Fill and Sign the Business Insurance Forms

EUROPEAN ECONOMY Economi cPaper s302|F ebr uar y2008 Eur ope a ne c onomi ca ndmone t a r yi nt e gr a t i on a ndt heopt i mum c ur r e nc ya r e at he or y Fr a nc e s c oPa ol oMonge l l i EUROPEANCOMMI SSI ON EMU@10 Research In May 2008, it will be ten years since the final decision to move to the third and final stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and the decision on which countries would be the first to introduce the euro. To mark this anniversary, the Commission is undertaking a strategic review of EMU. This paper constitutes part of the research that was either conducted or financed by the Commission as source material for the review. Economic Papers are written by the Staff of the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, or by experts working in association with them. The Papers are intended to increase awareness of the technical work being done by staff and to seek comments and suggestions for further analysis. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not necessarily correspond to those of the European Commission. Comments and enquiries should be addressed to: European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Publications B-1049 Brussels Belgium E-mail: Ecfin-Info@ec.europa.eu This paper exists in English only and can be downloaded from the website http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications A great deal of additional information is available on the Internet. It can be accessed through the Europa server (http://europa.eu) ISBN 978-92-79-08227-6 doi: 10.2765/3306 © European Communities, 2008 European Economic and Monetary Integration, and the Optimum Currency Area Theory Francesco Paolo Mongelli (ECB)∗ Abstract: This essay follows the synergies and complementarities between European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the optimum currency area (OCA) theory. Various advancements in economic theory and econometrics have made it possible to progress from the “early OCA theory” to a “new OCA theory”. The balance of judgements has shifted in favour of monetary union: it is deemed to generate fewer costs and there is more emphasis on benefits. The “endogeneity of OCA” has further strengthened this consideration. Yet there is still no simple OCA test. When EMU made the leap to the Maastricht Treaty, the OCA theory could not deliver clear policy guidance. Plans for EMU went ahead as a follow-up of the Single Market Programme (SMP) with only limited direct input from the OCA theory. The main concern was to remove the risks of destabilising exchange rate volatilities and misalignments that had disrupted the European Monetary System (EMS) on several occasions. While plans for EMU were advancing, it became apparent that several (future) euro area countries were still faring poorly under some OCA properties and concerns about “Eurosclerosis” emerged. The implications for EMU were cautionary. Over the last 10 to 15 years initiatives promoting structural reforms have been at the centre of policy-making (e.g. the Lisbon Agenda). Hence, under the surface the OCA theory was being heeded, and European countries were tackling their structural weaknesses. We can almost talk of an OCA theory in reverse. If we look at the broad governance structure of EMU there may be an “exogeneity of OCA”. So here we are: with the benefit of eight years of hindsight, what can we say about the functioning of EMU thus far? Can we also say something more about its various benefits and costs? JEL classification: E42, F15, F33 and F41. Keyword: Optimum currency area, economic and monetary integration, international monetary arrangements, EMU ∗ This essay is dedicated to W. Max Corden, who posed many of the difficult questions on monetary integration. I would like to thank Manfred Kremer, Hedwig Ongena, Ivo Maes, João Nogueira Martins, Chiara Osbat, Lina Bukeviciute, Malin Andersson, Luca Onorante, Tobias Blattner and Maurizio Habib for their various contributions and Juliette Cuvry for her assistance. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the DG ECFIN and BEPA workshop on “EMU@10: Achievements and Challenges” that was held in Brussels on 26-27 November 2007. I take full responsibility for any errors and omissions. The views expressed are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB. “EMU will have a very pervasive impact on the working of the economy. Many different mechanisms will come into play and interact.” “One Market, One Money” (1990) 1. Introduction The call for this conference noted that the “fixing of the irrevocable conversion rates to the euro for the currencies of eleven EU countries on 31 December 1998 created laboratory conditions for examining the importance of various concerns about monetary unification, one of which being whether the countries joining in the euro did form an optimum currency area (OCA)”. Furthermore, “early work suggested that the European countries might not have scored very highly on all OCA criteria. Yet, the successful establishment of economic and monetary union (EMU) suggests that the conventional OCA theory may not account fully for the net benefits deriving from currency unions”. A lot runs through these lines. The analogy of EMU with a laboratory is tempting, and we show that we are dealing with a very busy laboratory. In fact, over the last 50 years diverse forces and processes have been at work. First, European monetary integration has been part of the broader process of economic and financial integration. Second, European integration is a political process. The importance of the political origins, motivations and consequences of European integration cannot be overemphasised. Third, economic, financial and monetary integration has evolved gradually over a long period, and is still evolving. All along, national economies have needed to adjust to the changing market structures but also institutional setting. Fourth, the advancement of European integration has proceeded hand in hand with the advancements of economic theory: the synergies and complementarities with the OCA theory are an example. The essay is organised as follows. Section 2 revisits the OCA theory and the various OCA properties that would support the launch of a single currency and ensure that the benefits from monetary integration exceed the costs. Section 3 reviews the path to European monetary integration. Despite the similarity in terms of goal, the issue of establishing EMU is different from the OCA issue. The EMU issue has more dimensions and facets. In Section 4 we look at various aspects of the functioning of EMU, including: the working of the real interest channel, the risk of pro-cyclicality of fiscal policies, the changes in competitiveness within the euro area, the relationship between EMU and the drive towards structural reforms, the central role played by financial integration for the functioning of monetary unions and the impact of the euro on specialisation. Section 5 provides some insight into the main benefits and costs of the euro. Section 6 makes some final remarks. “The OCA theory is back. Once dismissed as a "dead-end problem" with little practical significance…the issue has been resuscitated and re-thought” George Tavlas (1993) 2. The evolving optimum currency area theory Almost 50 years have passed since the founding of the optimum currency area (OCA) theory thanks to the seminal contributions of, among others, Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). Several other important contributions followed suit highlighting a wide range of OCA properties that are desirable features for economies wanting to share a single currency. All of these properties are still central in the debate on monetary integration. This section presents the main elements of the OCA theory, lays out its main weaknesses and limitations, and outlines some “meta” OCA properties and the “endogeneity of OCA”. 1 The main elements of the OCA theory An optimum currency area (OCA) can be defined as the optimal geographical area for a single currency, or for several currencies, whose exchange rates are irrevocably pegged. The single currency, or the pegged currencies, fluctuate jointly vis-à-vis other currencies. The borders of an OCA are defined by the sovereign countries choosing to participate in the currency area. Optimality is defined in terms of various OCA properties, such as price and wage flexibility, financial integration, etc., as listed in Box 2.1 below. Some other “meta” properties, looking at the similarity of shocks and monetary transmission mechanisms, surfaced later. Sharing these OCA properties reduces the usefulness of nominal exchange rate adjustments within the currency area by lessening the impact of some types of shocks or facilitating their adjustment thereafter. Countries forming a currency area expect benefits to exceed costs (see Section 5). Box 2.1. The OCA properties (I): the seminal contributions The literature on the OCA theory came to light in the early 1960s: a period characterised inter alia by the Bretton Woods fixed (but adjustable) exchange rate regime, capital controls in many countries and the incipient process of European integration. Various OCA properties – also called “prerequisites,” “characteristics,” “ criterion” or “criteria” by some authors – emerged from the debate on the merits of fixed versus flexible exchange rate regimes, and also the comparison of several features of the US and European economies. They constitute the “early OCA theory”. a. Price and wage flexibility. When nominal prices and wages are flexible between and within countries contemplating a single currency, the transition towards adjustment following a shock is less likely to be associated with sustained unemployment in one country and/or inflation in another. This will in turn diminish the need for nominal exchange rate adjustments (Friedman (1953)). Alternatively, if nominal prices and wages are downward rigid some measure of real flexibility could be achieved by means of exchange rate adjustments. In this case the loss of direct control over the nominal exchange rate instrument represents a cost (Kawai (1987)). b. Mobility of factors of production including labour. High factor market integration within a group of partner countries can reduce the need to alter real factor prices and the nominal exchange rate between countries in response to disturbances (Mundell (1961)). Trade theory has long established that the mobility of factors of production enhances both efficiency and welfare. Such mobility is likely to be modest in the very short run and could display its effect over time. The mobility of factors of production is limited by the pace at which direct investment can be generated by one country and absorbed by another. Similarly, labour mobility is likely to be low in the short run, due to significant costs, such as for migration and retraining. Mobility, however, may increase in the medium and long run, easing the adjustment to permanent shocks. c. Financial market integration. Ingram (1962) noted that financial integration can reduce the need for exchange rate adjustments. It may cushion temporary adverse disturbances through capital inflows – e.g. by borrowing from surplus areas or decumulating net foreign assets that can be reverted when the shock is over. With a high degree of financial integration even modest changes in interest rates would elicit equilibrating capital movements across partner countries. This would reduce differences in long-term interest rates, easing the financing of external imbalances but also fostering an efficient allocation of resources. Financial integration is not a substitute for a permanent adjustment when necessary: in this case, it can only smooth this process. Temporary financial flows may induce a postponement of real adjustment and render it more difficult at a later stage. Some authors also warn that financial integration might lead to destabilising capital movements. 2 McKinnon (2004) analyses in depth the implications of a second seminal contribution by Mundell (1973) discussing the role of financial integration, in the form of cross-country asset holding, for international risk-sharing. Countries sharing a single currency can mitigate the effects of asymmetric shocks by diversifying their income sources,. This can operate through income insurance when a country’s residents hold claims to dividends, interests and rental revenue from other countries. Such ex ante insurance allows the smoothing of both temporary and permanent shocks as long as output is imperfectly correlated. Country’s residents can also adjust their wealth portfolio – e.g. in response to income fluctuations -- by buying and selling assets and borrowing and lending on international credit markets: an ex post adjustment. A corollary of this argument is that similarity of shocks is not a strict prerequisite for sharing a single currency if all members of the currency area are financially integrated and hold claims on each other’s output. In many ways some speak of a Mundell I versus a Mundell II positive and normative approach to EMU. The latter point has important implications for the debate on monetary integration: a new currency could be shared by countries subject to asymmetric shocks as long as they “insure” one another through private financial markets. This explains the emphasis on the need to strengthen financial integration in the subsequent literature. d. The degree of economic openness. The higher the degree of openness, the more changes in international prices of tradables are likely to be transmitted to the domestic cost of living. This would in turn reduce the potential for money and/or exchange rate illusion by wage earners (McKinnon (1963). Also, a devaluation would be more rapidly transmitted to the price of tradables and the cost of living, negating its intended effects. Hence the nominal exchange rate would be less useful as an adjustment instrument. Economic openness needs to be assessed along several dimensions, including the overall openness of a country to trade with the world; the degree of openness vis-à-vis the countries with which it intends to share a single currency; the share of tradable versus non-tradable goods and services in production and consumption; and the marginal propensity to import. These dimensions of openness overlap but are not synonymous. Later work showed that monetary integration catalyses further openness: i.e., the “endogeneity of OCA”. e. The diversification in production and consumption. High diversification in production and consumption, such as the “portfolio of jobs”, and correspondingly in imports and exports, dilutes the possible impact of shocks specific to any particular sector. Therefore, diversification reduces the need for changes in the terms of trade via the nominal exchange rate and provides “insulation” against a variety of disturbances (Kenen (1969). Highly diversified partner countries are more likely to incur reduced costs as a result of forsaking nominal exchange rate changes between them and find a single currency beneficial. f. Similarities of inflation rates. External imbalances can arise also from persistent differences in national inflation rates resulting from differences in: structural developments, labour market, economic policies, and social preferences (such as inflation aversion). Fleming (1971) notes that when inflation rates between countries are low and similar over time, terms of trade will also remain fairly stable. This will foster more equilibrated current account transactions and trade, reducing the need for nominal exchange rate adjustments. g. Fiscal integration. Countries sharing a supranational fiscal transfer system to redistribute funds to a member country affected by an adverse asymmetric shock would also be facilitated in the adjustment to such shocks and might require less nominal exchange rate adjustments (Kenen (1969). However, this would require an advanced degree of political integration and willingness to undertake such risk-sharing. h. Political integration. The political will to integrate is regarded by some as among the most important condition for sharing a single currency (Mintz (1970). Political will fosters compliance with joint commitments, sustains cooperation on various economic policies, and encourages more institutional linkages. Haberler (1970) stresses that a similarity of policy attitudes among partner countries is relevant in turning a group of countries into a successful currency area. Tower and Willett (1976) add that for a successful OCA, policy-makers need to trade-off between objectives. 3 Weaknesses and limitations of the OCA theory After the “early OCA theory” was completely mapped out, several weaknesses and limitations started emerging. Others emerged over time and are decades apart. We list them here for presentational convenience. a. Robson (1987) notes how several OCA properties are difficult to measure unambiguously. b. OCA properties are also difficult to evaluate against each other: i.e. the OCA theory as a whole lacked a unifying framework. One could still end up drawing different borders for a currency area by referring to different OCA properties. Tavlas (1994) calls this the “problem of inconclusiveness”, as OCA properties may point in different directions: for example, a country might be quite open in terms of reciprocal trade with a group of partner countries indicating that a fixed exchange rate regime is preferable, or even monetary integration, with its main trading partners. However, the same country might display a low mobility of factors of production, including labour, vis-à-vis these trading partners, suggesting instead that a flexible exchange rate arrangement might be desirable. c. Tavlas (1994) also observes that there can be a “problem of inconsistency”. For example, small economies, which are generally more open, should preferably adopt a fixed exchange rate, or even integrate monetarily, with their main partners following the openness property. However, the same small economies are more likely to be less differentiated in production than larger ones. In this case they would be better candidates for flexible exchange rates according to the diversification in production property. Conversely, McKinnon (1969) notes that more differentiated economies are generally larger and have smaller trade sectors. d. After the seminal contributions on the diverse OCA properties, the analytical framework behind the OCA theory started weakening (see next sub-section): all its main tenets were called into question by new theoretical and empirical advancements. Tavlas (1993) notes that from the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s “the subject [OCA theory] was for years consigned to intellectual limbo”. Economists and policy-makers looking at the OCA theory could not find clear answers to the question as to whether Europe should proceed towards complete monetary integration, and which countries would be fit to join. e. The “One Market, One Money” report by Emerson et al. (1992) points out that “there is no ready-to-use theory for assessing the costs and benefits of economic and monetary union”. The OCA theory has, in their view, provided important early insights but offers only a narrow and outdated analytical framework to define the optimum economic and monetary competencies of a given “area” such as the EU: i.e., it is unable to tell which countries should share a single currency. The latter EMU question is more complex than the OCA question. f. Studies investigating OCA properties are by necessity backward-looking. They cannot reflect a change in policy preferences, or a switch in policy regime such as monetary unification. Instead, in the second half of the 1990s, several authors started raising the issue of the endogenous effects of monetary integration: i.e., whether sharing a single currency may set in motion forces bringing countries closer together. This is the “endogeneity of OCA” that is discussed in Section 2.5, but also the “exogeneity of OCA” in Section 3.5. The intuition is that a single currency sets in motion some virtuous processes increasing the integration of euro area countries over time, thereby improving the rating of one or more OCA properties. g. While most OCA studies are applied to sovereign countries, OCAs may not correspond to national frontiers. Due to non-homogeneities within countries the analysis among groups of countries is not always informative (see Ishiyama (1975) and Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro 4 (2002) for a more recent discussion). In fact, several OCA properties have also been investigated at the intra-national level, i.e. “regions” within sovereign countries: e.g. the US States, German Länders, Spanish provinces or Italian regions (see Obstfeld and Peri (1998)) and Boldrin and Canova (2001). Such “regions” lack the nominal devaluation option that is a privilege of sovereign countries and have to rely on other adjustment mechanisms. h. The discussion of the benefits and costs from sharing a single currency by many authors was incomplete at best, and quite vague and hazy at worst. This is a subject with ill-defined contours and boundaries which is perplexing given that after all countries share sovereignty over a single currency and monetary policy in expectation of positive net benefits. We shall mention some of the exceptions later in the essay. i. With hindsight the early OCA theory could not have predicted the growing importance of services in post-industrialised economies. The services sector is by its nature more diversified, diffused and fragmented. This renders European economies more similar than just looking at their manufacturing sectors. j. With hindsight the early OCA theory could also not have predicted the pervasive role of institutions in hindering product and labour market flexibility and mobility. We argue later in the paper that it is other institutions that help addressing the areas of weakness of EMU. k. Perhaps the most important weakness of the "early OCA theory” was the crumbling of its conceptual framework, thus eroding the foundation of the whole edifice (see Box 2.2). These weaknesses and limitations hampered the normative appeal of the OCA theory for quite some time. At the same time interest in European monetary integration subsided in the 1970s (after the demise of the Bretton Woods arrangement) and re-emerged only in the mid 1980s. Box 2.2. The long-run ineffectiveness of monetary policy The "early OCA theory” was embedded in a Keynesian stabilisation framework and the belief that, at least in the short run, monetary policy is an effective policy instrument which could facilitate the adjustment of relative wages and prices in the wake of some types of idiosyncratic shocks: i.e. it could help to undertake business cycle stabilisation. This would provide a less costly adjustment than having to endure some unemployment to facilitate a real adjustment. Buiter (1999) calls the argument that monetary and also fiscal policy could successfully manipulate aggregate demand to offset private sector shocks the “fine-tuning fallacy”. The rational expectations revolution that started in the 1970s, the monetarist critique, and the literature on the inflation bias postulating the long-run ineffectiveness of monetary policy, helped to change this perception. See Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978), and Barro and Gordon (1983). The monetarist critique of the short-term constant Phillips curve, underlying some of the early OCA theory, observes that labour negotiates in terms of real wages rather than nominal wages. Correspondingly, the curve needs to be augmented by expected inflation, and perfectly anticipated policy changes could exert no impact upon real variables (McCallum (1989)). The Phillips Curve was then displaced by the natural rate of unemployment (NRU). Policy-makers have principally a choice of a rate of inflation rather than of a level of desired unemployment and economic activity. Hence, from this standpoint, the cost of losing direct control over national monetary policy to undertake business-cycle stabilisation is modest. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) raise the issue that to the extent that monetary policy is not properly used as a stabilisation device, the loss of monetary independence is not a substantial cost. Emerson et al. (1992) and several other authors demonstrate that, also in the long run, relatively higher inflation does not yield any macroeconomic benefits in terms of unemployment or growth. 5 On the contrary, higher inflation is associated with higher unemployment and relatively lower levels of real per capita income. Unanticipated inflation has even stronger adverse economic effects than anticipated inflation through several channels (see Issing, Gaspar, Angeloni and Tristani (2001), and ECB (2001a). This reassessment has several normative implications. All in all the costs of losing direct control over national monetary policy seem rather low (but subject to the above qualifications vis-à-vis inflation rates within a very narrow and low range). For a country with a track record of relatively higher inflation and a reputation for breaking low inflation promises, a way to immediately gain low inflation credibility is to ‘tie its hands’ by forsaking national monetary sovereignty and establishing a complete monetary union with a low inflation country (Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989)). An important prerequisite is that such an anchor country exists in the envisaged monetary union (Goodhart (1989)) and will not alter its commitment to monetary discipline after establishing monetary union. Hence, similarity of inflation rate could be a feasible outcome of participating in a monetary union but is not a necessary precondition (Gandolfo (1992)). The implication is that the borders of monetary unions could be enlarged provided that a firm “nominal anchor” exists from which other partner countries could borrow “anti-inflation” credibility. Operationalising the OCA theory and some “meta” OCA properties When interest in European monetary integration resurfaced, there were also advancements in econometric techniques to sustain empirical studies of the diverse OCA properties. These studies sought to assess why specific groups of countries may form an OCA by analysing and comparing a variety of OCA properties by means of several econometric techniques. Thus they aimed to operationalise the OCA theory. We shall refer to several empirical studies of the OCA properties – and also on the effects of the euro – in the next sections. A common denominator across these empirical studies is that their analysis goes deep into the features of the economy, as well as the institutions of each country and the preferences of economic agents (see Mongelli (2005)). Therefore, the assessment of OCA properties has now become more articulated. Some “meta” OCA properties were put forward in the 1990s. The similarity of shocks and of policy responses to those shocks is almost a “catch all” OCA property capturing the interaction between several properties (see Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996), Masson and Taylor (1993) and Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002)). The intuition is that if the incidence of supply and demand shocks and the speed with which the economy adjusts – taking into consideration also the policy responses – are similar across partner countries, then the need for policy autonomy is reduced and the cost of losing direct control over the nominal exchange rate falls. Hence, countries exhibiting large co-movements of outputs and prices have the lowest costs of abandoning monetary independence vis-à-vis their partners. For a comprehensive recent study see Demertzis, Hughes and Rummel (2000). These studies also drew some criticism (Tavlas (1994) notes that their results are ambiguous and often conflictive, and there is no concurrence on the theoretical underpinning of the tests). Another important “meta” OCA property is provided by studies looking at the monetary transmission mechanism (MTM) that can tell us something about the similarity in financial structures. In recent years, several new studies have emerged: see Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon and Terlizzese (2001). Such studies analyse and compare, inter alia, the financial structures of countries. They show that European countries display significant differences in terms of interest sensitivity of spending, maturity structure of debt, net-worth of firms and household sectors, the legal structure, contract enforcement costs, the bank lending channel and the alternatives to bank financing. Such differences are likely to diminish only gradually over time (see Angeloni and Ehrmann (2003)). 6 From the endogeneity of OCA to endogeneities of OCA The hypothesis of an “endogeneity of OCA” permitted a leap forward for the OCA theory. By studying the effects of several monetary unions that occurred in the past, Andrew Rose and Jeffrey Frankel (see Rose (2000 and 2004) and Frankel and Rose (1997 and 2001)) showed that monetary integration leads to a very significant deepening of reciprocal trade. The implication for EMU is that the euro area may turn into an OCA after the launch of monetary union even if it were not an OCA before, or “countries which join EMU, no matter what their motivation may be, may satisfy OCA properties ex post even if they do not ex ante!” (Frankel and Rose 1997). Consequently, the borders of new currency unions could be drawn larger in the expectation that trade integration and income correlation will increase once a currency union is created. This has been termed the “endogeneity of OCA”, and it completely turned around the perspective on the OCA theory.1 What might be so special about monetary unions? With a single currency some pecuniary costs disappear or decline. For example, the introduction of the euro is helping, inter alia, to reduce trading costs both directly and indirectly: e.g. by removing exchange rate risks and the cost of currency hedging. Information costs will be reduced as well. The euro is also expected to have a catalysing role for the Single Market Program by enhancing price transparency and discouraging price discrimination. This should help reducing market segmentation and foster competition. A single currency is more efficient than multiple currencies in performing the roles of medium of exchange and unit of account. It can also promote convergence in social conventions with potentially far reaching legal, contractual and accounting implications (Garcia-Herrero et al. (2001)). These are principally market-based forces. But there is more. A common currency among partner countries is seen as “a much more serious and durable commitment” (McCallum (1995)). It precludes future competitive devaluations, facilitates foreign direct investment and the building of long-term relationships, and might over time encourage forms of political integration. This will promote reciprocal trade (productivity shocks might also spill over via trade), economic and financial integration and even foster business cycle synchronisation among the countries sharing a single currency. It also reveals the willingness to commit over time to even broader economic integration “on issues of property rights, non-tariff trade barriers, labour policy, etc.” (Engel and Rogers (2004)). This might in turn boost progress in several OCA properties. There is a possibility that there might be other sources of “endogeneities of OCA”. Several authors have in fact brought forward concepts similar to the above hypothesis of “endogeneity of OCA” but in areas other than trade. De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005) examine three other sources of endogeneities of OCA and review some similar concepts: • • the endogeneity of financial integration or equivalently of insurance schemes provided by capital markets (see Baele et al. (2004) and Adjaute and Danthine (2003)). For example, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, Yosha (2003) and other authors have discussed the effects of sharing a single currency on financially-based insurance schemes; the endogeneity of symmetry of shocks and (similarly) synchronisation of outputs (see Artis and Zhang (1999), Melitz (2004) and Firdmuc (2003)); and 1 The endogeneity emerges from two main channels. The first is that the degree of openness – i.e. reciprocal trade between the members of the currency area – is likely to increase after a single currency is launched. This insight is widely accepted. The second channel postulates a positive link between trade integration and income correlation. On this insight there are instead diverging views: i.e. some think that monetary unification would instead spur specialisation and asymmetry of shocks (see Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996)). Mongelli (2005) illustrates the implications of both views. 7 • the endogeneity of product and labour market flexibility (see Bertola and Boeri (2004)). For example, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Saint Paul and Bentolila (2002), and SaintPaul (2002) discuss the endogeneity of labour market institutions. A common thread among these sources of endogeneity of OCA is that monetary integration represents a removal of “borders” (very broadly intended to include also national monies) that contributes to the narrowing of distances and a change in the incentive structure of agents. In any case, this analysis is still relatively new. Some (final) remarks on the OCA theory About 50 years have passed since the founding of the OCA theory. Its basic pioneering intuitions were remarkably strong. In fact, we still discuss all OCA properties. However, over recent decades the OCA theory has witnessed several ups and downs. Between the early 60s and mid-1970s, the early OCA theory had been completely mapped out. Several weaknesses and limitations of the analytical framework behind the OCA theory then started to emerge and the theory fell in neglect from the mid-1970s to the mid 1980s. It was difficult to find clear normative implications for the European monetary integration process and the stabilisation framework underlying it started crumbling. In the second half of the 1980s, the OCA theory missed an important appointment (as the discussion in the next section more clearly illustrates). When monetary integration made the formidable leap forward that ultimately led to the 1988 Delors Report and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the OCA theory could not deliver a clear view (Emerson et al. (1992)). In the event, plans for economic and monetary integration along three stages of EMU (with the launch of the euro in 1999) went ahead but the OCA theory had a limited direct input. In subsequent years, several of the weaknesses and limitations of the OCA theory were addressed. Some significant advancement in econometrics made it possible to “operationalise” several OCA properties and study the transmission of shocks as well as other features of the economy. As a result of this whole reassessment, the balance of judgements shifted in favour of monetary unions. Association to a currency union is now deemed to generate fewer costs in terms of the loss of autonomy of domestic macroeconomic policies. There is now also more emphasis on the benefits of currency areas. A “new OCA theory” starts emerging vis-à-vis the old OCA theory (Tavlas (1993)). The literature on the endogeneity of the OCA reinvigorated the debate on the OCA theory. There is, by now, compelling empirical evidence that removing “borders” broadly intended as impediments to trade, but also financial flows, as well as sharing a single currency, are a powerful magnet for deeper economic and financial integration. Such endogeneity could also result from deeper financial integration and risk-sharing, increased symmetry of shocks and similarly output synchronisation, and an increased pace of product and labour market reforms to enhance flexibility. Correspondingly, the borders of new currency unions could be drawn larger in the expectation that trade integration and income correlation will augment once a currency union is created. On the other hand, could any set of partner countries form a currency union and just wait for the deeper integration to occur almost automatically and thereby inevitably reap net benefits from a single currency? Could there instead be a critical lower threshold in the mix of OCA properties beyond which the “endogeneity of OCA” types of effects could manifest themselves? Ultimately this is an empirical question. Over and beyond its many weaknesses and limitations, we think that the OCA theory has great merits as an organising device over all these years and as a catalyst of analysis. Without the OCA theory there may not have been such a systematic scrutiny of so many economic features, which are after all the building bricks of monetary unions. Going back to the analogy 8 of EMU with a laboratory: this OCA patient has survived but it has been radically transformed over recent decades. “Policy-makers rushed to negotiate a detailed agreement [the Maastricht Treaty], having no time for detailed economic analysis” Charles Wyplosz (2006) 3. Monetary integration in Europe Monetary integration in Europe is part of a broader integration process fostering also economic and financial integration (i.e., EMU). We emphasise here the monetary aspects of this process. However, we also make some references to other aspects of EMU. This section is structured as follows. We start by tracing some of the steps leading to monetary cooperation, then the EMS, to EMU, and then the launch of the euro. After presenting an index of institutional integration we discuss the role of the OCA theory in shaping the convergence criteria and the design of EMU governance. We then turn to the institutional forces fostering the OCA properties: i.e., the “exogeneity of OCA”. Monetary integration steps (1): from Bretton Woods to the end of the EMS The first formal steps of European monetary integration go almost as far back in time as the OCA theory (see Table 3.1). In October 1962 the Commission issued a memorandum – known as the Marjolin Memorandum – that can be considered as the official starting point of monetary integration in Europe.2 The memorandum kicked off the discussion on a common currency and prompted several measures in the field of monetary cooperation. The exchange rates of the members of the European Economic Community (EEC) were never directly fixed, although they were all pegged to the US Dollar. At the time exchange rate stability was still secured by the Bretton Woods Arrangement, and there was no urgent need for a new institutional arrangements among European currencies. Under the provisions of the memorandum, a Committee of Governors (CoG) of the national central banks of the EEC was established in 1964 and started meeting in Basel. Over the years the Committee gradually gained in importance as it started developing, and managing, an institutional framework for monetary cooperation. It was this committee that prepared the first draft of the Statute of the ECB in 1990. One aspect that we can only briefly mention here is that EMU represents also a reconciliation of very different paradigms for European integration, and monetary integration in particular (see Box 3.1). Box 3.1. The Franco-German EMU controversies: “monetarists” versus “economists" Maes (2003 and 2007) notes that EMU represents, amongst others, the culmination of a process of reconciliation and understanding among different views about economic policymaking, the function of sovereign states, and (ultimately) monetary integration.3 Different “ideas” and meta-cultural beliefs played an important role in the in the process of integration. The differences among the “tradition republicaine” and centralisation of power prevailing in France, 2 However, European monetary integration had been mentioned by others before. In 1929 Gustav Stresemann put forward a proposal for a European currency in the League of Nations. Such a currency should have helped to reduce the economic division following the creation of several new nation states after WWI. 3 See also Wyplosz (2007), European Commission (1991), Begg et al (1991), Bini-Smaghi, Padoa-Schioppa and Papadia (1993), Kenen (1995), Baldwin et al (2001), and Baldwin et al (2004). 9 and the “ordo-liberalism” and federalist approach prevailing in Germany are among the most significant in shaping integration. The “monetarists” field, championed by France, was in favour of plans for greater exchange rate stability and exchange rate support mechanisms. Monetary integration could have a driving role in the convergence process. Later on in the last 1980s a tenet of the “monetarists” field was that nominal convergence was not indispensable as EMU represents a change in policy regimes. The credibility of the new common central bank (i.e., the ECB) will shape future expectations while past expectations become irrelevant. Such a bank can secure low inflation in all countries, even in those with a track record of higher inflation. The emphasis is then on institution building, while disinflation processes could otherwise be lengthy and costly. The “economists” field, championed by Germany, emphasised instead the coordination of economic policies and advocated a long convergence process to favour an alignment of monetary policies. Hence, the convergence of economic performances is a precondition for EMU. An implication is that a small group of stability-oriented countries could then have proceeded towards monetary integration but at a date to be set. This approach intends to minimise the risks of negative spill-over from high inflation countries sharing a single currency. With an emphasis on stability and convergence, the economist field goal of monetary integration is also referred as the “coronation theory”. By the end of the 1960s, the international environment changed due to persistent current account deficits of the US (the anchor country of the Bretton Woods System) and the emergence of widespread inflationary pressures that were then exacerbated by the first oilshock. The Bretton Woods System collapsed in August 1971 and the members of the EEC pursued different economic policies that in turn led to exchange rate tensions among them and even threatened to disrupt the customs union and the common agricultural market. In 1969 the Heads of State or Government requested a plan for the realisation of an economic and monetary union. The result was the Werner Report published in 1970, and that proposed to achieve economic and monetary union in several stages by 1980.4 While the final goal of monetary union was never achieved, as the report turned out to be too advanced for the level of economic and financial integration prevailing at the time, some of its elements could still be implemented. In 1972, after the demise of the Bretton Woods system, the “currency snake”, an exchange rate arrangement for European countries, was created.5 4 The Werner Report (1970) prescribed three main elements for monetary union: a. "Within the area of a monetary union, currencies must be fully and irreversibly convertible, fluctuation margins around exchange rates must be eliminated, par values irrevocably fixed, and capital movements completely free." b. "It is of primary importance that the main decisions regarding monetary policy be centralized, whether such decisions concern liquidity, interest rates, intervention on the exchange markets, management of reserves, or the fixing of currency parities vis-à-vis the rest of the world." and c. "Under such a system, national currencies could be maintained, or a single Community currency could be created. […], but psychological and political factors weigh the scale in favour of adopting a single currency that would demonstrate the irreversible nature of the undertaking." 5 Several EEC countries agreed to prevent exchange rate fluctuations of more than 2.25%. De facto in the late 1970s only the Deutsch Mark, the Benelux currencies and the Danish Krona were still members of the snake. The Pound Sterling, the Irish Pound, the French Franc, and the Italian Lira all entered and exited after shorter time periods. 10 Table 3.1. Monetary integration steps6 1958 Establishment of the Monetary Committee 1962 A proposal for economic and monetary union among the members of the European Economic Community (EEC) is first floated in the Marjolin Memorandum. 1964 A Committee of Governors of the central banks of the Member States of the EEC is formed to institutionalise the cooperation among EEC central banks. 1970 The Werner Report sets out a plan to realise an economic and monetary union in the Community by 1980. 1972 A system (the “snake”) for the progressive narrowing of the margins of fluctuation between the currencies of the Member States of the EEC is established. 1973 The European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) is set up to ensure the proper operation of the snake. 1974 the ECOFIN Council adopted a Decision to foster the convergence of economic policies and a Directive on stability, growth and full employment. 1979 The European Monetary System (EMS) is created. 1987 Strengthening of the EMS through the Basle-Nyborg Agreement. 1988 The European Council mandates a committee of experts under the chairmanship of Jacques Delors (the “Delors Committee”) to make proposals for the realisation of EMU. 1989 The “Delors Report” is submitted to the European Council. 1989 The European Council agrees on the realisation of EMU in three stages. 1990 Completion of "One Money, One Market" evaluation that had been commissioned in 1988 as an input for the Delors Report. 1990 Stage One of EMU begins in July. 1990 An Intergovernmental Conference to prepare for Stages Two and Three of EMU is launched. 1992 The Treaty on European Union (the “Maastricht Treaty”) is signed in February. 1993 The Treaty on European Union enters into force. 1994 Stage Two of EMU begins and the EMI is established. 1997 The European Council in June agrees on the Stability and Growth Pact. 1998 In May Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland are considered to fulfil the necessary conditions for the adoption of the euro as their single currency; the Members of the Executive Board of the ECB are appointed. 1998 The ECB and the ESCB are established in June. 1998 In October the ECB announces the strategy and the operational framework for the single monetary policy it will conduct from 1 January 1999. 1999 In January Stage Three of EMU begins; the euro is launched; conversion rates are fixed irrevocably; a single monetary policy is established for the euro area. 2001 Greece joins the euro area. 2002 The euro cash changeover: euro banknotes and coins are introduced and become sole legal tender in the euro area by the end of February 2002. 2004 In May the national central banks (NCBs) of the ten new EU Member States join the ESCB. 2007 Slovenia joins the euro area. 2008 Cyprus and Malta join the euro area, and Bulgaria and Rumania join the EU and ESCB. In March 1979 the process of monetary integration was revamped with the founding of the European Monetary System (EMS) whose principal aim was to reduce the disruptive impact of sizeable exchange rate devaluations and regulate changes in parities. The basic elements of the EMS were: the definition of the European currency unit (or ECU) as a basket of currencies; and an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) based on the concept of fixed currency exchange rate margins, but with variable exchange rates within those margins (see Giavazzi and Giovannini (1995), De Grauwe (2005), and Baldwin and Wyplosz (2005)). 6 See EU Commission website, Scheller (2004), and Deutsche Bundesbank (2005). 11 Exchange rates were based on the ECU, whose value was determined as a weighted average of the participating currencies. A parity grid of bilateral rates was calculated on the basis of these central rates expressed in ECUs, and currency fluctuations had to be contained within a margin of 2.25% on either side of the bilateral rates. Officially no currency was designated as an anchor. However, the Deutsche Mark and the Bundesbank were unquestionably the centre of the EMS: all other currencies followed its lead. Monetary cooperation became closer, and links between NCBs were strengthened. Internal and external monetary stability became important goals. Domestic economic policies were instrumental in achieving exchange rate stability. Countries with relatively high inflation found it easier to pursue disinflation policies. This fostered a downward convergence of inflation rates, reduced excessive exchange rate volatility, and promoted trade and an improvement in overall economic performance. Capital controls were gradually relaxed. However, the lack of fiscal convergence remained a source of tension as some countries ran persistently large budget deficits. The EMS lasted from 1979 until the launch of the euro in 1999. During these two decades it went through four main phases and several periods of turbulence. 1979-85 represented the first phase of the EMS and some countries still maintained capital controls in place and exhibited significant inflation differentials. With fixed nominal exchange rates this resulted in continued misalignments that required frequent adjustment of the official parities. Full nominal convergence had not been established yet. Differentials in budget deficits and public debt were also substantial. The adjustment of official parities often occurred in the wake of financial market turmoil, which periodically brought up questions about the sustainability of the ERM. All in all, during this first phase, there were nine adjustments involving several currencies at the same time (see Baldwin and Wyplosz (2004)). The second phase of the EMS spanned from 1986 to September 1992. Several EMS members, but not all, managed to bring down their inflation rates towards German inflation rates. In this phase the EMS is described by many as a “Deutsche Mark Area” as the monetary policies of all members (except Germany) were de facto surrendered: i.e. the Deutsche Mark was effectively the anchor of the EMS. Between early 1986 and January 1987 there were three more adjustments, and then until September 1992 there were no realignments (with the exception of an adjustment of the central parity of the Italian lira). Capital controls were being dismantled and were officially banned as of July 1990. Owing to the impossible trinity proposition (see Box 3.2) all central banks participating in the ERM had de facto renounced an independent monetary policy. This second phase of the EMS bore several fruits from the standpoint of further integration. An opportunity for setting a course towards economic and monetary union opened up after the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986 (that introduced the Single Market as a further objective of the Community). Jacques Delors, President of the Commission, set up a committee to study the feasibility of a monetary union. The resulting report of the Delors Committee was approved in Madrid in 1989. The completion of the Delors Report was accelerated at the time of the break-up of the former Soviet Union and the looming German reunification, i.e. a unique window of opportunity had just opened up. It laid out the blueprint of the Maastricht Treaty that was signed in February 1992. A three-stage process leading to the single currency and on designing the corresponding institutions was completely mapped out at the end of the decade. In 1990 a group of economists led by Michael Emerson finalised “One Money, One Market: An Evaluation of the Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union”. This evaluation had been commissioned in 1988 as an input for the Delors Report. Wyplosz (2006) observed that while “One Money, One Market” was completed too late to provide an academic input into the blueprint of the Maastricht Treaty, it drew 12 researchers back into the study of monetary integration and forestalled a spectacular comeback of the OCA theory. Box 3.2 The “impossible trinity” The “impossible trinity” refers to the fact that three desiderata of governments – i.e. free trade and capital mobility, monetary policy autonomy, and fixed exchange rates – cannot be reconciled. Governments must choose. With open markets – i.e. with free trade and free movement of capital – free-floating of the exchange rate is a necessary condition to secure some monetary autonomy (at least in the short run). Conversely, abdicating monetary policy autonomy is necessary to maintain fixed exchange rates (see Padoa-Schioppa (1988 and 1990)). Following Dorrucci (2004), the European way to solve the impossible trinity has entailed a lengthy process that over the last 40-50 years has lead to a Common Market for the EU, irrevocably fixed exchange rates for euro area countries, and correspondingly no monetary policy autonomy at the national levels for the countries that have adopted the euro as illustrated in Figure 3.1. At the same time the euro area countries’ exchange rates can fluctuate vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Figure 3.1. The European way to solve the “impossible trinity” European Union/Euro Area EU Common Market Flexible exchange rates (= free trade and free factor movement within Euro Area) Rest of the world Irrevocably fixed exchange rates No monetary policy autonomy at country level (= adoption of the euro) (= one central bank, the Eurosystem) High degree of monetary policy autonomy The third phase of the EMS, from September 1992 until March 1993, is marked by the most severe crisis of the whole EMS arrangement. Some countries, which were unable to reduce inflation, gradually overvalued (albeit at a slower pace than in the past). There were several concurring adverse events. Misalignments kept growing, albeit at a slower pace, because inflation differentials, despite their decline, were still significant for some counties. The tight monetary policy pursued by the Bundesbank following reunification and the shock of the Danish electorate voting against the Maastricht Treaty alarmed the exchange markets and prompted speculative attacks on the overvalued currencies. Such attacks were in fact one way bets: the speculations could either win (if the parities were indefensible) or lose nothing. Speculative attacks almost destroyed the EMS in the period between September 1992 and March 1993. The UK and Italy were forced to leave the ERM (Italy then rejoined in 1996) and the fluctuation margins were widened to +/- 15% in March 1993. This implied the end of a tight ERM. The fourth phase of the EMS runs until the launch of the euro, allowing the principle of fixed exchange rates, although much weakened, to be kept alive. The European Monetary 13 System ceased to function in its original form when 11 EU countries irrevocably fixed their exchange rates in preparation to adopt the euro. The successor of the original arrangement was ERM II, launched on 1 January 1999. In it, the ECU basket is discarded and the euro becomes an anchor for other participating currencies. Several lessons were learned from the two decades with the EMS. Experience showed that keeping separate currencies with fixed exchange rates among them and full capital mobility leads to tensions: it is unsustainable if monetary authorities intend to pursue different goals and inflation rates still differ. A “corner solution”, such as monetary union, is seen as a solution to this dilemma. The original intention of the Delors Report was to present the path to monetary union as a natural follow-up of the Single European Act. Fixed exchange rates and full capital mobility prevent an independent monetary policy that represents the impossible trinity principle. Hence, the Delors Report also had a defensive purpose: that exchange rate stability enhances trade while exchange rate volatility and misalignments harm trade; and that even tightly pegged exchange rates cannot impose sufficient discipline on monetary policy. Even a strengthened ERM would not be sufficient. A widely held view was that the Single Market was not expected to be able to exploit its full potential without a single currency. A single currency would ensure greater price transparency for consumers and investors, eliminate exchange rate risks, reduce transaction costs and, as a result, significantly increase economic welfare in the Community. During most of the EMS all countries, except the anchor country, have de facto lost control over monetary policy. Instead a new currency and a common central bank would allow all European countries to share influence over monetary policy decisions. The German government agreed to this plan largely on political grounds. Monetary integration steps (2): the path to EMU and the euro Taking all these lessons into consideration, the 12 Member States of the European Economic Community (at the time) decided to relaunch the EMU project. A fresh impulse came when the nature of monetary cooperation in Europe switched to mild forms of coordination of monetary policies. In June 1988 the European Council appointed a Committee chaired by Jacques Delors to propose concrete steps leading to economic and monetary union. The Delors Report then formed the blueprint for the Maastricht Treaty that laid out a timetable along three stages (see Figure 3.1) and the key elements for the Eurosystem. The first stage of EMU coincided with the complete liberalisation of capital movements in Europe. In its blueprint for the ESCB, which took into account the experience of the NCBs and strongly influenced the Maastricht Treaty, the Committee spelled out the main principles for creating a European Central Bank. Member States could only participate in the union if they could show a high degree of lasting convergence confirmed by the fulfilment of four economic criteria (inflation, long-term interest rates, fiscal debt and deficit, and exchange rates). The “Delors Report” also advocated an independent central bank with the primary objective of price stability. Relevant provisions were later included in the Maastricht Treaty. The Eurosystem’s institutional framework for monetary policy took into account the main elements of the existing frameworks of NCBs prior to its establishment, and aimed at implementing best practice. 14 Figure 3.1. The three stages of Economic and Monetary Union STAGE THREE 1 January 1999 STAGE TWO 1 January 1994 STAGE ONE 1 July 1990 Complete freedom for capital transactions Increased co-operation Free use of the ECU (European Currency Unit, forerunner of the €) Improvement of economic convergence Start of preparatory work for Stage Three Maastricht Treaty gets binding (on 7 Febr 92) Establishment of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) Ban on the granting of central bank credit to the public sector Increased co-ordination of monetary policies Strengthening of economic convergence Irrevocable fixing of conversion rates Introduction of the euro in 11 EU Member States Foundation of the Eurosystem and transfer of responsibility for the single monetary policy to the ECB Entry into effect of the intra-EU exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) Entry into force of the Stability and Growth Pact National central banks become fully independent with price stability as their primary objective Preparatory work for Stage Three Source: Adapted from ECB website. The establishment of the EMI in early 1994 as a transitional institution marked the start of the second stage of EMU. Responsibility for the conduct of monetary policy in the EU remained the preserve of the national authorities. The two main tasks of the EMI were (a) to strengthen central bank cooperation and monetary policy coordination (including the assessment of progress in the fields of economic and legal convergence); and (b) to make the preparations required for the establishment of the ESCB, for the conduct of the single monetary policy and for the creation of a single currency in the third stage. At the same time, the blueprint for the Eurosystem also required the EMI to carry out preparatory work on the regulatory, organisational and logistical framework necessary for the ESCB, and on the future monetary and exchange rate relationships between the euro area and other EU countries (see EMI (1995)), including: a. the definition of the concepts and framework for conducting the single monetary policy and the preparation of the ESCB’s operational rules and procedures; b. the implementation of a single foreign exchange policy; c. the promotion of efficient crossborder payments; d. the collection and harmonisation, where necessary, of reliable and timely statistics to support the conduct of monetary policy; e. the supervision of the technical planning of the printing and issuing of a European banknote; and f. the harmonisation of accounting rules and standards of the NCBs and the setting-up of an adequate information systems architecture for the ESCB. The EMI Council agreed on a master plan as a guiding instrument to organise, monitor and assess the related activities by various areas involving experts from the EMI and the NCBs. On 1 January 1999 the third and final stage of EMU started with the introduction of the euro in 11 EU Member States, the establishment of the Eurosystem, and the transfer of responsibility for the conduct of monetary policy to the ECB. At the same time, the intra-EU exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) and the Stability and Growth Pact came into force. 15 Monetary integration and the broader process of European integration We illustrate here the extent by which monetary integration is part of the broader process of European integration. We do so by means of an index of institutional integration that was first suggested by Balassa (1961). The index identifies five main stages of regional integration, and for convenience we discuss the case of the six founding countries of the European Union (i.e., the EU 6):7 • In Stage 1 the EU 6 formed a Free Trade Area (FTA): i.e., an area where tariffs and quotas are abolished for imports from area members, which, however, retain national tariffs and quotas against third countries. Tariffs were actually reduced in three steps starting 1957 and ending 1968; • In Stage 2 the EU 6 formed a Customs Union (CU): i.e., a free trade area setting up common tariffs and quotas (if any) for trade with non-members. The EU 6 have had a CU since 1968; • In Stage 3 the EU 6 formed a Common Market (CM): i.e., they abolished non-tariff barriers to trade (i.e., promoting the integration of product and service markets) as well as restrictions on factor movement (i.e., promoting the integration of capital and labour markets). This was the case for the European Community since 1993 (with the launch of the European Single Market). In any case, the CM was already one of the objectives of the Treaty of Rome (i.e., the so-called “four freedoms”, although capital market integration remained low for a long time); • In Stage 4 the EU 6 formed an Economic Union (EUN): i.e., a common market with a significant degree of co-ordination of national economic policies and/or harmonisation of relevant domestic laws. This is the case for the European Union nowadays; and • In Stage 5 the EU 6 pursued Total Economic Integration (TEI): i.e., an economic union with all relevant economic policies conducted at the supranational level, in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. An example of TEI is the euro area with a single monetary policy, which can be currently classified somewhere between a EUN and a TEI. However, some supranational authorities and joint rule making were established already with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and subsequently enhanced. Our index is built by assigning “scores” to the level of integration recorded for each of these five stages. In particular, scores from 0 to 25 are assigned to the degree of regional integration achieved over time in the development of, respectively, a Free Trade Area/Customs Union (FTA/CU, considered jointly), a Common Market (CM), an Economic Union (EUN), and an area with Total Economic Integration (TEI). By summing up the scores achieved in each moment in time, an index of institutional regional integration is obtained which can range between 0 (no economic integration at all) and 100 (full economic integration, including monetary and financial integration). The figure below illustrates the evolution of the whole index as well as the evolution of the main steps toward monetary and financial integration. 7 See Mongelli et al (2007) for a discussion on the successive EU enlargements. Forming a political union goes beyond these five stages. Scores are assigned w