Unlock eSignature Lawfulness for Public Relations in the UK

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in the matter of our on the application Seinfeld and Cayden versus secretary of state International Development Lord Coe will explain the judgment of the court the appellant in this appeal are a couple who had been in a long-term and committed relationship one is a man and the other a woman they wish to enter a civil partnership they have a conscientious ideological objection to marriage at present the law does not allow couples of different sexes to contract a civil partnership couples of the same sex however have been permitted to enter such partnerships since their coming into force of the Civil Partnership Act of 2004 now until the 13th of March 2014 same-sex couples were not permitted to marry but with the coming into force of the marriage same-sex couples Act 2013 on that day their 13th of March 2014 same-sex couples have been allowed to marry and many have done so but many have chosen not to since March 2014 for same-sex couples can choose either to enter a civil partnership or to marry that is not possible for a different sex couples they may only marry the appellant claimed that this position discriminates against them contrary to article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and fundamental freedoms taken together with article 8 which is the right to respect for a private and family life and it is now accepted that on the coming into force of the 2013 Act in March 2014 a situation of inequality between same-sex and different sex couples was brought about it is also accepted that the unequal treatment was based on the sexual orientation of the appellant as a different sex cover article 14 of the European Convention provides that the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any of a number of specified Grymes they include sex race color or other status and it's now accepted that sexual orientation qualifies as a ground on which discrimination under article fourteen is forbidden but to have recourse to article fourteen one must show that the complaint of discrimination comes within the ambit of another convention right in this case the discrimination comes within the ambit of article eight the only basis therefore on which the respondent could escape a finding that there has been an infringement of the appellant article fourteen rights is by showing that the unequal treatment was justified by a unanimous decision this Court has decided that the secretary of state has failed to establish justification it had been submitted that the government wanted to have a better sense of high civil partnerships would come to be regarded after same-sex marriage became possible before taking a final decision on the future of that institution and this was the government claimed a legitimate aim of the interference with the appellant rights moreover it claimed that interference required to be considered in its historical context between 2005 on the coming into force of the civil partnership act and 2014 when the marriage same-sex couples are came into force there was no question the government said of discrimination between same-sex and different sex couples both had access to all the rights entitlements and responsibilities that marriage intend the only difference was the gateways to those entitlements that were differently labeled civil partnership on the one hand and marriage and the other so the respondents defense of the appeal proceeded principally on two related but distinct strands the first was that changes in the law in this sensitive area of social policy had been incremental the civil partnership Act had been introduced as a reaction to perceive changes in social attitudes and to address the increasingly recognized anomaly that same-sex couples did not have the opportunity which was available to different sex couples of legal recognition of their commitment to each other with all the benefits that flowed from such their commitment at the time that the civil partnership Act was enacted it was judged by the government and Parliament that's a society as a whole in the United Kingdom was not ready to contemplate extending the institution of marriage to same-sex couples and it was not disputed that that was a judgment which they were entitled to make the second strand of the respondents argument can be described in this way when in 2013 it was decided that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry the government and Parliament were presented with a choice should they do away with civil partnerships for same-sex couples or should there be retained and extended to different sex couples in one view the government suggested they ought to be abolished after all same-sex couples were being placed in precisely the equivalent position as different sex couples and incidentally in none of the countries of the Council of Europe for civil partnerships for same-sex couples were transformed to marriage entitlement had the civil partnership institution been retained this Court did not accept these arguments that are addressing by the legislature of an imbalance which has in which it has come to recognize is one thing the creation of inequality is quite another to be allowed time to reflect on what should be done when one is considering how to deal with an evolving societal attitude is reasonable and understandable but to create as Parliament did a situation of inequality and then ask for the indulgence of time in this case several years as to how that inequality is to be cured is significantly different it's for the government and Parliament to show that it was necessary in order to achieve the aim of having time to consider what to do about the difference in treatment between same-sex and different sex couples brought about by the enactment of the 2013 Act it's for the government of Parliament to show that that was necessary that it was necessary to exclude different sex couples from the Civil Partnership Act and one can understand why the government might have wished to maintain the status quo while considering various options but that is a very far cry from saying that it was necessary to exclude different sex couples from the institution of civil partnership to be legitimate therefore the aim of the interference with the appellant rights must address the perpetration of the unequal treatment or as counsel for the appellant put it the aim must be intrinsically linked to the discriminatory treatment in this case it does not and is not in fact on proper analysis the respondent doesn't seek to justify the difference in treatment between same-sex and different sex couples to the contrary the safety of state accepts that that difference cannot be justified or the sacred state cease is tolerance of the discrimination while it sorts out how to deal with it that cannot be characterized as a legitimate aim the government therefore had to eliminate the inequality of treatment as soon it arose this could have been done either by abolishing civil partnerships or by instantly extending them to different sex couples and if the government had chosen one of those options it might have been theoretically possible then to assemble information which could have influenced its longer-term decisions but that doesn't barricade from the central finding of this court that taking time to evaluate whether to abolish or extend could never amount to a legitimate aim for the continuance of the discrimination the legitimate aim must be connected to the justification for discrimination and plainly time for evaluation does not sound on that it cannot be a legitimate aim for continuing to discriminate it was therefore concluded that the appeal must be allowed and that a declaration should be made at sections 1 & 3 of the Civil Partnership Act to the extent that they preclude a different sex couple from entering into a civil partnership or incompatible with article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights taken in conjunction with article 8 of that Convention the court will now adjourn you