Fill and Sign the Motion for Permission to Proceed Form

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF_________ COUNTY, ____________ NAME OF PLAINTIFF) )) V. )NO.))NAME OF DEFENDANT) )) MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEEDEX PARTE ON APPLICATIONS FOR FUNDS COMES NOW, ________________, by counsel, and moves this Court pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article _______, Sections ________ of the __________ Constitution to proceed ex parte on his applications for funds. In support of his motion, ____________________, states as follows:1. _______________ submits this motion and memorandum to demonstrate that such ex parte proceedings are essential to protect confidential attorney-client communica- tions and attor ney work-product material which must be disclosed to make a showing of need for the requested assistance. Disclo sure of this information would violate ________________ rights to present a de fense, to the effective assistance of counsel, to compul sory process to secure wit- nesses, to con front the evidence against him, to due process, to equal protection of the laws, to freedom from cruel and unusu al punishment, and against compulsory self-incrimination. 2.It is possible to argue that extended discussion of this issue is not merited, since the Supreme Court of __________ has explicitly ordered that such ex parte hearings should be held. In Chester Johnston v. State of __________ , No. 90-N-0271 (May 23, 1990), the Supreme Court faced an interlocutory appeal from Sunflower County where the indigent capital accused asserted his right to present his motions for funds on an ex parte basis. Without even waiting for the State to respond, the Supreme Court entered the following order: DISPOSITION: Johnston's Petition for Permission to Appeal Denied Except to the Limited Extent that the Circuit Court is Directed to Hear the Defendant's Motion Concerning Funds for Expert/Investigative Assistance Ex Parte.(emphasis in original).3.Nevertheless, in case the State argues that this is not one of the rare occasions where the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial overrides the general prohibition against ex parte proceedings, _______ discusses the constitutional rationale underlying such -2- hearings in the pages below:I. SINCE THE PROSECUTION IS ALLOWED TO ENGAGE IN EX PARTE MATTERS, THE DEFENSE SHOULD BE ALLOWED THE SAME RIGHT: WHAT IS SAUCE FOR THE PROVERBIAL GOOSE MUST ALSO BE SAUCE FOR THE PROVERBIAL GANDER.4. Certain parts of the criminal process are carried out ex parte. For example, _________________ has not been consulted by the District Attorney to assist in the decision as to which Assistant District Attorneys should be involved in this case. Neither ________________ nor his counsel was summoned to the grand jury when the prosecu tion was presenting its case for indictment. They were not invited to hear the testimony, cross-examine any of the witnesses or make any statements to assist the grand jurors in their deliberations. To this day, the proceedings before the grand jury remain a secret. 5. Nor has __________________ or his counsel been asked to help the prosecution determine which investigators to use or what experts to employ in the prosecution of the case against her. Similarly, an applica tion for an arrest or search warrant is usually presented to a judicial officer ex parte without notification to the accused or his counsel. Certain interests of the criminal justice system are served by these ex parte proceedings involving the prosecution function. 6. Where the prosecution may partake of ex parte proceedings without making disclosures to the defense, it is not just the logic of an aphorism which compels the conclu sion that the defense may do the same: "the Due Process Clause . . . forbids enforcement of . . . rules unless reciprocal rights are given to criminal defendants." Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472, 93 S. Ct. 2208, 37 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1973). 7.Indeed, it is now well established that ex parte proceed ings relating to the defense function are equally essential to protect a number of important constitutional rights of an indigent ac cused as well as other vital interests of the criminal justice system. In this motion and memorandum, __________________ will review the circumstances, principles and precedents, which require ex parte applications and proceedings.II. EX PARTE PROCEEDINGS ARE INDISPENSABLE TO THE PROPER -3- FUNCTIONING OF THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM AND TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED.8.It is now well established that when a state brings its judi- cial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal case "it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense." Almond v. State, 180 Ga. App. 475, 349 S.E.2d 482, 485-86 (1986) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1985)). In Ake, the United States Supreme Court held that where the assistance of an expert is needed to prepare to present a defense, an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to the services of an independent expert at state expense: [When a] question . . . [is] likely to be a significant factor in his defense . . . [the defendant is] entitled to the assistance of [an expert] on this issue and the denial of that assistance deprive[s] him of due process.470 U.S. at 86-87. Ake involved the denial of an independent psychiatrist in a capital case, which presented issues of insanity and future dangerousness. In analyzing under what circumstances expert assistance is constitutionally required, the Court explicitly held that a showing of need was to be made ex parte: When the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent . . . . [The State must [then], at a mini mum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.Id. at 82-83 (emphasis added). 9.Every court, which has considered the issue, has deter- mined that such hearings should be held on an ex parte basis. See, e.g., Johnston v. State, __________ Supreme Court Order, No. 90- M-0271 (May 23, 199O); McGregor v. State , 733 P.2d 416, 416- 17 (Okl. Cr. 1987), conviction rev'd after remand, 754 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Okla. Cr. 1988) (intention of Ake majority that hearings be held ex parte is "manifest"); Brooks v. State, 385 S.E.2d 81, 82-84 (Ga. 1989); People v. Loyer, 169 Mich. App. 105, 425 N.W.2d 714, 721-22 (1989); State v. Hickey, 346 S.E.2d 646, 654 (N.C. 1986) (dicta); State v. Poulsen, 45 Wash. App. 706, 726 P. 2d 10361038 (1986) (dicta ); Wall v. State, 289 Ark. 570, 715 S.W.2d 208, 209 (1986) (dicta); People v. Thornton, 80 Mich. App. 746, -4- 265 N.W.2d 35, 38-39 (1978) (dicta); Lindsey v. State, 330 S.E.2d 563, 566 (Ga. 1985) (findings of Ake expert privileged to defendant). Other jurisdictions have preserved the constitutional rights of the accused through a statute, which expressly allows ex parte applications to the trial judge. See, e.g. Minn. Stat. 611.21 (1982); Nev. Rev. Stat. 7.135 (1983); N.Y. County Law 722-C (McKinney Supp. 1984-85); Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-4508 (Supp. 1981); Tenn. Code Ann. 40-14-207 (1988); Cal. Pen. Code 987.9 (1983) (allowing an ex parte hearing before a different judge than the trial judge to preserve the accused's right). No reported decision of any appellate court has held that the constitution does not require such ex parte hearings. 10.In the following sections, we first demonstrate that because of the showing, which a defendant is required to make to secure specific expert assistance, and because of the nature of the services sought, disclosure to the prosecution would be prejudicial to the defense and thus requires ex parte consider ation. We then discuss the various constitutional guarantees that would be violated by such disclosure. (a) The nature and scope of the request requires that the application be made ex parte .11.The Supreme Court's decision in Ake was based on its recognition that to deny an indigent accused basic, critical expert assistance while the State may utilize the services of virtually any expert of its choosing would render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair. The truth finding function of the adversary process would also be lost if the prosecution were allowed simply to overwhelm the impoverished defendant with the wealth of its resources: We recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and that a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense. . . . [This Court] has often reaffirmed that funda- mental fairness entitles indigent defendants to "an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary system."470 U.S. at 77 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974)). Due process and fundamental fairness thus forbid the State from "legitimately assert[ing] an interest in maintenance of a strategic advantage over the defense, if the result of that advantage is to cast a pall on the accuracy of the -5- verdict obtained." Ake , 470 U.S. at 79.12. However, Ake provides that an indigent defendant is entitled to defense services at state expense only upon a threshold showing that such assistance is required to deal with a significant factor in the defense of the case. Ake, 470 U.S. at 86-87. See also Caldwell v. __________, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1985) (defendant must support request for investigator and fingerprint and ballistics experts with something more than general statement of need). In order to demonstrate his entitlement to an expert or investigative assistance, the defendant must reveal to the court the theory of the defense, the results of any investigation and witness consultation that has already taken place and other work product, and the information that is anticipated from the services sought. Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 710-12 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Messer v. Kemp , 831 F.2d 946 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc). Obviously, of necessity, this showing must require disclosure of information obtained in attorney-client interviews. 13. Such discovery is expressly forbidden by Rule 4.06, which provides that the trial court may not order disclosure of "records, correspondence, reports, or memoranda to the extent that they contain the opinions, theories or conclu sions of the . . . defense attorney or members of legal staff." Miss. Unif. Crim. R. Cir. Ct. 4.06 (b) (1). Even without the clear rule that we already have, ___________________ adversary, the District Attorney, should have no more right to disclosure of the intimate attorney-client discussions which precede the development of the defense strategy than __________________ should have a voice in what police officers investigate his case or how the prosecution plans to develop its case. (b) The Equal Protection Clause forbids requiring indigent defendants to disclose his defense to secure the expert assistance which would be readily available to a defendant of means without any disclosures.14. The United States Supreme Court has long since recog- nized that "[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891 (1956). To the contrary, "all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17. In analyzing whether the prosecution -6- may attend ____________________ applications of funds, it must be borne in mind that were ____________________ financially independent he would obtain investigative and other services without informing the prosecution of whose assistance he was seeking or why. Penalizing the impoverished defendants by requiring them to announce privileged information and their trial strategy, as a prerequisite to inves tigating and presenting a defense would obviously constitute invidious discrimination. See United States v. Tate, 419 F.2d 131, 132 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 716 (5th Cir. 1973) (Wisdom, J., con- curring); State v. Hamilton, 448 So.2d 1007, 1008-09 (Fla. 1984). 15. In Blazo v. Superior Court, 315 N.E.2d 857 (Mass. 1974), the court held that "[the reason ex parte application is allowed is that, just as a defendant able to foot the costs need not explain to anyone his reasons for summoning a given witness, so an impecunious defen dant should be able to summon his witnesses without explana tion that will reach the adversary." Id. at 860 n.8. This, as the court held in People v. Loyer, 169 Mich. App. 105, 425 N.W.2d 714 (1989): potentially exposes defendant's defense to prosecutorial review when a monied defendant's defense would remain inviolate. * * * When such an advantage is to be reaped by the pros ecution only when the defendant is poor and therefore cannot afford to pay the . . . fees of his witnesses, it seems undeniable to us that such a defendant is not the recipient of equal justice under law.Id. at 722.16. In federal prosecutions, a defendant is protected by express statutory provisions in the Criminal Justice Act which require that an indigent's request for expert assistance be considered ex parte . See 18 U.S.C. 3006A (e); Fed. R. Crim. P. 17 (b). See also H.R.Rep. No. 864, 88th Cong., 2d Sess (1963) reprinted in 2 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 2990 (1964) (Criminal Justice Act's ex parte procedure "prevents the possibility that an open hearing may cause a defen dant to reveal his defense"); S.Rep. No. 346, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963) (ex parte require ment included in Criminal Justice Act "in order to protect the accused from pre- mature disclosure of his case."). Judicial interpretations of the ex parte requirement have made clear that its function is to protect the accused from having to make premature disclosure of confidential information to the State, the kind of disclosure which would not have to be made by a defendant of means. 17. As the Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Meriwether, -7- 486 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 948 (1974):When an indigent defendant's case is subjected to pre-trial scrutiny by the prose cutor, while the monied defendant is able to proceed without such scrutiny, serious equal protection questions are raised.See also United States v. Holden , 393 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1968). In Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1970), the court overturned a conviction when the accused was subject to an adversarial rather than ex parte hearing on his need for investi- gative aid, observing that "the manifest purpose of requiring that the inquiry be ex parte is to insure that the defendant will not have to make a premature disclosure of his case." Id. at 1318; see also Williams v. United States, 310 A.2d 244 (D.C. App. 1973) (purpose of ex parte hearing is to ensure that defendant need not make premature disclosure of case in order to obtain access to expert services); Gaither v. United States, 391 A.2d 1364, 1367 n.4 (D.C. App. 1978) (eligibility and need for defense service must be determined in ex parte proceeding to afford accused opportunity to present request without prematurely disclosing merits of defense to prosecution); United States v. Sutton, 464 F.2d 552, 553 (5th Cir. 1972). (c) The denial of an ex parte hearing on an applica- tion for funds would force an indigent defendant to disclose matters without reciprocal disclosure by the prosecution, in violation of the Due Process Clause.18. It is one thing to require the defense to submit reciprocal discovery pursuant to Rule 4.06. Such rules are reciprocal and, therefore, constitutional. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 26 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1970). However, "the Due Process Clause . . . forbids enforcement of [discovery] rules unless reciprocal rights are given to criminal defendants." Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472, 93 S. Ct. 2208, 37 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1973). 19. What are the limits of the prosecution's discovery obligation? The prosecution is bound by Rule 4.06 to disclose the names and addresses of all witnesses in chief who will be called at trial, as well as a copy of crime lab reports on the examination of physical evidence. Miss. Unif. Crim. R. Cir. Ct. 4.06 (a) (1), (4). However, the trial court is expressly forbidden from ordering disclosure of "records, correspondence, reports, or memoranda to the extent that they contain the opinions, theories or conclusions of the prosecuting . . . attorney or members of legal staff." Id. at (b)(1). It would be just such a disclosure that would be required of the defense, absent permission to proceed ex parte on applications for funds. -8- 20. It is important to note that the application for funds will come in the early stages of the development of the proposed defense. The right identified in Ake is to funds for "the assistance of a competent [expert] in preparing the defense." Lindsey v. State, 330 S.E.2d 563, 566 (Ga. 1985) (emphasis supplied). The expert's "services embrace pretrial and trial assistance to the defense, as well as potential testimony." United States v. Bass , 477 F.2d 723, 725-26 (9th Cir. 1973). In order to show why such assistance in preparation will be necessary, the defense will be asked to disclose more than the results of whatever expert testing is done: The defense must show how such testing fits into the plan of defense. As stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, proceeding must be held ex parte because "[dis- semination of information critical to the defense permits the government to enjoy unauthorized discovery which is forbidden under our concept of criminal procedure . . . ." United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154, 1162 (5th Cir. 1974); see also United States v. Greschner, 802 F.2d 373, 379-80 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908 (1987) (although waived by defense, court of appeals notes on its own motion that it was error for trial court to allow government attorneys to attend hearing on application for penologist, pathologist, bloodtests and subpoenas at which defendants were required to disclose their theory of self-defense in support of their applica tions); United States v. Meriwether, 486 F.2d 498, 506 (5th Cir. 1973) (intent of ex parte provision is to shield theory of defense from prosecutor's scrutiny). 21. The same considerations apply with even greater force to this capital prosecution. To require ______________ to disclose the nature of his defense, the names of persons with whom he seeks to consult, and the purposes for which he seeks such assis- tance would compromise his right to present a defense and to prepare his case in confidence with counsel.(d) Applications for defense expenses must be made on an ex parte basis to protect the Accused's right to counsel.22.As the Supreme Court observed in Ake, the appointment of an expert may be necessary to help the accused gather facts, advise counsel on how to question opposing witnesses and interpret their answers, and generally "__________l" his defense. Id., 470 U.S. at 80. To provide effective assistance an attorney must adequately investigate and prepare his or her client's case. Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 (11th Cir. 1982) (at heart of effective -9- representation is independent duty to investigate and prepare); see also McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 217 (8th Cir. 1974) (attorney who does not seek out all facts relevant to client’s case will not be prepared at trial). Where investiga tive and other services are necessary to the preparation and presentation of an adequate defense, the denial of access to those services may also deprive a defendant of the minimally effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Blake v. Kemp , 758 F.2d 523, 531 (11th Cir. 1985); Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383, 1396 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Mason v. Arizona , 504 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936 (1975) (failure to provide investigative assistance when necessary to defense constitutes ineffective performance). 23. _______________________ counsel will not be prepared to rebut the State's evidence without meaningful consultation with experts for the defense. Nor can counsel appropriately investigate aspects of their client's case without the type of assistance that any attorney would obtain for a financially able defendant. Such assistance is essential for proper functioning of the adversary system, in which it is rarely justifiable that one party have exclusive access to the means of understanding, presenting, and explaining relevant facts: [The defense] expert fills a different role. He supplies expert services "necessary to an adequate defense," which embraces pre- trial and trial assistance to the defense as well as availability to testify. His conclu sions need not be reported to either the court or the prosecution.United States v. Theriault , 440 F.2d 713, 715 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 984 (1973); see also United States v. Bass 477 F.2d 723, 725-26 (9th Cir. 1973) (expert may be partisan witness whose services include pretrial and trial assistance to the defense); Ford v. Wainwright , 477 U.S. 399, 414, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 91 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1986) ("without any adversarial assistance from the [defendant's] representative . . . the fact finder loses the substantial benefit of potentially proba tive information"). 24.The expert appointed pursuant to Ake is expected to "assist the defense by aiding defense counsel in the cross- examination and rebuttal of the state's . . . experts," and thereby protect his Sixth Amendment right to confront the evidence against him. Lindsey v. State, 330 S.E.2d 563, 567 (Ga. 1985); see also United States v. Fessel, 781 F.2d 826, 834 (10th Cir. 1986) (services of expert -10- appointed in ex parte proceeding include those necessary for cross- examination of government witnesses as well as presentation of defense expertise). Thus, "[j]ust as an indigent defendant has a right to appointed counsel to serve him as a loyal advocate he has a similar right under properly proven circumstances to investigative aid that will serve him unfettered by an inescapable conflict of interest." United States v. Marshall, 423 F.2d 1315, 1319 (10th Cir. 1970) (error to deny ex parte hearing on need for investigative assistance, and appointment of F.B.I. agent cannot suffice to satisfy request). 25.The failure to allow ex parte applications for assistance would inevitably deprive ______________________ of the benefit of effective counsel such as a non-indigent defendant might expect to receive. Counsel will be forced either to forgo an application for assistance in order to keep attorney-client communications, work-product and trial strategy confidential or make the needed re- quest, breach his duty of confidentiality and prematurely reveal matters no competent attorney would disclose prior to trial. See State v. Hamilton, 448 So.2d 1007, 1008-09 (Fla. 1984) (basis for request for expert founded on communications between lawyer and client; inquiry into basis would violate attorney -client privilege). An ex parte procedure obviates the need for such an untenable choice. In contrast, it would be error for this Court to give the State a voice in deciding whether __________________ was enti- tled to certain investigators or expert witnesses or in determining who should provide that assistance. (e) Applications for defense expenses must be ex parte to protect ___________________'s right to freedom from self-incrimination.26. Ex parte proceedings on the need for defense assistance are necessary to protect ___________________'s right to freedom from self-incrimina tion. The privilege against self-incrimination is secured only when a criminal defendant has the right "to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty ... for such silence." Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1981) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964)). If _________________ or his attorney is compelled to disclose confidential facts in order to obtain financial assistance, the defendant surely cannot be said to have exercised his own will. Nor can the failure to justify the request for aid be deemed anything but a penalty for silence. -11- 27. This was made abundantly clear in Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1970). The defendant in that case was compelled to justify his need for investigative assistance before the prosecuting attorney. As a result, the State was able to locate a witness of whom it had previously been unaware who then testified against the defendant. In reversing the conviction, the court emphasized: Certainly the movant cannot be said to "waive" disclosure of his case and his concomitant rights against self-incrimination and to due process by [requesting services] . . . [That request cannot] be used . . . as a means of frustrating the fifth amendment right prohibiting self-incrimination. Id. at 1318-19. __________________ cannot be called on to sacrifice one set of constitutional rights in order to receive the benefit of another. Bordenkircher v. Hayes , 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); see also State v. Armstead, 152 Ga. App. 56, 262 S.E.2d 233 (1979). His motions for the "raw materials integral" to his defense must be considered ex parte. (f) The involvement of the Executive Arm--the District Attorney--in decisions which are fundamentally Judicial in nature violates the Separation of Powers doctrine.28. The authority of the judiciary cannot not be curtailed by any other branch, just as "the whole of the legislative power has been vested in the legislature . . . [and] the whole of the executive power has been vested in a separate and distinct [executive] department of our government. . . ." Alexan der v. State by and through Allain, 441 So.2d 1329, 1339 (Miss. 1983); accord Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So.2d 332, 342-43 (Miss. 1987). One facet of the doctrine of Separation of Powers is that there may be no confusion of power and authority between the branches of the government. As a member of the judicial branch, a judge may not mix and match authority as a deputy sheriff--a member of the Executive branch. Vaughn v. State, 160 Ga. App. 283, 284, 287 S.E.2d 277, 288 (1981). A judge may not discuss "strategy" with a prosecutor--another member of the Executive branch. State v. Guhl, 140 Ga. App. 23, 230 S.E.2d 22 (1976); see also Thomason v. State, 148 Ga. App. 513, 251 S.E.2d 598 (1978); McAllister v. State, 157 Ga. App. 158, 276 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1981). Indeed, the authority of the judiciary may not be usurped even in part by another branch of government even where there is "a laudable purpose" for doing so. Glenn v. Her ring, 415 So.2d 695, 696 (Miss. 1982) (legislature cannot tell trial judges to render an opinion within six months). -12- 29. As Ake makes clear, it is one of the court's functions to determine whether funds will be allowed for expert assistance in a capital case. The granting of funds is an obvious attribute of the judicial authority, for it "is the duty of this Court to assure such financing so its agencies can discharge the 'jurisdiction and lawful powers as are necessary to conduct a proper and speedy disposition of any complaint'. . . ." In the Matter of the __________ State Bar, 361 So.2d 503, 506 (Miss. 1978). For the reasons stated herein, __________________ is entitled to proceed ex parte, with a sealed record, in his applications for the funds necessary for his defense. Respectfully submitted, ________________________________________ Attorney for Defendant CERTIFICATE I, ________________, do hereby certify that I have on this day delivered, by hand, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to __________________. This _____ day of _________, _____. ____________________ -13- ____________________