC); • adhere to the most current QAS issued by the FBI Director; • have a Technical Leader located onsite at the laboratory; • provide quality data that can be easily reviewed and uploaded to CODIS; • have the appropriate resources to screen evidence (if applicable); and • only be paid for work that is actually performed. TP 28 PT See Appendix III for further information regarding Program specific requirements. – 22 – We reviewed OJP’s administration and oversight of the Program to determine if grants were made in accordance with applicable legislation, and whether OJP adequately monitored grantee progress and compliance with Program requirements. In addition, we assessed whether the Programspecific requirements instituted by OJP fully supported the Program’s mission. We identified the following weaknesses in OJP’s administration and oversight of the Program. Additional Funds Awarded to Grantees not Drawing Down Initial Funds Timely In FY 2003, OJP awarded grants for the second year of the Program, totaling $10.2 million, to six states that had drawn down none of their initial awards, and to one state (New Mexico) that had drawn down less than 1 percent of its initial award, as of the date the second-year grants were made. The initial awards to these seven states totaled $11.8 million. Further, for six of the seven states, the applications requested funding for purposes that were partially or completely identical to those identified in their initial award application.29 TABLE 3 FY 2003 Program Awards to States Unable to Timely Use FY 2001 Grant Funds 09/05/2002 FY 2003 FY 2001 Award Date Grant Amount $5,048,669 09/24/2003 FY 2003 Grant Amount $2,072,362 New York 09/20/2002 $5,039,535 09/16/2003 $5,482,020 New Mexico 08/13/2002 $550,245 07/11/2003 $674,414 Oklahoma 08/22/2002 $500,000 07/11/2003 $244,500 New Jersey 08/07/2002 $286,805 06/10/2003 $1,272,254 Nebraska 09/10/2002 $226,494 07/11/2003 $125,086 Connecticut 08/05/2002 $117,163 09/10/2003 $346,758 State FY 2001 Award Date Maryland Total $11,768,911 29 $10,217,394 We excluded from this analysis states that had begun to draw down more than trace amounts of their grant funds by the time they were awarded their second-year grant. – 23 – The two largest grantees in the initial award, Maryland and New York, had not drawn down any of their FY 2001 funds when OJP awarded them second-year funding. As shown in the table, both states received their second grant roughly a year after their initial award. Their applications for the second-year funds requested resources to pay for similar transactions as were funded in their initial award. For example, Maryland was funded in FY 2001 for the outsourcing of 3,704 no-suspect cases. Similarly, OJP awarded it funds for the outsourcing of an additional 500 no-suspect cases in the FY 2003 award. In New York, three laboratories (Monroe, Nassau Counties, and the New York State Police) received funding for the outsourcing of cases in both FY 2001 and FY 2003. Oklahoma, Connecticut, and New Jersey also had not drawn down any of their initial awards when they received second-year funding for activities similar to the first year. We noted that New Jersey, in particular, received a significant increase in its second-year grant even though it had failed to establish a pattern of drawing down its first-year Program funds efficiently. According to application documents, New Jersey requested this increase to outsource a significantly larger number of no-suspect cases than was requested in the first year (1,500 no-suspect cases in FY 2003 versus 220 in FY 2001). While these states may have legitimate bases for requesting funding for additional cases, based upon the number of cases in their backlog we question OJP’s awarding additional funds to states that had failed to establish a pattern of drawing down their current Program funds in a timely manner. We noted that although Nebraska had not drawn down any of its initial award at the time it received additional Program funding, unlike the previous states mentioned, Nebraska significantly changed its funding request in its FY 2003 grant application. The initial award was provided to pay for personnel and consultant/contractual agreements so the Omaha Police Department could outsource the analysis of no-suspect cases. The FY 2003 award