Can I Sign New Jersey Banking PPT

Can i industry sign banking new jersey ppt easy

good morning um thanks again for uh for tuning in and joining us this morning for uh our webinar on q3 results and what the true state of credit quality is my name's sean o'brien i'm the president of quick rate uh and uh am pleased to be joined on today's webinar by david ruffin david joined us last year to build out a new suite of credit risk management tools uh that we call in telecredit and in telecredit along with quick analytics our recently newly added endorsed vendors of the new jersey banker association so we're very excited to be working with you and your organization and we hope you'll find today's webinar helpful and certainly invite you to learn more about the solutions and the tools that we've uh that we've built that we think will drive some efficiencies for you at the bank just before we get started a couple of housekeeping items one monday we will send you a link to the recording as well as a copy of today's powerpoint uh some of the things we're going to talk about today we're going to start just kind of looking at the third quarter uh numbers we run a quarterly report every month uh every every quarter after the call reports are filed that just gives you a sense of what's happening both within the state and uh nationally uh and then we'll talk about you know some economic signals certainly they're mixed but i think the the clear evidence right now is that you know a lot of things have been good for wall street but not necessarily main street uh david's gonna talk uh more about the the state of credit quality and then we'll just show you a few things that are new at quick analytics and in telecredit uh and again remind you that we just were recently endorsed and then um you know certainly invite you to uh to give us a a shout out uh okay so as i mentioned quick analytics we uh we are a comprehensive source of call report information so one of the things that we like to do every quarter is once those re call reports are filed is to put together some numbers we we do them both at the state and national level so here you can see we have what we call the qcbi the quick analytics community bank index which is essentially the definition that the fdic provides for community banks but this is a way to draw to some distinctions between uh you know some of the larger banks in the country and community banks um so you can see there's 60 banks in new jersey eight of them get excluded from our index in the numbers that you'll see uh asset growth has been very good across the country it has been as well in new jersey a little bit lower than the national trend all of these numbers you'll see are the state numbers there are state median numbers and then the red line represents the national median um so as we move through these uh those are uh how you should evaluate these we also break things down by size so up in the right hand corner um you can just see you know asset growth by percentages and then a lower box in the middle uh asset growth just by the asset size of the bank so you can see it's a little bit choppy in terms of asset growth even though everybody has experienced uh you know good asset growth over the last 12 months um deposits the same way uh you know pretty strong deposit growth needless to say uh we are in the liquidity business at a quick rate and there's plenty of liquidity uh you know banks are awash in liquidity i will say however if you are in a local market that still has stubbornly high rates there is plenty and i repeat plenty of available uh low-cost wholesale money so certainly uh don't pay more than you need to in your in your local markets uh again the deposit growth has been kind of good across the board um it's but certainly uh the larger banks have seen the the biggest rise on a on a percentage basis uh now we get into some of the tougher numbers so uh you know this current environment has been tough for a lot of different sectors it's certainly been you know difficult and will probably continue to be difficult for banks um you can see and you already know better than i uh yield on loans you know the pricing with rates dropping has gotten much more competitive uh you know new jersey traditionally has been uh you know very competitive on uh loan uh pricing uh you know the pricing is below the national trend and has you know dropped uh in the last uh 12 months you know 46 basis points the cost of funds has seen a nice drop as well over 52 basis points but the combination of those two has still resulted in about a 30 basis point decrease in nim and that's clearly going to be at the forefront of our challenges as banks you know over the next couple of years as it seems likely that uh short-term interest rates will remain close to if not at zero bound uh and it you know the that environment will mean you know lower prices on loans it'll mean less lower yielding security rate um so just a very very difficult environment to start with and then the potential for layering in any credit cost you know makes makes the challenges ahead uh you know pretty pretty significant um non-interest income has stayed pretty steady slightly declining but certainly well below the national trend and the efficiency ratio has crept up here uh in 2020 so again a lot of headwinds for us as we as we move into 2021 um that's resulted in you know median pre-tax roa of 71 basis points for the state again below the national trend uh and then a second number as we move to the right you can see by asset size in the bank this is kind of somewhat unusual i attribute part of it just to the smaller number of banks in each of these categories um but you know the interesting that the next highest median is between 0 and 100 million um where these banks between 100 million and a billion uh are a little bit more choppy uh the the highest median pre-tax roa banks above a billion which again typically is what you see is a little bit more of a slope line like this uh as you know a lot of the larger banks are able to take advantage of more technology to build efficiencies uh into the banks core operating earnings that's what the coe stands for this is a measure of pre-tax pre-provision type of income uh we exclude a lot of the one-time items like loan losses gains and sales on securities etc and so this is always what we feel is a very good measure of just the true operating profits you know of banks you know in addition with the deposit franchise being the most uh you know valuable thing we have as banks the next biggest thing in our mind is core operating earnings so we focus in on that a lot uh you know to see where banks are are able to generate the their their earnings so again we've seen a you know a 13 basis point drop um it's been kind of you know across the board but you know the the largest banks still driving the highest core operating earnings so uh needless to say again a lot of challenges uh this makes sense then those that follow through into roa and uh roe so you can see those numbers uh 53 basis points median roa and 4.77 median roe for banks in new jersey uh we come over here to the right you know the largest banks at 10.1 percent roe and then everybody in here uh just under five percent uh roe uh okay so you know as we think about all that and then what we have to look forward to uh you know we've uh kind of made this point throughout the you know really since march uh but then the you know that the federal reserve you know certainly in their minutes have been pretty consistent about it as well uh we've all heard this um you know probably more than we want to but essentially the path of the economy is going to depend on the course of the virus it certainly appears now we are making progress towards a vaccine um distribution of that will still take some time so you know needless to say we're looking at you know still a continued difficult environment for the same next six to twelve uh months uh 2020 you know gdp i think you know again uh numbers can be funny things uh we're big believers in you know both at quick analytics but also just within our banks you know suggesting that we stick to a uh you know a preferred measurement of how we look at numbers one of the things that can be very disconcerting and just to me in some ways frustrating is that particularly around gdp numbers and just like another economic numbers that we jump around between what the actual numbers are and what the annualized uh numbers are on a quarterly basis so you know i think it's important as you think about it and you're doing your you know estimates and just expectations uh always try to stick to some kind of consistent reporting base and that's you know again kind of at the heart of what we try to do with the call report information at quick analytics is let the numbers you know finally be an objective arbiter of of truth so uh gdp numbers uh you can see here bottom line right now the economy is three and a half percent smaller than it was at the end of of 29. um the loan to deposit ratio in the industry is at multi-decades lows with the you know the huge influx of deposits um debt to gdp exceeded the size of the economy for the full fiscal year and that's the first time that's happened in more than 70 years and that you know that trend of increasing debt at the federal government level i think is with us for the foreseeable future so you know again it all brings to light that you know we are not really going anywhere economically until we get this virus uh under under control uh some more economic numbers and again i think it's you know it's it's worth repeating that uh what's happened on wall street isn't necessarily of what's happened on main street we are still 9.8 million or 10 million jobs short of where we were pre-pandemic if you think about the last month's jobs numbers where the economy created 245 000 jobs at that pace it will take 40 months to get back to pre-pandemic levels um so that's over three years and if you think back just to a month ago or two months ago when the economy was producing 600 000 jobs it's a stark difference because then it would suggest that the economy would get back to pre-pandemic employment levels in a little over a year well that deceleration is very concerning um and it it's in you know exacerbated by the fact that two-thirds of the people who are unemployed today are relying on programs from the cares act that was passed earlier this summer and uh those programs expire on 12 26. um this week the new unemployment claims were 1.4 million that's the 38th consecutive week where we've had over 1 million claims so even though it feels if you look at the stock market that the economy is on very strong footing the underlying numbers would tell you a different story and i think that's the divide between wall street and main street and the way i characterize this the easiest way is every time a business on on main street closes probably a wall street business uh increases their market share and that's really what we're talking about small businesses are closing larger businesses are stepping in because they have the capital and the balance sheets to uh to continue on so um you know i think there is going to be more need for fiscal support and we'll see if uh if any of that happens uh here uh in the next month or so um again some uh you know gdp forecast now i me i broke my own rule here by showing you showing them to you annualized but the reason is is because uh you can see the third quarter number annualized showed over 30 right that's not really how fast the economy grew on an annualized basis it did but that was really only one quarter so i think it's important to remember uh where you know what we're really looking at as we as we move forward uh okay so i think again if we drill this and bring it back to us at the bank what does this all mean and i think part of it is uh you know trying to set a tone uh and david will touch on this in greater detail but what tone are we really looking to set internally and for our regulators as we think about our bank and our credit quality moving forward certainly in quarter two we saw pretty much across the board loan loss provisions increasing the third quarter it's been more mixed money centers and many of the regional regionals started to uh slow their provisions some have even pulled back some reserves um so again i think that's creating mixed signals there are certainly reasons to be positive net charge-offs are obviously low or non-existent for most banks reserve balances have been increasing we are for many of us still continuing to see steady loan demand it's likely we'll see another round of ppp loan or programs you know either at the end of this month or in early uh the first quarter there is plenty of capital and liquidity on our balance sheets there is you know increasing consumer confidence you know uh you know with the with the the site of a vaccine you know being within sight and then i think different from the last crisis a decade ago where a lot of the problems were caused by one to four family uh home prices have actually obviously been a strength for not only you know banks but for borrowers right i mean it's uh inc prices pretty much increased across the board in many markets there's not enough homes um it has really been a source of strength so you know plenty of reasons to be positive on the other hand there are plenty of reasons to be cautious again quantitatively a lot of things look good on the surface qualitatively not so much you know the virus is still not under control in the next coming months uh in winter are going to be tough ones uh they're going to be difficult for everybody and the inability for people to be outside and have the virus get worse is probably going to increase anxiety which again is is is not healthy for any of us margin deterioration is probably likely to continue with low interest rates um the economy is smaller is there an expectation next year that taxes might increase uh maybe not next year but in the subsequent years uh unemployment has you know it's coming down but still still higher than we'd like it again uh nearly 10 million people are out of work uh from pre-pandemic levels and then you know i think it gets down to we have to see what really kind of condition our borrowers in and can they survive another six to nine months of these current types of conditions so you know it goes without saying i i don't mean to be overly pessimistic but there's certainly a lot of uncertainty around uh the condition the actual condition of our our borrowers and that's why while we're optimistic uh with the vaccine and things are you know hopefully there's an end in sight we do think there's potentially some credit uh tales that uh you know can can arise and so with that i'm going to turn the presentation over to david and he's going to take you through uh the next uh part of our presentation thank you very much sean i hope uh you can see the screen um we as sean alluded to of course much of the data that's been presented in this webinar so far has been from our sister division quick analytics which deals robustly with public data the heart and soul frankly of intel credit is non-public data which is idiosyncratic from the individual banks uh information that doesn't make it yet to the call report and we think frankly that's really the art of credit risk management is is is understanding emerging credit risk in those early indicators well before it becomes public knowledge as a criticized classified loan for example intel credit and some of the things will show and and this and described today will be based on two primary concepts our portfolio analytic tool and our and the time to uh uh loan review concept that are that are wed together uh uh in the same portal uh three general areas of of lending have always been predominant and one is is growth one is quality and one is yield uh certainly sean has already alluded to the yield let's talk a little bit about loan growth and loan quality loan growth not unlike asset growth has has increased all over the place but a lot of that is is is is really non-organic loan growth we know that through the ppp loans uh even in new jersey while a tad bit below the national average here that still has been very robust throug the third quarter of 2020 and in the larger banks in other words the banks between 1 and 10 billion are leading the uh the parade on that so to speak in terms of quality i think these are very good uh numbers for the state of new jersey and everything we're going to look at here again as sean alluded to we look at our universe is his ban our banks uh 10 billion and under in assets because we think as you get up into mega bank territory it skews a lot of the comparative data that we want to look at at our banks and the one of the things that i have always looked at from a quality standpoint is in in working with boards and management is in fairly simple terms you've got your inventory of acknowledged problems and then the question is what do you do with you either charge them off or you you reserve for them new jersey is below and in our world our region is the the mid-atlantic peer group of states as you see below but new jersey is actually below the peer group and the national average in terms of 83 basis points of acknowledged problem loans as we speak today we'll talk a little bit about that conundrum frankly going forward net charge as sean alluded to or not are in inconsequential these days almost no one's charging loans off at this particular point in time but on the other hand people are anticipating uh credit stress continuing to increase and even the post-covet environment i think most people are adding to reserves again new jersey's a little bit below the national average as as is the mid-atlantic but that's not uh un un uh that's that's pretty standard expectation and logical another way of looking at it is how much of your reserves collectively in the 10 billion dollar banks and under in new jersey are covering your at least acknowledged inventory of problems and again good news new jersey's covering uh uh two and a quarter times your acknowledged inventory of of current problem loans uh in your reserves so what do we do oh sean's one of his last words in his presentation was uncertainty i don't think there's any question whatsoever that that's the operative uh description of the credit environment that's been left by covet 19. it is uncertainty um i'm not here to to cry doom and gloom that's not my my point it is the issue of i think vigilance uh and trying to minimize or reduce the uncertainty uh particularly going into 2021 so over the uncertainty over the short and long-term effects of the economic shock itself certainly over the impact on your loan portfolios in terms of quality and growth over the disparate impact on industries again sean alluded to the fact that a decade ago we had really one commodity if you will uh wonderful family housing valuations that took the whole country into a financial crisis and a recession coven unfortunately has left us with many disparate impacts on different industries uh some good some bad uh some very bad and i think that is uh added to the complexity of how we have to analyze and assess our credit uh portfolios uh in in this environment certainly uncertainty on the impact on bank valuations if you talk to uh investment bankers today they will tell you never in their careers have they seen such uh unclear signs about where embedded credit risk may be in bank portfolios and that's certainly uh lending itself to the fact that bank valuations even in the in the in the stock market have not uh has not appreciated to the level that so many other tech level rebounds have been realized that we've seen lately uncertainty as sean said over the fate of the economy being tied to the virus uh and and there is certainly hope that vaccines and therapeutics will help once and for all end the covet uh crisis but uh we don't know when that will be and of course the good news again has alluded to earlier we have more capital more liquidity better risk management unlike a decade or so ago there's certainly no blame to the community banking industry in fact there's if anything of late i think the community banks have tremendous goodwill in the marketplace particularly relative to their energetic uh distribution of the ppp loans and we'll we'll touch on that at the end of my segment again as to another aspect of how we can continue to preserve or build on that goodwill in the in the in the industry so how do what do we need to be doing for 2021 in terms of credit i do believe that our current credit quality metrics are misleading uh we're experiencing a coveted high potentially masking credit deterioration in all of our bank portfolios a lot of that comes from three predominant factors and that is we've had a massive federal stimulus um and uncertainty yet over even more to come uh unlike a decade or so ago much of that money came quickly to the street and and and helped us get through the shock of this crisis obviously regulate regulators have given the banking industry a bit of a respite this year over tdrs suspension uh over the allowance for more aggressive uh extensions and modifications and then we've had just this flush of non-baseline loans and deposits that have given us somewhat of a false sense of comfort around this crisis uh again but as is was clearly said by sean our credit everyone on this call i think would adhere to this our credit lives on main street not wall street uh irrespective of the dyer's record uh recent recovery we're in a recession uh 50 of americans um who don't uh have either indirect or indirect involvement in the stock market through 401ks in many ways are living paycheck to paycheck and are in survival mode not investment mode and and uh these are the bulk of our consumer and certainly small business borrowers and as we all know those of you that own this call is credit management uh specialist understand that's a classic red flag for traditional credit risk so what should we consider doing in 2021 i'm going to talk about eight action items that might be worth your consideration for managing credit risk in this rather unique code and maybe post and hopefully post covet environment one is to know our concentrations uh that's an obvious and we're looking at numbers here also uh from in quick analytics on on new jersey uh this we think so often at the community and regional bank space on cre concentrations and of course we depicted here the 300 100 the broader 300 they're non banks in new jersey that exceed the 300 percent guidance uh they're one there's one bank in new jersey that exceeds the uh construction development 100 guidance on that subset of the broader cre which of course doesn't mean it's uh not uh it's a violation of a regulation it just means that there's even more uh in imperativeness on explaining why you're either at or exceeding those guidelines but i think again as i said earlier covet is leaving us with a lot more of a breadth of need to understand where are concentrations coming from other industries or other borrowers new jersey not uh surprisingly leads in multi-family exposure the middle chart here is is what i tend to call funny money because it really and i i feel for all of you in the banking world that are trying to spend time on strategic planning for loan growth and excuse me organic loan growth for next year because we've had such a massive spike up in cni loans again a lot of that is tpi not surprisingly of course um unlike banks in the midwest new jersey is not uh heavily involved in ag lending but the reason that i wanted to talk about concentrations is the the fdic sponsored study that was published last summer that was excellent relative to fail banks in the last crisis and it basically said that 70 of those bank failures were cre lending focus not surprising we know that but other aspects of it were the high concentrations and late cycle growth of what we call vintages or lack of loan seasoning in other words loans that were made laid in a very healthy or benign credit cycle oftentimes become the most toxic in a period of credit stress excuse me uh also there's a high correlation to collateral dependence which is the worst of both worlds because when you really need collateral oftentimes pressures on collateral valuations are at their greatest and of course there are state and regional market forces that were critical co-variants i do think this whole study can be also applied to any form of concentration that you might be faced with as you look to manage your credit risk in particular as it relates to cre that even since the financial crisis look where we are in terms of commercial banking cre now uh in the whole banking uh space has has now matched the exposure to residential lending and if you take communities and smaller regional banks i would argue that number is probably even exceeding residential lending uh so how do we look at our concentrations again certainly looking at it by band or or loan types would be important these are depictions from our tools that in telecredit uh understanding your concentrations uh relative to your average risk-based capital or community bank leverage ratio whichever approach you're now using for example we had a customer in nebraska that has 650 percent of his uh risk-based capital tied up and ag loans but he's able to quickly disabuse a regulator's concern of that because he's able to show that he has a fairly pristine ag portfolio this is the kind of exercise that i think you're going to be challenged with throughout all of next year with the regulators is explaining what might be uh implicit of adverse exposures or concentrations such that you need to be in a position to allay their their fears that this may be problematic for your bank and if it is problematic start beginning a process of explaining uh how you're mitigating that recognize the varying covet impact on borrowing industries as i said before never before have have uh allegiance to things like nasa codes or industry qualified calculus characterizations been more important in banking and that is the ability for your bank to understand for an example in this case of looking at hospitality loans or restaurant loans that may have significantly different credit risk profiles uh than other industries your need now is going to be able to look at your portfolio as the sum of many parts it's in my opinion it's no longer even reasonable to be thinking of your portfolio as just one entity and how it's performing as a single entity you are needing i think to subset your portfolio uh whether it's into the covet effective loans the pp loans you uh ppp loans or you may be having the s you may have a significant amount of sba loans or asset-based lending loans that you want to begin to treat and analyze and understand in a separate context and and getting or having the ability to do that in a practical technological way i think will be very very helpful for you to understand your portfolio subsets vintages and hotspots another example of this which i is one of my favorite uh approaches and and looks are here's an example of a bell curve depicting risk rate migrations within past categories i might i might add which again for us credit people we tend to i think focus on that because we know that emerging risk in those past categories or deteriorations in those is really the art of credit risk management so the chart to the right on the other hand is a subset of the portfolio as a whole which shows residential construction lending perhaps migrating a bit to the right in terms of the bell curve which implies while not yet criticized classified it does show some deterioration and credit having your ability to do this type of analysis to begin to show your management and your boards and your regulators where you are on these emerging credit risks and what the post-covered landscape has left you i think is going to be critically important in terms of effective credit credit risk management next year and also your frankly relationship with regulators so identifying the stress borrowers many of you are already deep into this what i call tedious process of determining frankly who the winners and losers are in your portfolio relative to the coveted environment and again we are using an example here is where a lot of the qualitative aspects of managing those the credit risk associated with those are are going to be tedious but i think quite necessary into giving you the ability to understand which borrowers are survivors and which are not and and again i hear this quite often from bank practitioners we're just waiting for the next shoe to drop in terms of of what what the credit covett environment leaves us adjust our credit management focuses a few different ways of looking at we've already talked about uh of this aspect of it i think some talent assessment is probably in order we haven't needed special asset or problem on management talent in years in the banking industry frankly because of benign credit that may unfortunately come to a bit of an end in the next couple of years i do think you should look at your policies some of the policies that you've got on in place a much different environment economically and credit wise we all know that one of the traps you you tend to walk into sometimes is regulators will look at what your policy says and then compare that to what your practice is and and if it's not in in sync then obviously you get criticized uh i think we're in an era now where conservatism without overreaction is going to be the name of the game certainly stress testing portfolio at the portfolio level and the loan level which we can certainly offer um but also i think that while many of you on this call are probably not technically mandated to do stress tests we're hearing this anecdotally almost everywhere that regulators are beginning to suggest strongly suggest stress testing of community and regional bank portfolios particularly as a result of what they think the effects of coven may be i do think because of the ability that we have now the big cushion of capital that we have in the banking industry we're going to be in into a focus much more on reserves than charge-offs which frankly dominated the last financial crisis which was really more focused on charge us and probably largely because we just didn't have the capital as much as we do at this point we'll end by talking about government guarantee programs a little bit in a moment but also again avoid the trap of all loans or good loans until they're bad loans because that sounds a little trite but uh it is a trap that i think we bankers get into sometimes over thinking uh well we're not really understanding uh emerging credit risk in the in the in the nuances that they begin to show in the early stages and we also know that there's a current a strong correlation between the early detection of credit risk and the ultimate losses that we that we incur through problem loans i do think it's important for you to begin to look at using any type of practical and affordable quantitative tools that you might have at your disposal to do some of this analysis to identify emerging risk and certainly at a level that's far more revealing than just that someone's past due again focused on risk rate migrations within the past categories i think it's very important that we make loan review more effective and efficient that is one of the hallmarks of intel credit is to try to bring loan review out of the wilderness of just a one-off engagement almost an audit-like process to make it more real-time and interactive with analytic analysis of your portfolio and i do think that's very important as the regulators as you know were already pre-coded concerned about the quality of our credit risk review systems on the presumption that we were going to have a change in the credit cycle anyway and the final issuance of this came in may of this year and and there are things that i think we have to understand why this is a bit of a a of a concern is that there's been a backlog of a lot of loan review because of just the practical implications of kovit not being able to do loan review as as robustly and there's been a backlog of it and of all things that i think you don't want to be caught in is a sense that you're behind schedule on doing loan review or effective loan review again in our world we we like to try to think of bringing oan review in a very interactive and a very dynamic way associated in real time with portfolio analytic work some of the things that i think are going to be very very important for loan review is to make sure that whoever the is doing your independent or or uh external loan review is qualified is no longer adequate to just have a neophyte out there doing uh kind of check the box on documents in a in a credit file you almost need to have someone that's seasoned enough to frankly challenge assumptions within the bank now more than ever because there may be a requirement to do that and again the adhere the early detection of problems within a loan review process actually is it's not a negative it's a it's a positive it saves money in the end so a few of the other questions we'd like to think about again is it in culturally in sync is it does it any have any relevance to your portfolio risk assessment and does suppressing of the loan review work through much of 2020 have some potential to exacerbate more losses later number six was know our vulnerabilities one of the while the texas ratio again is is almost inconsequential obviously it's improved from from the years of the last crisis but one of the things we have to realize is that smaller banks have structural disadvantages when we have waves of credit problems one of those is capital the second is highly subjective and qualitative which is in many cases smaller community banks and regional banks actually know their problem and stress borrowers and it makes it more difficult to deal with that personal aspect and thirdly we're heavily connected to real estate and that is arguably the most uh illiquid of all problem assets uh and problem loans and even in new jersey as you can see in the two fit the larger acknowledged inventory of problem loans even though it's highly uh clean and by any standards it still remains very clean and benign it's the 250 to 500 million dollar banks in new jersey they're currently holding the existing npls and again if we have another wave of that you want to be concerned about it number seven is to write your own credit risk management profile before the regulator does it for you that again seems rather obvious and and logical but again i think of all the things we talked about that may be your your most uh daunting challenge uh in 2021 is be sure you are ahead of the regulator in understanding what is unique to your own bank's credit risk management profile because they will certainly write it for you if they face a vacuum number eight is finding an alternative source for loan growth we all know that as sean alluded to the economic stresses i have basically created an environment where the traditional quality of loan borrower has has has been reduced um and and and sources for traditional organic loan growth are going to be even more challenging in 2021 and probably into 2022. one source is clearly to go ahead and embrace uh government guaranteed lending earlier this week i spoke on a webinar with one of the larger uh providers of sba lending and usda lending uh hope meyer monson and the point there is that this would be an opportunity for you to either convert some of the ppp loans uh certainly uh create some more organic loan growth under the patronage of an additional underwriter of the risk again this is the point of i said earlier about continuing the goodwill garnered by the ppp programs and being seen as an active embracer of the sba or usda lending programs in a way to provide legitimate lending and a very stressed time for these so-called main street borrowers and of course there's some profitability associated with that from the fees and the secondary market sales associated with that uh having said that i believe that uh we are into another slide with sean and i appreciate the opportunity to be with you today thank you david uh yes and so uh just to jump back and just uh talk a little bit uh here before we close just a reminder of some of the things we're trying to do at quick analytics and in telecredit to you know help you navigate this environment better for those of you who haven't looked at quick analytics we have a number of tools including a portfolio stress test we'll be adding bank market research data that includes uh thread data that you can do research on lending we are updating our portfolio credit stress test solution uh we are actually making a lot more interactive we have a webinar coming up in december that will discuss how banks can use it but it's a very easy way to run a portfolio level credit stress test so again just some actionable items that you can incorporate into into your own analysis it allows you to build in your own internal capital target levels as well as factor any potential capital raises look at your own periods of stress and pick the appropriate time period so again just trying to where we can save you time by doing a lot of the data aggregation work so you can spend your time analyzing uh the results for those of you who have seen it we do have what's called an excel add-in tool uh one of the requests we've gotten from users is to incorporate credit union data so that they can see that when appropriate so we will be adding that in january or excuse me in february with the year end call report uh release information uh as i mentioned uh we have the fred data will be including for the for the larger banks if you are looking for an investor relations solution if your bank is traded there are some recent sec updates about requirements in order to have your stock uh traded uh our page will accompany or address that and allow uh either for you to host it uh or for us to host it and this is just an example of that so i think the bottom line what we're trying to just demonstrate is that you know we've tried to continue to build much in the spirit of what quick rate has been been doing for banks for 30 years is build affordable easy to use solutions we understand if you've got things in place but if you're looking for ways to drive some inefficiencies we think we've built some really uh not only affordable solutions but very efficient uh solutions um and it's a way to just you know evaluate and improve some of your services so i'd encourage you to do that as david mentioned uh you know intellicredit can assist for those of you who have internal loan review departments we can drive efficiencies there and then you can enhance your current loan review experience if you use external by incorporating our portfolio analyzer tool uh you know possibly at the same cost of your current current loan review so again we recognize the challenges banks are facing we're trying to give you options uh to again to drive efficiencies and maybe save some money on multiple um uh vendors um david i don't know if you want to take this one i'll take go ahead yeah i i just think that the the real key to it if you don't mind is is just reminding that you know can you can you navigate between macro and transactional credit risk is going to be the real key of understanding what macro trends may show but then can you explain what individual transactional borrowers are creating those either positive or negative trends again the the name of the game next year is going to be do you know your credit hot spots and do you have the capabilities to subset your portfolio in an efficient way as as sean just alluded to can you customize any view of your portfolio to to to write your own script and does your loan review interface in any way with portfolio diagnostics because i do believe loan view is going to be back in in heavy attention in the next two to three years and i would say that i'd like to this again sounds very uh almost a platitude but avoid too many credit surprises i've worked with management and boards for over the years and i have found that that is the one toxic issue that tends to get in the way between boards and management is that if one particular boards feel like there's way too many credit surprises there always will be credit surprises but what we don't want to have is uh too much too many because it conjures up either an issue of transparency or competency at the management level so having said those these are the tools that we feel like that the intelli credit portal credit risk management solution offer you uh it stays on top of your risk it gives you your credit hot spots it gives you your instant reports any way you like it if the data exists and it has an interface and interactivity with your loan view which as sean said can be done internally or to enhance a third party loan review experience okay thank you david uh again we certainly if there's any questions uh we will take those now there is an icon uh if you if you have any questions in the as we wait just to see if any come in or if they're already here let me check um in the meantime if uh it doesn't appear that we have any questions today i would thank you all very much for taking time out of what i know is a busy day to listen to our presentation uh we are proud to uh be associated with the new jersey bankers association we appreciate the opportunity to present to you today we'd invite all of you to schedule a tour of quick analytics or share a flat file with us and we can show you what intellicritic can do or if you're haven't scheduled your loan review for 2021 yet certainly maybe uh ask for the opportunity to submit a proposal on that we'll leave this screen up for you but otherwise be safe be well thanks again for joining us and let us know if we can be of help to you thank you so much