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How is Harvard Business School so out of touch with Apple Pay?
“Rail travel at high speeds is not possible because passengers, unable to breathe, would die of asphyxia.”-Dionysius Lardner, Professor of Natural Philosophy and Astronomy at University College, London, 1830It hurts my heart to see an esteemed university publish such a regrettable article. It is also shocking that there was no empirical based insight published, just agenda ladened conjecture. In some ways I am not surprised. Academia has misunderstood the payments industry for over 50 years and I have tried and have been successful to help quite a number of well known professors understand the details. However, if one were to go by the postulations some Professors have presented over the years, the payments industry should not exist. There is much to learn from these insights and surprisingly many of them were adopted by some payment startups, advisors, board members and VCs. I will address the idle conjecture from this article, section by section:Apple Pay’s Technology Adoption ProblemApple wants to convert your iPhone into a digital wallet with Apple Pay. Professors Benjamin Edelman and Willy Shih assess its chances for success and wonder if consumers have a compelling reason to make the switch.This is a mostly correct insight. It may turn out to be ironic wording on the part of the author. To be clear, no one needs to “switch”.On the eve of debuting its digital payment system, Apple Pay, two Harvard Business School professors think the Cupertino company will have trouble coming up with an equally compelling message to drive sales of a service that allows you to pay at the retail counter with a swipe of an iPhone.No iPhones are “swiped” during a transaction, they are held at short distance for a few seconds in front of a customer facing terminal. "What does it do for me as a consumer?" asks Associate Professor Benjamin Edelman. “Why would I want to trade for something that already works [e.g. credit and debit cards], something that doesn't complain when it gets wet in the rain, something that doesn't complain when I launder my pants?"Why would I want to trade in an iPod, for something that already works, the Sony Walkman and use the cassette tapes that already work. This is a comment that shows a professor that truly does not understand the history of technology. Especially, he adds, when those cards give users and additional 1 or 2 percent off the purchase price. “I think Apple has its work ahead in convincing thoughtful and potentially skeptical customers," says Edelman.There is little that one can draw from this passage. There is no loss of 1 or 2 percent if the cards offered them before, they will be offered in the exact same manner via Apple Pay. ON WITH THE SHOWReports say Apple will roll out the digital payment service later this week, with perhaps more details coming at a press conference Thursday. But will it catch on, especially when several other similar services with big name sponsors such as Google have failed to gain much traction?The element that was overlooked by this professor is the fact that very little is similar to the business processes and business relationships Apple used in relationship to Google. Apple choose wisely to work with every element of the existing payments ecosystem. History will show, and likely this university will teach, that this was the primary premise that made Apple Pay the largest change since the invention of the magnetic stripe. Apple has a chicken-and-egg game to solve. Consumers won't use the service unless they are in use at a compelling number of stores. But merchants won’t install the expensive near field communications readers used by Apple Pay unless consumer demand is high.First off, Apple must convince merchants to adopt its service, says Willy Shih, the Robert and Jane Cizik Professor of Management Practice.“I THINK APPLE HAS ITS WORK AHEAD IN CONVINCING THOUGHTFUL AND POTENTIALLY SKEPTICAL CUSTOMERS”Only about 10 percent of retailers use NFC readers, and at least one retailer—Best Buy—stopped using them because they were too expensive. Officials with both Best Buy and Walmart have said the retailers have no plans, at least right now, of accepting the new payments technology in their stores.There will always be a “Chicken / Egg” issue with any system that would require equipment upgrades. However this article assumes over 200,000 of the most popular businesses in the US is not “a compelling number of stores”. It took 30 years for Visa and MasterCard to have over 200,000 businesses. It took over 5 years for Discover to have over 200,000 business locations. The professors did not even do a single empirical study to gain insights about the number of actual businesses and the demand to upgrade. I am performing these studies and can say that early results point of almost 300,000 locations and a demand that has shot up by over 3,000% and growing among small to large businesses.Thus Apple will not have “work” to convince merchants, the huge drive is coming from merchants and banks wanting to implement the service.Best Buy stopped using NFC for only one reason, they were not paying PIN based debit rates for these transactions and Apple is on the way to get these types of cards to be confirmed using biometric PINs. Shih believes merchants who consider adopting Apple Pay will naturally wonder: What do we get out of this? And they will specifically want to know if they will be asked to pay higher fees than credit card companies are charging?The data that Professor Shih has is invalid. The merchant is paying the exact same rate as with any other credit card. What they get out of it is manifold but no one can argue that the increase in speed is one foundational benefit. "Consumers might be motivated to do it, but if I don't have the merchant side in place, it doesn't matter," Shih says. "The merchants certainly aren't going to be motivated if the economic model is less favorable than today. It’s a complicated puzzle."The data that Professor Shih has is invalid. The economic model is not a “complicated puzzle to anyone other then Professor Shih.Apple has touted that Apple Pay will be supported by several leading retailers, including Bloomingdale's, McDonald's, and Macy's—and that it will work at about 220,000 merchant locations across the United States that have enabled contactless payments. But some analysts believe that's a small number compared with the nine million US merchants that currently accept credit cards. In short, Apple has a long way to go to knock off the established credit card system, Shih says.There is some valid information here. However 80% of the dollar volume in retail payment card sales come from 20% of merchants. Apple will have coverage of about 70% of these merchants by year end. My research suggests that a tremendous number of smaller merchants will fill in these numbers as 2015 winds out. "Ecosystems are very delicately balanced, and the current payment system represents a balance that has resulted from 40 years of evolution. There's a lot of inertia around that," Shih says. "You can have great technology, but you really have to line up the complementary assets so all the pieces play with you and they are motivated to make it work. At the end of the day, Apple is going to have to make the economics work for everybody. That is a hard job.”Professor Shih is still functioning on invalid data about the “economics”. The economics are exactly the same.DO CUSTOMERS CARE?Which brings us to the customer side of the chicken-and-egg conundrum. Millions of shoppers have used cards for years, with little hassle. Edelman points out that people will continue to carry cards even if digital payments gain some traction, so the barrier to overcome for mass acceptance is even higher.Millions of people used payment cards every day at Starbucks. But somehow 6 million weekly transactions in the U.S a full 15% of transactions made at the U.S. Starbucks-operated stores are made on the Starbucks wallet. The barriers these users overcome are huge, they have to buy credits using a payment card to even operate the wallet, yet this barrier is overcome 6 million times per week.Edelman has studied Bitcoin, a software-based online payment system, and he sees similarities between technology adoption roadblocks Bitcoin has encountered and issues Apple Pay is likely to face."Apple Pay has the same problems as Bitcoin: There's no reason for the regular consumer to use it," he says. “Why would a consumer want to make a $100 purchase with Bitcoin when the consumer can pay with a credit card and get 2 percent cash back?"There is absolutely no comparison to Apple Pay and Bitcoin. Professor Edelman is also operating on invalid data. The payment card that pays 2% back will continue to pay 2% back with Apple Pay.In addition to the limited number of merchants, Apple Pay appears to be limited to users of the latest iPhone 6, iPhone 6 Plus, and Apple Watch—which leaves out many consumers with older iPhones or Android models.“Apple might be hamstrung by an incompatibility issue that the company intentionally introduced," Edelman says.The system works on iPhone 6 series phones. There is no doubt that there will be similar Android initiatives. The picture is very clear, if you have an iPhone 6 series phone, it works. This is not an incompatibility issue. Shih agrees that selling technology is tricky in a market full of incompatible products.Yes, yes it is."We're in a period now where you see this design competition with competing offerings, and on top of that, you have a platform competition where everyone has their network effects," he said. "It's like PlayStation versus Xbox. The technology convergence has brought us to a place where people are scrambling to come up with a new platform and trying to become the new dominant design.”Great insight about video game platforms. However they have no analogy with the subject of Apple Pay.Other companies that have attempted mobile payments have run into similar problems. Google Wallet was limited by its compatibility with different types of phones and cellular networks. And Softcard, which was backed by major wireless carriers, has seen little traction with its mobile wallet for similar reasons.This is correct. This is one of the most accurate insights from these professors. The destiny of Google Wallet was never in the hands of Google and thus it contributed to the failure of the system. This is not the case with Apple Pay. PITCHING SECURITYOne marketing pitch Apple is sure to try out with potential users is security, especially after notable bsignNowes at Home Depot and Target. When a customer pays with an iPhone, cashiers won't see the consumer's name, credit card number or security code because Apple uses a fingerprint reader on its recent iPhones to confirm identities. And when consumers add a credit or debit card with Apple Pay, the card number is not stored by Apple—instead, Apple provides a unique device account number for each transaction. In addition, the company says it won’t collect consumers' purchase history.Very accurate assertion.Edelman questions whether addressing security and privacy will be enough of a carrot to wean consumers off of their beloved plastic. Hesays other companies have tried to market the security angle, including the RevolutionCard, a PIN-based credit card that had no name, signature, or account number on it so that if it got lost or stolen, it couldn't be used unless the PIN was known. "It was stillborn," Edelman says. "It didn't work as a feature set. No one cared.”Professor Edelman is partly correct about the failure of Steve Case’s Gratis Card and The Revolution Money Card. However the professor is operating on invalid data. Apple Pay is not a card replacement. Apple Pay is a security wrapped around the existing payment card issuer relationship.“APPLE PAY HAS THE SAME PROBLEMS AS BITCOIN. THERE’S NO REASON FOR THE REGULAR CONSUMER TO USE IT”Even recent high-profile data bsignNowes have not led consumers to abandon credit cards in signNow numbers. "Security doesn't work for the thoughtful consumer," Edelman says. "(Data bsignNowes) mostly mean inconvenience for the consumer because the losses are really borne by banks, merchants, and credit cards, not by consumers."Besides, Shih wonders whether data will be any safer with the Apple Pay system.I think Professor Shih may need to conduct a study on how the Target bsignNow impacted consumers. I have not conducted a deep study but can state clearly that some consumers had their bank account zeroed out in the early days of the bsignNow and the banks were not crediting back the transaction that appeared “valid” from debit card bsignNowes. I know of a case where a single mom had missed rent and food because of the missing funds in her checking account for days. Although this is anecdotal, there are many examples vetted by the media. I would also ask Professor Shih to speak with any merchant that has been a victim of a major bsignNow about how systems like Apple Pay would have saved them millions of dollars in fines and replacement costs to card holders. "The fingerprint reader generating a unique code is pretty smart," he acknowledges. "But it electronically seems to do the same thing as a PIN code. And to the extent that the code goes into the existing payment network that's still not secure, have we really accomplished anything?"TouchID is far and away more secure then a 4 digit PIN code. The math is quite simple. But just the logic, it take very little time to guess a PIN number. It takes a great deal of time to try to fake a finger print that is acceptable to TouchID. In many cases it is impossible to fake a fingerprint unless you have intimate access to the target. Thus a faster way to steal money is a PIN number and not a finger print. CAN YOU PAY ME NOW?Other technical questions remain. Edelman wants to know whether Apple Pay will work if the phone isn’t charged, or in areas with poor cell reception?This would be better addressed by studying the technology and not using a a guessing game. Apple Pay will work with zero cell or WiFi reception. Apple Pay will work with a low battery. Apple Pay will stop working if there is no way to power on the iPhone. Apple may release more details tomorrow, so time will tell whether the company will address some of the system's potential shortcomings—and perhaps more important, whether regardless of any shortcomings, merchants and consumers will embrace this new mode of payment. Either way, even if Apple stumbles with its mobile wallet, the company will likely survive the reputation hit.Yes, they addressed the shortcomings. Apple announced that instead of 7 banks supporting Apple Pay payment cards, there are now over 500."Any failure Apple experiences here will be more than offset by the legions of fans that like their other stuff," Edelman said. “I'm not losing any sleep for Apple."I think Professor Edelman can sleep soundly. He has articulated how some academics, even notable academics are all too human. We are fallible. I hope that history is kind with these Professors.
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How secure is WhatsApp's new end-to-end encryption?
Warning long answer!Since 1990, I’ve been studying the confidentiality of the messaging systems on computers and mobile devices.It was obvious that the electronic forums, emails and SMS messages could easily be intercepted by 3rd parties. Expecting the service providing companies to develop and implement confidentiality protocols were unrealistic. There were never a general consensus about the need for confidentiality or inter-service protocol development.With the discouragement of the governments many computer scientists shied away from creating software to keep communication confidential between parties.Many spy movies showed advanced technologies to keep the communication between spies and their organizations. The most famous being the Enigma machine used by the Germans during the World War 2. British scientist Alan Turing was the one to develop an early version of today’s computers to solve the mystery of the Enigma machine. Like every visionary he had serious problems with the establishment. After the government discovering that he was gay, he was given 2 options. First option was jail time until he turned heterosexual, or chemical castration. Poor Turing chose the second option and after a while he committed suicide. Every cryptologist today remembers to what happened to the first representative of this science.Without getting into the technological terms (they are all available on Wikipedia) the best way to keep conversation confidential is to use a code book between 2 (or more, but more on that later) parties. A code book is a simple definition and a list of codes that is shared between the parties and each code is used only once. Unless the code book is compromised this method of communication privacy is bullet proof. There is no computer in the world, and there won’t be any in the future that can figure out what the communication is. The only method would be the old school spying on the parties who are communicating between each other.If I need to give an example for the method above, it would be like, let’s choose a newspaper that is accessible to both parties. That will be our message base.Let’s define a codebook now:First code in the book is3–4,6–7,1–2 and repeats itselfsecond code is5–7,3–1,8–5,4–2 and repeats itselfSo let’s say I send you a message today like20,42,15,5,8,67,23,56,12,43,13,11,10Since it is our first message exchange you will use the first code in the book. Also our message base is only known to us which also makes it even more difficult for others to understand the secret message I just sent you.To understand the message, here is what you do: you pick up today’s New York Times which is the newspaper we agreed to use.Take the first number in the secret message which is 20, then look in the codebook for the first code which is 3–4. You go to the 3rd page find the 4th paragraph and get the 20th character and repeat this process for each number in the secret message I sent.Let’s say MI6 is trying to intercept the message, which they do because I sent the message by email or SMS or event with both to you.All they have is 20,42,15,5,8,67,23,56,12,43,13,11,10 and they have no idea what it means. They don’t know which text source we used, which was New York Times and they don’t know the code we used for that message which was 3–4,6–7,1–2. We can even make this more difficult, for each day of the week we use a different newspaper that we agree upon.And let’s say MI6 figures out which newspaper we use for each day, let’s say they even figure out our code mechanism which is the page, paragraph and character to decode the secret message.As long as we use each line of code only once and never repeat used codes, there is virtually no way that MI6 to figure out our conversation. Except of course sending their double o agent to one of us and beating us in the head with an iron bar which would make us sing like a bird and spill all the secrets.As you can see in the example an iron bar, strategically placed on your head with a moderate blow would break all the code we established.That reality aside, if I whisper to your ear the newspaper names and hand you a piece of paper with a list of codes which I also have the same copy, until ve run out of codes there is no way our communication can be interpreted when intercepted.The difficulty in this type of message confidentiality is sharing and keeping a piece of paper with a list of codes and do the code exchange again when the list of codes are depleted and never use a code again.When this is not possible for practical reasons like distance between parties or the number of messages exchanged being too high and frequent the methodology used is computer based encryption (ensuring the confidentiality of communication between parties) of messages.This is also not so unlike what we did in the first example. To create our never ending codes is that for each message we exchange we use 3 constants. You have a master key, a public key and we agree on a mathematical formula which is very very difficult for the computer to solve. The difficulty here ensures that the time to try every combination of variables (without the master key) for the formula is so long, it practically makes it impossible for others to guess our code list.In this method I also have a master key and a public key. To solve the issue of keeping a list of established codes and communicating that between parties we freely exchange our public keys with everyone and when I’m sending you a message, I use your public key (any of my keys except generating a special signature with my private key so that you can validate with my public key that ensures the message has originated really from me) to create a confidential message. When you receive it by email, SMS or regular post mail, you use your private key which can only find out the contents of the confidential message. And since we are talking about computer systems, we protect our private keys with passwords.I don’t like using names given by computer engineers or any other technical person but for the sake of clarification this master/public key and an established algorithm to use is called public private key cryptology.Another term I don’t like is ‘end to end encryption’. This is to confirm that the cryptology method used can not be intercepted by other parties and only the recipient can understand the contents of the message.One company who has developed an implementation of end to end encryption is Open Whisper Systems. They named their product ‘Signal’ which is a platform and also the name of their app on iOS and Android. Their product uses this public private key cryptology to ensure the text and voice communications between parties to stay confidential. Supposedly the infamous NSA whistle blower Edward Snowden uses their app and he considers it quite good.Now let’s circle back to the WhatsApp security issue. WhatsApp is using the protocol established by the Open Whisper Systems for their public private key protected communications (audio, video and text messages).The problem is the user friendliness of the Signal app is not good. There are certain times that these public and private keys have to be changed. 2 example of those times is if you change your phone or uninstall / reinstall your app (whichever app you are using, Signal or WhatsApp)To test the user friendliness of Signal App’s handling the change of the key pairs (public private key combinations) I used my regular human guinea pig Riz. It was very difficult for me to explain what he has to do and also to find the location of the menu items were horribly difficult. After cursing at me and the app designers many times Riz completed the approval of the new key exchange between us so we could communicate again.Let’s have a look into how WhatsApp has implemented this renewal of key pairs between users. Since authenticity of a user can only identified by trusting their private key signed signature and for the likely case of the user have a new phone or has reinstalled the WhatsApp App, WhatsApp servers keep a copy of the secret message until the recipient downloads it. Now let’s say that you sent me a message while I was offline and I changed phones meanwhile. When I get that message from you what the Signal app does is, it warns me and it won’t let you communicate with you until I approve your new public key (in the style of a combined public keys of both parties because there is only one code that needs to be verified on both ends). Instead of asking user to do the verification what WhatsApp does it re-encrypts your message with my new key again (in their explanation by asking your WhatsApp to keep that message in memory in encrypted form and first decrypt then re-encrypt the same message with my new public key) without asking neither of us to re-confirm the identity of both parties.This technically opens up a backdoor for intelligence agencies to decrypt the messages between parties.How does that happen? WhatsApp confirms App installation by SMS confirmation. Let’s say I want to intercept your WhatsApp messages. I send a team in a delivery van which looks like a repair van but which has a mobile communication signal jammer to your home address. The jamming is smart enough to make your phone think it is still in network coverage so you don’t suspect a thing unless you try to make a call which will look like mobile network is crowded and unavailable. While I knock your phone off the network I can do 2 things, I can either intercept any SMS messages which comes your way in my service van, or give a court order to the mobile phone company to give me a copy of your SMS messages in real time.Then I install WhatsApp on a new phone, enter your phone number as my number and receive a copy of the SMS confirmation with the verification number and enter it in WhatsApp. From that moment on I will receive any waiting (since I knocked you off mobile network) and any news messages WhatsApp users send to you.Intentional or unintentional this is a secret door that can be easily used by government agencies.If I used the above technique to intercept messages between Signal users, what would happen were to be, first I couldn’t receive any messages waiting in the cloud because Signal does not keep messages in the cloud, when you are offline, the message waits in the sender’s Signal App. When the sender tries to send a new or resend the unsent message to you, my new installation of Signal app on my government agency phone will inform your friend, the sender that I’ve changed our shared agreed secret code and asks your friend if s/he wants to approve this new installation on the other end by confirming the new shared secret code with you. When s/he calls you on your landline, you say you haven’t installed a new WhatsApp on your phone or changed phones, you both understand that there is another party in between trying to intercept your messages.Now, WhatsApp says that there is an option in their App, under Settings / Account / Security / Show Security Notifications which is by default off. If you turn this ON then their claim is you will receive notifications when a contact’s security code has changed. They don’t say if the messages will still be delivered in spite of a security notification or not. They add that ‘The messages you send your calls are encrypted regardless of this setting, WHEN POSSIBLE’. I capitalized the last 2 words, what the heck ‘WHEN POSSIBLE’ mean? They also do not say anything about the messages you are going to receive. Even though you enable this warning setting on, if your friend’s setting is not on, they will not be notified if the messages they are sending to you are intercepted.This unintentional secret door is called a ‘user friendly design choice’ by WhatsApp. It is such a user friendly design choice it is government agents friendly as well. I can’t imagine how many diplomats already delivered confidential messages to enemy agencies using WhatsApp. Diplomats in Brussels wake up and smell the coffee…
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How secure is WhatsApp? What does the company have to say about the recent security flaws pointed out in their app?
Since 1990, I’ve been studying the confidentiality of the messaging systems on computers and mobile devices.It was obvious that the electronic forums, emails and SMS messages could easily be intercepted by 3rd parties. Expecting the service providing companies to develop and implement confidentiality protocols were unrealistic. There were never a general consensus about the need for confidentiality or inter-service protocol development.With the discouragement of the governments many computer scientists shied away from creating software to keep communication confidential between parties.Many spy movies showed advanced technologies to keep the communication between spies and their organizations. The most famous being the Enigma machine used by the Germans during the World War 2. British scientist Alan Turing was the one to develop an early version of today’s computers to solve the mystery of the Enigma machine. Like every visionary he had serious problems with the establishment. After the government discovering that he was gay, he was given 2 options. First option was jail time until he turned heterosexual, or chemical castration. Poor Turing chose the second option and after a while he committed suicide. Every cryptologist today remembers to what happened to the first representative of this science.Without getting into the technological terms (they are all available on Wikipedia) the best way to keep conversation confidential is to use a code book between 2 (or more, but more on that later) parties. A code book is a simple definition and a list of codes that is shared between the parties and each code is used only once. Unless the code book is compromised this method of communication privacy is bullet proof. There is no computer in the world, and there won’t be any in the future that can figure out what the communication is. The only method would be the old school spying on the parties who are communicating between each other.If I need to give an example for the method above, it would be like, let’s choose a newspaper that is accessible to both parties. That will be our message base.Let’s define a codebook now:First code in the book is3–4,6–7,1–2 and repeats itselfsecond code is5–7,3–1,8–5,4–2 and repeats itselfSo let’s say I send you a message today like20,42,15,5,8,67,23,56,12,43,13,11,10Since it is our first message exchange you will use the first code in the book. Also our message base is only known to us which also makes it even more difficult for others to understand the secret message I just sent you.To understand the message, here is what you do: you pick up today’s New York Times which is the newspaper we agreed to use.Take the first number in the secret message which is 20, then look in the codebook for the first code which is 3–4. You go to the 3rd page find the 4th paragraph and get the 20th character and repeat this process for each number in the secret message I sent.Let’s say MI6 is trying to intercept the message, which they do because I sent the message by email or SMS or event with both to you.All they have is 20,42,15,5,8,67,23,56,12,43,13,11,10 and they have no idea what it means. They don’t know which text source we used, which was New York Times and they don’t know the code we used for that message which was 3–4,6–7,1–2. We can even make this more difficult, for each day of the week we use a different newspaper that we agree upon.And let’s say MI6 figures out which newspaper we use for each day, let’s say they even figure out our code mechanism which is the page, paragraph and character to decode the secret message.As long as we use each line of code only once and never repeat used codes, there is virtually no way that MI6 to figure out our conversation. Except of course sending their double o agent to one of us and beating us in the head with an iron bar which would make us sing like a bird and spill all the secrets.As you can see in the example an iron bar, strategically placed on your head with a moderate blow would break all the code we established.That reality aside, if I whisper to your ear the newspaper names and hand you a piece of paper with a list of codes which I also have the same copy, until ve run out of codes there is no way our communication can be interpreted when intercepted.The difficulty in this type of message confidentiality is sharing and keeping a piece of paper with a list of codes and do the code exchange again when the list of codes are depleted and never use a code again.When this is not possible for practical reasons like distance between parties or the number of messages exchanged being too high and frequent the methodology used is computer based encryption (ensuring the confidentiality of communication between parties) of messages.This is also not so unlike what we did in the first example. To create our never ending codes is that for each message we exchange we use 3 constants. You have a master key, a public key and we agree on a mathematical formula which is very very difficult for the computer to solve. The difficulty here ensures that the time to try every combination of variables (without the master key) for the formula is so long, it practically makes it impossible for others to guess our code list.In this method I also have a master key and a public key. To solve the issue of keeping a list of established codes and communicating that between parties we freely exchange our public keys with everyone and when I’m sending you a message, I use your public key (any of my keys except generating a special signature with my private key so that you can validate with my public key that ensures the message has originated really from me) to create a confidential message. When you receive it by email, SMS or regular post mail, you use your private key which can only find out the contents of the confidential message. And since we are talking about computer systems, we protect our private keys with passwords.I don’t like using names given by computer engineers or any other technical person but for the sake of clarification this master/public key and an established algorithm to use is called public private key cryptology.Another term I don’t like is ‘end to end encryption’. This is to confirm that the cryptology method used can not be intercepted by other parties and only the recipient can understand the contents of the message.One company who has developed an implementation of end to end encryption is Open Whisper Systems. They named their product ‘Signal’ which is a platform and also the name of their app on iOS and Android. Their product uses this public private key cryptology to ensure the text and voice communications between parties to stay confidential. Supposedly the infamous NSA whistle blower Edward Snowden uses their app and he considers it quite good.Now let’s circle back to the WhatsApp security issue. WhatsApp is using the protocol established by the Open Whisper Systems for their public private key protected communications (audio, video and text messages).The problem is the user friendliness of the Signal app is not good. There are certain times that these public and private keys have to be changed. 2 example of those times is if you change your phone or uninstall / reinstall your app (whichever app you are using, Signal or WhatsApp)To test the user friendliness of Signal App’s handling the change of the key pairs (public private key combinations) I used my regular human guinea pig Riz. It was very difficult for me to explain what he has to do and also to find the location of the menu items were horribly difficult. After cursing at me and the app designers many times Riz completed the approval of the new key exchange between us so we could communicate again.Let’s have a look into how WhatsApp has implemented this renewal of key pairs between users. Since authenticity of a user can only identified by trusting their private key signed signature and for the likely case of the user have a new phone or has reinstalled the WhatsApp App, WhatsApp servers keep a copy of the secret message until the recipient downloads it. Now let’s say that you sent me a message while I was offline and I changed phones meanwhile. When I get that message from you what the Signal app does is, it warns me and it won’t let you communicate with you until I approve your new public key (in the style of a combined public keys of both parties because there is only one code that needs to be verified on both ends). Instead of asking user to do the verification what WhatsApp does it re-encrypts your message with my new key again (in their explanation by asking your WhatsApp to keep that message in memory in encrypted form and first decrypt then re-encrypt the same message with my new public key) without asking neither of us to re-confirm the identity of both parties.This technically opens up a backdoor for intelligence agencies to decrypt the messages between parties.How does that happen? WhatsApp confirms App installation by SMS confirmation. Let’s say I want to intercept your WhatsApp messages. I send a team in a delivery van which looks like a repair van but which has a mobile communication signal jammer to your home address. The jamming is smart enough to make your phone think it is still in network coverage so you don’t suspect a thing unless you try to make a call which will look like mobile network is crowded and unavailable. While I knock your phone off the network I can do 2 things, I can either intercept any SMS messages which comes your way in my service van, or give a court order to the mobile phone company to give me a copy of your SMS messages in real time.Then I install WhatsApp on a new phone, enter your phone number as my number and receive a copy of the SMS confirmation with the verification number and enter it in WhatsApp. From that moment on I will receive any waiting (since I knocked you off mobile network) and any news messages WhatsApp users send to you.Intentional or unintentional this is a secret door that can be easily used by government agencies.If I used the above technique to intercept messages between Signal users, what would happen were to be, first I couldn’t receive any messages waiting in the cloud because Signal does not keep messages in the cloud, when you are offline, the message waits in the sender’s Signal App. When the sender tries to send a new or resend the unsent message to you, my new installation of Signal app on my government agency phone will inform your friend, the sender that I’ve changed our shared agreed secret code and asks your friend if s/he wants to approve this new installation on the other end by confirming the new shared secret code with you. When s/he calls you on your landline, you say you haven’t installed a new WhatsApp on your phone or changed phones, you both understand that there is another party in between trying to intercept your messages.Now, WhatsApp says that there is an option in their App, under Settings / Account / Security / Show Security Notifications which is by default off. If you turn this ON then their claim is you will receive notifications when a contact’s security code has changed. They don’t say if the messages will still be delivered in spite of a security notification or not. They add that ‘The messages you send your calls are encrypted regardless of this setting, WHEN POSSIBLE’. I capitalized the last 2 words, what the heck ‘WHEN POSSIBLE’ mean? They also do not say anything about the messages you are going to receive. Even though you enable this warning setting on, if your friend’s setting is not on, they will not be notified if the messages they are sending to you are intercepted.This unintentional secret door is called a ‘user friendly design choice’ by WhatsApp. It is such a user friendly design choice it is government agents friendly as well. I can’t imagine how many diplomats already delivered confidential messages to enemy agencies using WhatsApp. Diplomats in Brussels wake up and smell the coffee…
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