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Redline succession agreement

hi everybody welcome and thank you for joining us good morning good afternoon good evening from wherever you are my name is Hafsa Halawa I'm a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute and I'm very happy to be invited by Carnegie's Middle East program and dr. Michelle dam to moderate this very timely discussion on Egypt today today our panel will be discussing enduring challenges in Egypt in a time of pandemic challenges faced by the coab in nineteen crisis ongoing issues related to domestic freedoms with continuing arrests of journalists and actors as well as the public health crisis Egypt is increasingly under the gun enduring security challenges that have reached an inflection point including Nile water access and the ongoing stalemate with the tripartite countries over the GERD dam in Ethiopia the escalation in Libya and questions of Egypt's military engagement and ongoing insurgency in Sinai and the effect not just of that but of the pandemic or marginalized communities in the Sinai Peninsula and also other places such as the Nubian community we are going to have a 30 to 40 minute discussion with our excellent panel that I will introduce to you shortly and then we'll open up for questions please notes I'm sure everybody is perfectly worst on zoom and webinar etiquette to date after the the months of lockdown but you can submit your questions at any time in the chat window via YouTube you can also submit anonymous or private questions via email to Middle East at sea EIP gorg that's Middle East at sea EIP org this panel is the third and final of a three events ear is hosted by Carnegie's at least program entitled Egypt faces the pandemic the first event on health and economic effects and the second event related to politics rights and global dynamics are both available for viewing on YouTube and via the Carnegie website and I thoroughly encourage those who haven't yet had a chance to see them to go and access that those discussions I'm going to introduce our panelists today this afternoon we have three phenomenal Egyptian speakers with us Mohamed Fadel is the program coordinator for civil society partnerships at the project on Middle Eastern mock receipt in the United States in Washington DC Shirley flesh Mary is an associate analyst with control risks global risk analysis team leading the analysis on North Africa based in Dawei in the United Arab Emirates and Sharif Moshe Dean is a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Centre in Beirut welcome to all three of you and thank you for joining us this afternoon again just to repeat after our panel discussions will open up for questions so please remember questions are open from now so please feel free to submit your questions even during the panel discussion as I mentioned by email or via the YouTube chat so thank you to the three of you for joining we're gonna dive right in straight away and turn to you you actually flash Mary to discuss Libya the conflict in Libya obviously has shifted dramatically in recent weeks how would you how do you view Egypt's assessments of the current situation and their priorities in regards to the conflict would you argue that half that is still a major part of the policy or no longer I think you're off so it's a pleasure to be on this panel I think to understand Egypt's concerns regarding Libya I think we need to remember that Libya is is the only country in North Africa and arguably in the MENA region as well where the post 2011 bring questions remain unsettled the absurd a to the ideological orientation of the political establishment the foreign alliances and the model of governance and the remains a great deal of fluidity in Libya which partly explains the kind of regional competition that we've been seeing over the past decade and our playing out more intensely now as we speak in order to shape the future of Libya so just to give sort of a very quick summary of the changing dynamics in the Libyan conflict so over the past two months we've seen a complete reversal of the diet's as the forces aligned with the government of national Accord in Tripoli supported by Turkish drones equipment and fighters / mercenaries were able to force the Libyan National Army which is Egypt's ally to retreat from northwestern Libya which effectively meant the end of the Tripoli offensive that was launched in April 2019 by the Libyan National Army to capture the capital Tripoli the result of this was that that ji and he the camera of national Accord aligned groups became on the offensive now with ongoing attempts to build on the momentum to capture more territory in central and eastern Libya at the expense of the enemy specifically now this is playing out around the areas of absurd on the Central Coast on central coastal in central coast of Libya as well as the central java district so there were the way each of these views this development is is definitely with a great deal of concern it has invested significant capital in its relationship with the elderly since 2014 as a security partner on its on its western border and now it's seen these forces collapsing in advancing at the face of the advancing GNA aligned groups will then show potential ramifications for the cohesiveness of the and it's it's also seeing a plethora of militias affiliated with the GNA including Islamist elements that are hostile to Egypt because of its support to D to D attorney in recent years advancing eastwards and backed by creation of the rivals of Egypt mainly Turkey and to a lesser extent other so in terms of Egypt's priorities I think there are two key priorities first of all is security the security observe 1200 kilometer border that that separates Egypt from Libya which has been a hot spot of smuggling activity and militant infiltration since 2011 which affected security in the Western Desert of Egypt as well as in North Sinai and Egypt in recent years as me has made a lot of progress in stead of cracking down on the cross-border smuggling activity which has been reflected in the improvement in the security environment in the western desert but also in reduced which reduced the weapons smuggling that reach the Sinai Peninsula and this is now coming to the fore again with the potential for instability in eastern Libya part of this beauty of tens of thousands of Egyptian workers who are based in Libya and we've seen a flavor of that already with the detention and mistreatment of a number of Egyptians in the town of Taruna in the northwest earlier this month which before the issue was resolved another key priority I think is ensuring that the political order in eastern Libya is not hostile to Cairo to Egypt Egypt is weary of having a government controlling eastern Libya and that government having Islamist tendencies and the Turkish and cautery support which would have of course political and security ramifications for Egypt down the road also the significance of the SIRT jaffa redline and that that president Sisi communicated during his speech last weekend is that if the genie captures the city of CERN's it would easily take control of the oil ports which is called the oil crest and and the third basins oil fields and and this is this would be a major game for the LME and but just because oil is one of the last cards that the M&E and the eastern authorities still have against so hold against the GN a given the ongoing oil blockades since since January this year which hasn't used the flow of revenue to the GNA so just that the last part or the last point that they want to Asia after is still part of the policy or not and I think in the past few weeks we've seen indications that there is an increasing frustration with after from Egypt and from the other foreign backers of the elleny his importance will be less pronounced now as there is a significant focus on the potential for a political solution and in CC speech I think we we all noticed that he talked about the Libyan tribes and said that Egypt would arm and train Libyan tribes which effectively bypasses the enemy and give an indication about how coyote was and even after at the moment I would say the Yemeni still matters and it's early to know whether there will be a change in its leadership or not definitely succession will be tough because it will need and sort of require a mutual understanding and an agreement between a multitude of Libyan actors but also foreign supporters of the enemy and the Eastern authorities I think more generally there will be a more focus on the political track where someone like Agena Saleh he had the Parliament the House of Representatives will play a more important role thank you very much very much to those three you've hinted towards the implications of Merthyr Cairo initiative and CeCe's recent statement last Saturday to troops and they would appear to both simultaneously propose de-escalation whilst at the same time threatening direct intervention how do you assess the Egyptian position with regards to the priorities you've outlined is military conflict inevitable yeah I mean I don't I don't necessarily see a contradiction between the Cairo initiative that was laid out earlier this month and presidency sees a speech last weekend in fact they go both hand-in-hand I think there's a significance in the sequence of Egypt's moves in in recent weeks so first was that is the Keio declaration on the 6th of June regarding a political solution in Libya along the lines of the initiative that was already proposed by the head of Parliament Ankita soda in April and then came Sisi speech and the threat of intervention and this followed the fact that the initiative the earlier initiative was rejected by the GNA which gave indication and the generated indications that it will it is committed to to go ahead with its plan to end note on the L&E held territories in central and eastern Libya so then came CC speech and the sort of intervention and the goal here was really to communicate egypt's priorities and interests and red lines and the fact that it would not tolerate a transfer of the conflict from western libya to eastern near the egyptian borders more broadly I think Egypt prefers a political solution to the to the ongoing conflict based on the current territorial control lines mainly with that line being drawn in central Libya as sec has has mentioned i think i mean it's it's the difficult nature of the Libyan conflict itself and the likely difficult exit from it to intervene militarily and it's priority is to find a political solution to the conflict again along based on the contrary lines but also because Egypt doesn't like to sort of involve its army in extensive foreign missions and we've seen that already in 2015 day Yemen the war in Yemen but also the signal that it wanted to give I mean that the main message of the third is to the GNA side and to Turkey but also the international community that Egypt is prepared to deploy troops of Libya to protect its interests in case it's its initiative or it's peaceful initiative proposal is not accepted by the GNA and Turkish science thank you and and just finally talking about sort of the the you've talked very well about the sort of legitimate national security concerns for Egypt and the real need to ensure for them that the political order in or the political leadership in the East is not in their view influenced by Islamists looking at the red line specifically in the center for our area that's been outlined and you mentioned very clearly that the oil Crescent is in part a major a major part of that reasoning do you think there's room within a political negotiation or ceasefire settlement where these areas service your friend the oil Crescent are up for negotiation in any way or do you think that those red lines are really set in stone for Egypt to protect its its interests yeah I think that's that's a good question I mean that the the signs we've seen from the GNA so far they are committed to just build on the momentum that they have had and continue their effort to control set and jofre and possibly move beyond that to the eastern oil fields and that's that's a key concern for the GNA because as I've mentioned since since January 2020 there has been this this Elleni led blockade of oil experts from Libya and that has really hurt the revenue that the GNA is getting from from oil sales again the oil and gas is is the major sort of source of foreign currency income for Libya so one of its goals is to take control of these oil fields in order to restart oil production and exports and again that to Egypt is a red line as CC has has mentioned I mean generally I would say more instability in eastern Libya means more smuggling activity and potential infiltration of militants and and terrorist elements into Egypt which is which is why it is acting this way I mean Privett also preventing a hostile environment our sites are hostile governments that that controls eastern Libya and that has Islamist elements that enjoy again enjoy support from Turkey and Qatar is a major priority for Egypt and also if we don't look at the controversial maritime demarcation agreement between Turkey and the GNA last November it also concerns a short part of the coastline in eastern Libya further with Egypt and its implementation we would potentially upset injects ambitions in in the East met gas dynamics that we're seeing at the moment also I mean that these concerns since since 2014 where the driver behind the fact that Egypt has supported the evany since then just given after's anti-islamist 90 Muslim Brotherhood agenda and his efforts to fight local and transnational militant and terrorist groups in Doha and Frazee which have been a major concern for Egypt and the security of the border I think more recently after his military defeats in western libya compels Egypt to move beyond after to engage with a wide range of military actors to ensure an adequate political and military order and the stable one more importantly in eastern Libya and through fostering a political solution that kind of preserves the status quo as we see it at the moment thank you very much chief I have no doubt that we will return again to to Libya as the discussion goes on moving slightly and to shitty Mohideen the insurgency obviously in North Sinai continues along with a complete halt of tourism after the the lockdowns were introduced with the global economy downturn with the covert pandemic could you just outline what the current status of Sinai communities and tribes are both as they relate to the pandemic and the security situation in the area and just having some tiny technical issues unmuting surely / you're able to unmute yourself okay we're just going to shift things around a bit we're having a tiny technical difficulty and moved to just as an important issue Ethiopia and the GERD and Mohammed sorry Matt Lord thank you very briefly there's been a flurry of activity not just in the last few weeks but in the last several months on guard and and could you just give us an update on where the parties stand on negotiations over the dam we've seen the collapse of the Washington process and the internal tripartite process last week and the UN Security Council appeal and what are your expectations in the coming weeks prior to a fill on the the summer to 20-20-20 reservoir fill for the dam first think you have sir thank you for having me and it really honor and pleasure to be with you at the sea let me start with a very brief background about the negotiations and what happened since the collapse of ajanta negotiations basically the negotiation Washinton negotiations stopped or plucked and late February of this year since then Sudan has played a significant role to bring all the parties together and the asking both is euboea and Egypt to to come to negotiations again and the move I did like paper or an agreement based on the points that the three parties agreed on in Washington process the three parties come to the started negotiations again apparently as this June and the had and for the first time in negotiation they had observers from from the EU and from South Africa previously they had the World Bank and the US but this time they had also hope Zooniverse from the opinion and South Africa as the head of the African Union however after the this last round of negotiation the negotiation failed for three reasons the first reason is that the three party couldn't agree on the legality of the agreement Egypt and Sudan wanted to wanted a binding agreement that includes a resolution mechanism for any future problems but if you be rejected that also Egypt and Sudan wanted to include a mitigation measures for drought and blue long drive in dry years and also if you be rejected that the one thing that that that was kind of new in the last round of negotiations that Egypt wanted to add or to mention it's to mention its historical rights it's a sort of historical water rights and they're in the agreement and issue and if and if you be are firmly rejected that and said that they basically are negotiation they are negotiating the would that the Renaissance them operation not entails to go back to your question like where is the stand what what where is it country and what is the current state basically the three countries dismissed what would he feel first if you BIA affirmed several times that they're going to fill the reservoir the Renaissance them whether they have an agreement with Egypt or Sudan or not also if you be a moved heavily military equipment near the Renaissance dam and it's DBT army chief said that the country will defend itself over the dam and he also added that Egyptians and the rest of the world knows too well how we conduct whenever it comes and so this is kind of like a an increase or like a more hostile environment between the three countries when it comes to using military force just for a very historical note Egypt and Ethiopia had two wars in history one of them was in 1875 and the second one was 1876 and Egypt lost both words to go back to and also that in the same line within like militarizing the talks between the country's Prime Minister Abbey Ahmed said like mentioned like he met with the early this month in June he met with the generals from the army and he said the main the main idea was to discuss new defense strategy and early this year in January or February he mentioned in a speech and in a few in Parliament that if he said specifically if there is a need to go to war we could get millions threaded if and and and that was lesson of that talks when comes to military so we have and the third point from Ethiopia that there is some change and the negotiations they are basically a they have been talking for years about electricity in recent weeks we have been seeing some change both in the Indian media as well in the as well as in the government official interviews they mentioned that they also need part of from the wood that that was never an issue before that might this this this might be a chord that the Cuban government is using to to make pressure on on that Sudanese and his chickens and his Sudanese and Egyptian side and it might be a genuine request from them that he need part from the water they also mentioned this and that UN Security Council letter that they submitted early month or like like not a religious most like he would feel like days ago they mentioned that the don't get any water from the from the blue line and they want to have point from this water so this is where if you be a stand to go to go to Egypt and where Egypt to stand right now we have basically three points that can summarize Egypt stand first that Egypt wants an agreement before the said that several times president Sisi said it Sameh Shoukry the foreign ministry said it several times that there would be no failing without an agreement this is the first point the second point is Egypt submitted a letter to the UN Security Council asking them to interfere to affirm the importance of the three complete immunity negotiations the and they didn't ask Sameh Shoukry said in an interview that they don't want the Security Council to take any sanctions against Syria we just want them to to to ask them to go back to negotiations again so this is when it this is the second the third point is that president Sisi as you might all know visited a military base few days ago and he mentioned both is Euboea and libya in his speech and he said and he can he urges the army to be in to accomplish any missions whether here within the pack up within the borders of Egypt or in or outside of needed so this is also one of the things that Egypt is like hinting or giving us a signals that they can use force if needed when it comes to Sudan this is the standard Sudan this is then witnessed the most significant the Sudan was like the country that witnessed most most significant change during the period from since the not sufficient in process up until now so then four years have been leaning towards with ups at the oh he has been always like like sympathized or supporting if you'll be a whether they said in public you or not the media there so then his media used to support if you bein side most of not all the time we have seen a significant change in us so then recently since partisans may they started to to basically be as close as possible to Egypt site they said that you don't want first felling without an agreement and they rejected a few beers over several times to come to like to come to an agreement between Syria and Sudan without Egypt they rejected negotiations between if you can offer to have a negotiation between Ethiopia and Sudan without Egypt Saudi basically try and they submitted early this morning they submitted a letter to the UN Security Council arguing that the three countries should come again to negotiations and no country should take any lateral action so this is where the three parties stand at the moment there are the second part of your question of what is possible the expectation prior the hospital reservoir failing I think there are like three possible think that that that can happen during upcoming few weeks first all the expectations first Egypt will try to win support as much as possible from both African and international plates to in diplomatic support that can make pressure as much as possible if you fear not to do two to stop them from first filling second we are waiting for this the UN Security Council resolution which would be very it's not gonna be binding it's very unlikely to be binding solution a resolution from from from the Security Council but it's going to be a step forward to words like asking the parties to come again to an agreement the third expectation that if you BIA will try to enter then back again they have been trying and they have been trying we had this visit for high middle and to to to to be a few days ago so the if you BIA will try as much as possible to win Sudan back and we'll see whether so then we'll accept the offers or not but it's not very clear and it's very unlikely that Sudan will go back especially if we kept in mind that tensions the military tensions between the two countries and the south also then between if you we and and so that thank you very much Matt Morden and just it's building a little bit on that that the Sudanese have been really quite clear in the Arab League and in other forums that they really want to avoid an Arab African Wars as they call it or any kind of conflict as you mentioned we've seen Ethiopia massed troops to around the dam structure and towards the border and and Egypt has been effectively flexing its muscles that it can engage militarily the the rainy season is set to begin in in a matter of weeks without projector predicting sorry what you think definitely will await just very very quickly because I want to ask about the water security issue as well do you think at any sort of military engagement on either side is is possible I think I think for I think for Egyptians it is it's I don't think the regime can can deal with the water crisis water crisis for Egypt is basically no one can afford this just to give you a very very small number to to show you how how Egypt is really like way below the poverty the water poverty line Egypt and like that the water poverty line is that each each person should have at least one 1000 cubic meter every year and we have Egypt that it's its population is 100 million and they receive 55 million cubic meters so if we if we do this mat like between the numbers between the water that Egypt receives and that populations are hidden Egypt is way way below the International poverty line I don't think at all that that that Egypt no matter how strong or the regime is and can kind of for it to silence people when it comes to water just to give you very very small like the two examples the the first one is that when they ask it said that about the same issue in the late 70s he said that I'm not going to watch many people die here I will take them and die there so this is this is just to give you a context of how the Egyptians like through the history and the current regime that basically successor to previous regimes come from their same ideology or from the same background it's one of the main things in Egypt not national security water is one of the main main things indeed and I'm just ever very obviously one of the arguments is that as you mentioned water poverty warrant security is a major issue one that will continue to be one no they need to be it in the country regard of the damn issue it will continue to have questions over water efficiency usage wastage etc are are certainly very much a part of the national discourse and debate but also climate change and the nile waters how do you see Egypt's water security policy has evolved in recent years and how would you describe the response to water insecurity domestically just to start with laying out what is the problem when it comes to water security in Egypt and to be two problems with climate change the problem can we can we can summarize in a very few points four years as I mentioned earlier Egypt is already under the poverty line when it comes to under the water poverty line when it comes to old so four years are four decades I would say Egyptian regimes have been like given there have been an extreme pool management water management and agent we have an irrigation system that as the same as ancient Egyptian nothing changed no modernization whatsoever when it comes to the irrigation system with which takes more than eighty percent from Egypt's water this is for a second water used to be all was for free in Egypt under like maybe like ten or fifteen years ago they started to have price on water before that it was almost free for everyone irrigation canals that people used to to have water to to then goes to farms and places like that that British created more than hundred years ago no one did anything to modernize it were to sustain it in any way and and when it comes and also to add to this Egypt Delta which is a northern part of Egypt is already just one meter above the sea water so Egypt is already in a very bad situation when it comes to water management the the current government with the current regime has been taken like several steps like to overcome these challenges the first thing that the current regime with the current government has been doing is that the parliament approved several laws to ban alteration of certain courts that takes lots of water such as rats in certain areas in Egypt also the current government built a lot of desalination plants and to give you a number between what is the difference between how much this initial lands have been dependent Egypt used to have 80,000 cubic meter per year from desalination plant before before the current government now it have almost 800 South so this this has been the increase from 87 to 800 700 meters also Egypt start episode this programme the current the current government announced this like in early 2018 that you go to use the irrigation water at least three times and the final thing that the government is doing is that the the announcement in 2018 that they're going to modernize the irrigation system in Egypt in 10 years they started they started this program and it's it's not here what is the progress and the program that they meant that the announced and to to modernize the irrigation system but it's this is what he said into authority my opinion to end with us my opinion is that the government is taking steps it's very very very small compared to that problem the problem is quite huge and it's even I would say that its way even bigger Olivia and because like as they mentioned like Egypt is basically nothing without water if you don't have water and Egypt it would be all desert and people like they caught the economy and everything would be most most likely collapse so I think they and also you get to just the population groups and and how that eats from the water ratio that it's really limited or it's really very easy small to Egypt so I think the government say instead but still very very way to go thank you very much - she leave - sorry my lord and moving - Eve just before I asked to leave to come in just a reminder that you can submit you as and when as I said by email at Middle East at CIP dog or in the chat box on next to the YouTube screen so Sharif Mohideen thank you and thank you for your patience while we sorted that technical difficulty so just to start again moving now back to marginalized communities and starting in the Sinai as I said obviously we've seen the insurgency is continuing in North Sinai and with the effects of covert 19 we've seen a complete halt to tourism across the peninsula particularly of course in South finite just give us an update on the status of the Sinai communities and tribes both in relation to the pandemic and regarding security situation in the area thank you have saw actually so now Sinai people have been living under like between a hammer and anvil for so long and now also they are facing the global pandemic North Sinai has been under lockdown for years way before the pandemic has started its it was also it was due the war on terrorists and now it's it seems ironic but it's time it might be time to pay off a little hopefully because not of course justifying the deadly measures and normalizing the exceptional rules but since the first military operation started there like eight years ago and in August 2012 unlike most parts of Egypt North Sinai is the last place in all of our Egypt that it has announced it's a covered 19 cases with with the first positive case it was late April 30 April and the first days of the virus it was in John this June at on the 11th so far as a pandemic has not hate Sinai the whole Sinai Peninsula nor since house Zoey hate Cairo now we are having almost hundred cases and this is like according to last week from both North and South Sinai health health officials and it seems that it's a pandemic can be controlled in in Sinai in North Sinai specifically it can be controlled and we have like a lot of chances to control it more than Cairo for so many reasons I think the pandemic spread will rely on two specific points how's the operation of the land crossings with Israel and Gaza on the north and the second point it's about the resuming the tourism to the South Sinai if extra care and like the necessary tests and Burke oceans are followed Sinai can survive from the pandemic like no no other place in Egypt regarding the security situation it sure has been upgraded lately comparing to the chaotic previous year since 2013 yes there has been like a major incident or two incident every month I mean terrorist attacks but if we take a deep look we'll find that the location of this incidents are no longer inside the cities or the villages and also it's basically like hit and run styles and using the bomb big devices rather than the full engagement that we have witness in 2013 and 2004 14 and it which has led to like diddly this distal based on my research I think also many was Amiga and most deadly terrorist attacks it took cared in July since the removal of Morsi in July 2013 and also way before that it was in charm shake the most deadly attack happened the most terrorist attack happening all over Egypt before the Arab Spring it was on July 23rd which is the anniversary of the army officers taking the regime in - in 52 so it was the biggest and the deadliest attack it happened internship in 2005 and after this we have also the first of gelato which is like it can be described as like the deadliest battle after Yom Kippur in 1973 this was the deadliest battle but it was inside notre war was in a foreign country it was with Isis was the right Sinai and this happened in the first of July 2015 so fingers crossed that July can like passes in Sinai and all over Egypt as much peaceful as it can get and I'm so hopeful about this year it's it's it's the pandemic of course but the security challenges in in Sinai it can it can be defeated this year and just a touch on that sorry can you hear me yep um thank you and just to build on that you know you've interestingly highlighted that July seems to be the most the month of significant but in turn the Isis Sinai province the Isis offshoot that is in in northern sign no what's your assessment of the current potency of the group and the Egyptian military's offensive to to root out the militancy there all right that's that's a fantastic questions thank you have sir we're asking it I think North Sinai people main challenge is to basically to live a normal life after the chaotic years it is important also for like entering audience to get an idea about what has been going in Sinai for all those years the whole war on terror in Sinai Peninsula it has been going deadly for like almost eight years but only two specific parts of North Sinai which is like accounts like not more than five percent of the total size of the Sinai Peninsula I do hope that Egypt announced the military victory over all right Sinai before the end of ongoing year and I'm sure it can but the real threat not just from military defeating the lowlights I know I think the real threat comes from the radicalization process of people who witnessed like human rights violation during all of this war and in the name of the war against theirs of course his regime is serious about defusing such bombs and defeating the ideology is the same way it's really seeking to defeat it military I think some of like brave steps it's it's it's it would be so much needed so because we all know during during Wars a lot of mistakes happens and for sure a lot of mistakes happened during all of this eight years so acknowledging those mistakes and addressing Sinai people with a different narrative and different discourse including them more in reality not just you know figure of speech I think acknowledging such mistakes and interesting it is the key challenge for everyone saying I people to be able to get back to to the normal life without any fears and also the Egyptian army to be able to defeat what I sign I post ideology and of course military I think also one of the main current challenges for the army nowadays is is a growing threat coming from the western borders with with a Libyan so even so the army announced it like killing shamash Mary who who was the terrorist Megamind behind many of the deadliest attacks in Egypt but he shamash many strategies him to because he moved to Libya and he got captured in Libya and then Egypt succeeded in transferring him back to Egypt and then they hanged him earlier this year I think one of the key themes of shamash maha strategy is to get the Egyptian army distracted within and with with Libya and with also the borders with Libya and even so he shamash now is off now he's killed but it seems that it might his strategy it might get working now with the current updates from Libya I see no no big harm of having like the Egyptian army on a standby situation now with the updates on Libyan conflict but I think also as we are following up the political leadership is seeking a de-escalation for the whole conflict as you mentioned before and as Sharif also mentioned and not risking a white and well involvement and of the Egyptian army crossing the border which would have great cost not not only to the Egyptian army and Egyptian troops participating but of course also to do it would affect Sinai and it would affect also the South's border as well thank you Sherif and and on that note moving to the southern border you you've recently released a report with Carnegie on the Egypt Sudan relationship and I thoroughly encourage people to read it and the effect on on the Nubian community is and you've provided some some guidance and recommendations related to both the border crossing itself but also the movement and the long-held attempt for the right of return just very very briefly if you could highlight your observations from your research and the main issues with the Egypt Sudan relationship in that border between Egypt and Sudan yes sure my pleasure actually to make it very briefly even so the public relations between Egyptian and Sudanese people are based on mutual respect and peaceful coexistence I think I try to shed some light on the sources of the hidden conflict the hidden conflict that keeps our just rising to the surface every now and then when the media for an instance focuses on the Helene and shallot in disputed areas and when it comes also to the grd if you've been down in the nile conflict the main reasons underlying the conflict based on my research findings are four reasons since sudan independence in 1956 the first reason is the tightened security over border and restriction of movement of people out out of the country from egypt and inside the country as well and it has accelerated ways after 2013 it has accelerated with imposing more visa restriction between the two countries that goes actually again is the four freedoms treaties that post countries have have signed on 2000 for the second reason is the displacement of Egyptian in Sudanese will be an after building the high dam back at the 1960s where Nubian families after the construction of the dam see got like we we got a huge geographical gap across the borders he was leaving and they were feeling more than 300 kilometres of the border and now they are they have moved in aswan and now they were emigrating to Cairo Alexandria and other European and the u.s. to the US also seeking to work and to afford their families the third source of the conflict which is the conflicts the ongoing conflict over her life and she looking the disputed triangle and is visually after 2013 it has increased well the Egyptian army has increased the military presence there the first and the last reason of all of this conflict is a political antagonize between the two regimes especially since the assassination attempt of Hosni Mubarak ex-president which was which was commonly believed back then that the Sudanese Omar Bashir was behind it all of these issues has affected it has it have affected not only Egypt's longest land border it has with Sudan which is two hundred two hundred kilometres and seventy-six but also law it has affected the local borderland communities and it has affected millions of citizens of both countries restricting their movement between the two countries yet the fall of Mubarak regime it's freely gave way to organized activists within the nubian communities both Egyptian and students this activism leads to more pressure to the regime and with this pressure it has led to the opening of the first to land crossing between the two countries which the we're used to be one country but they were only relying on the Nile ferry to cross the borders now they are they have all been to coastal and or keen land crossings post 2014 and 2017 but with the closure also of the crossing those crossing as part of the corona virus pandemic and lockdown procedures and so on the two countries need to use this opportunity to bluster the mutual interest that they are having because they are post suffering now from the pandemic economic pandemic impacts and you will unfortunately suffer from this impacts for at least two years or something like that so my my take on this is the return of Nubians to the border areas could really really help improving the cross across border relations as well at a later stage II both Egypt and Sudan can really revive their discussions on on like collaboration on some projects like connecting the two countries with Railways and electricity and engaging also in opening a third land crossings as you're talking about it for 40 years and finally when it comes to holoband sure that means this is like the main theme of the conflict - non - public I think if it really remains like unresolved like this the potential for more con serious conflict between Egypt and Sudan where I me and will appear and of course with this Euboea thing I think it might be a bargain between the two countries that they are pushing each other so finally my take on holoband gelatine I saying both countries can do smart maneuver and settle down the conflict with try making some special and unique deal agreement that gives the disputed areas extra service from both countries and both countries they can share the gold and mineral wealth and resources that they are going they are extracting from this disputed area by doing this it really really can make like a breakthrough with the relation resolving this historical conflict and of course it can give an amazing example to the whole Middle East border conflicts how to have like a win-win strategy and resolving conflict with very peaceful ways I hope that answers your question it does and and again it's a very very good report thank you to all three of our speakers we have a very number of questions and apologies both to the speakers and to the audience that we may jump around as I'm looking to address them all coming in so so apologies if we do sort of jump from Libya to Sinai to a salon to Ethiopian and so forth we're gonna go back move back to Libya with a question Sharif for you a political solution based on the status quo in Libya is surely a recipe for continued political instability the question reads the LNA seems to show no interest in one and reliance on the tribes would be even less stable the question asked isn't it more in Egypt's interest to accept and work with an even with even an unfriendly GNA that controls the border your remarks well I mean that's an interesting because I think I mean if that's imagines a scenario whereby the GNA controls all of Libya including the border with Egypt and there would be no point of political solution because that would be the imposed political solution which Jelena may be trying to to to advance when it when it launched its its Tripoli offensive to sort of unify the country under its leadership obviously didn't work out and now we're seeing sort of the opposite happening to be honest I'm very I'm very doubtful about the potential for the GNA forces to actually capture certain Jafra and move into the East I think I think I mean the yes they've had many successes in the northwest but now they're risking to be a bit over stretched and the the LNA force are still present and they are very committed to prevent the GNA from expanding further into Central and Eastern and they are backed by by Russia by by Egypt by the UAE we're seeing a deployment or a presence of Russian fighters from the group according to my understanding of present in the jaffa airbase so i mean III don't see that scenario as a likely scenario and I think I mean regarding the appetite for the elleny to negotiate a political solution I think it has more appetite now because it has an interest in sort of just securing its gains or its let's say its current areas of control and a political solution based on that and then not kind of lose any more territory to the GNA I think it has more interest in doing that what we're seeing now perhaps a GN in that kind of just tries to build on the military momentum to capture more territory so it's it's perhaps a GNA that is has less interest now in negotiating based on the current state thank you and we have just about 15 minutes I'm gonna ask us B because to their response I have one more shitty flash Mary before we move on away from Libya in your opinion what are the dynamics between Egypt and Russia regarding Libya and how much to their interests overlap yeah again that's a great question because the Russian on in Libya has been a big enigma I thinking in recent years and particularly Greece and more recently I think there is a great deal of of common interests in Libya and we've seen that in recent weeks in the of political statements from both the government's kind of trying to foster a political solution based on the current territorial control areas so that there is a great deal of overlap of kind of common interests in supporting the enemy and kind of trying to find a political solution and supporting the eastern authorities however I would like to highlight the fact that the interests of Egypt and Russia in in Libya are extremely different and and very divergent in the sense that Russia views Libya as move an opportunity to project its influence in the important country like Libya because across North Africa too to have a presence south of Europe and to to be present or to have an influence in in a country where Turkey is present and that could give Russia leverage any negotiations between Turkey and Russia over Syria for example but also for economic benefits down the road why for Egypt it's it's a it's a direct national security issue and just given given the massive border between the two countries it's said that it a Gypsys the current dynamics in Libya has more of a threat than an opportunity I think even with we just want to intervene in Libya I don't think it's interested in sort of having long term economic gains yeah I mean the economic gains would something but it's the priority of Egypt but also it has no interests in occupying Easter let's say it's its key priority is security and that's I think that's that's probably the the benefit or the the advantage that Russia has because it has more leeway in dealing with Libya as it doesn't suffer any consequences from instability I won't either I'm coming sure I wanted to also answer within your response briefly we're getting a lot of questions on this idea that the or this possibility that the recent statements on Libya are some kind of way to divert attention from the garden from the Ethiopia question and the idea of no resolution on the dam how do you think the dispute on the Nile if it has any way to influence on calculations with an intervention in Libya you know does one side employ you know just one policy of action on one side imply action on another one well I think yes I think Egypt can't afford to have basically two words and this conflict in Sinai at the same time like historically speaking when when when Egypt does at this they basically no military can can can afford this like let alone we have like the Egyptian military has been not like tested in Wars while the like forty years since like an actual actual war since 73 since then there were there's been no like very like military actions okay and there have been lots of reports on how efficient the military is and silence oh we too have three but to have to open words at the same time this is a very very dangerous situation that if Egypt used if the Egyptian government choose to do so it would be one of the riskiest decisions that a decision maker can take so I I think and for now like but from the Egyptian point Egypt still have more time to maneuver and like make more pressure on Ethiopia when it comes to diplomatic and all if the see in the Security Council come up with a resolution that asked for new petitions to come back and then they have another step that Center to sanction is India or to prevent if you be in goods or if you bein chaps to cross from this canal Suez because if Egypt is in a war with a country like legally they have according to the constant across Tanzania agreement the Egypt cane like stop or prevent chips that comes from countries that Egypt has war with to to use the Swiss cannot so there are like some tools that Egypt can use internationally to to pressure if you fear and I think the deal is not very hard to get we have today like a very clear like Sudan put an outline for a deal and this meant this morning to the Security Council it's very clear that countries can come together so yeah thank you Mahmoud my eyes just on the clock so I have a question for she leave Maha Dean and then a question for all the speakers and I apologize to people who you may not see their their questions answered but I understand that you know we take enough time already for people's days and and greatly appreciate the audience but also wary that we should end on time she leave a question that's coming through you is she's my ID sorry is the the current decline that you noted of the potency of terrorist groups and militant activity in Sinai how much do you you think predictive Egyptian government counterterrorism measures or is it related to the defeat of Isis in Syria territory any other factors you can point to you well I thing it's very difficult to get to get like a definite answer for this question it's so many reasons contributed to just giving us such like lace trachea and this mess compared to the previous years the what once there was like a high wave of terrorism and political violence so I do think like the strategy by the Egyptian military it's finally work but to go through all the steps there are a lot of things that could have been avoided as well and I do think as well a the factor of the defeat of Isis it has contributed a little but I don't think this is like the major factor of this because we are having uncertain amounts way before without Sinai and of course Hashanah marshmallowy contributed a lot and then he disagreed with with the malicious and left to Libya but it was also a he was using some strategy to distract Egyptian army so a lot a lot of reasons and factors but we can't name one factor for it but I think would be all of us will be so glad if we can finally defeat the bullets I know and this year yet do you wanna say something no no sorry no so so just to finish this I think to go and do a lot of research into this because we all know it's it's like a kind of black box but for example it has been only this year at the beginning of this year specifically if I recall it was the 24th of January the first like Congress members and staff they have been to reach and I think this it's a big and it's a huge step comparing to previous years it was very very difficult to get any access any like external access even from Cairo to have some official visiting Irish and staying and for a day or something like that I think it couldn't happen before before this year so I do hope for this year yeah it's it's a groaner and stuff what they do have for this year the war against terrorism in Egypt will be like it will succeed a little thank you Sherif so the closing question for all of you and I'm gonna give you a minute each to respond is dealing with the pandemic and the global economic recession recession and sort of the the massive effects that are very much out of Egypt's control at the moment how does it affect the Egyptian government's ability to deal with Libya and or Ethiopia and/or Sinai and and how so we start with Sharif Mohideen then Matt Lord and then end with Sheila flash Mary I think Egypt's the last couple of weeks since since it started to take like serious measures with a corona and on in Marsh I think we have acquired so far about thirteen billion dollars assistance foreign assistance to deal with the corona stuff so I think it would be more than enough to continue like with all of this assistance till the end of the year yeah but if god forbid the corona virus like stayed with us for another year I think it would be it would be hectic and it would be consuming a lot with economic dealing with economic impacts but it's not quite it's not so much related in my opinion because the decision to go into Libya or to go with SEO beer to go with any other conflict it's not based economically to Egypt because if if the regime really wanna go is equal to go well no matter what so I think the current strategy is working to being defensive to alerting the army like this like Cece mentioned a couple of days ago and visited like the troops on the western borders I think to be defensive that's very good but if we engage in some like wide Wars or whatever battles crossing the border with Libya or whatever I think it would be consuming a lot and it will like affect the economy of the country so much thank you she's my hordes please I think I would say like the pandemic and the economic effects of the pandemic affected Egypt ability to deal with Egypt ability to deal with this European conflict and it will affect that how the Egyptian regime can deal with a conflict in the future and now we're having a health problem that it's really each of these numbers of infection has been has been increasing for this month this month alone the numbers increased for two hundred and almost fifty percent so you have this problem which is a health problem which which affected significantly the economic problem take the economic situation the country so adding to this if the country take an action either military action which goes into this wave of like militarizing the problem this will make it extremely heavy on the Egyptian economy while dealing with all of this if not it didn't take an action this will also have if you didn't give it a serious attention and they didn't come with an agreement as much as as possible as fast as possible this will water crisis will add to the current two major problems which is economic and health problems that Egypt is facing at the moment so I think the pandemic and the economic implication as affected Egypt quite significantly to deal with Iran Sudan problem thank you Mahmoud Sharif you'll get the last 30 seconds so go for it thank you sir I mean I mean as you described it I think there is a convergence of challenges that Egypt is facing major challenges and but at the same time we sometimes tend to forget that these kind of challenges have always been present and especially Egypt's environment has always been unstable and we've always faced challenges on our borders so I think I think today will perhaps in in a better position than before because there is a decent state capacity to deal with some of these challenges in the political stability is definitely in a better position than few years back and I think dealing with each other these challenges will usually depend on the state's capacity and ability to responses and sort of give enough resources to each of these challenges to deal with them and yeah I mean I bet it will it will to a great extent it will depend on the government's ability to just coordinate the responses and you have to be able to deal with them in an efficient way thank you very much Sharif Sharif and muhammad's for an incredibly interesting discussion and with everything's happening it could go on forever too audience members I encourage you to to reach out and continue the conversation everyone's on Twitter and we can provide contact information to speak to people directly I want to thank Carnegie's Middle East program dr. Michelle done and the admin wizard that is Carrie do again search for all of their support and help in putting this on and just a reminder that this is the third and final webinar and the Carnegie's series of Egypt faces the pandemic this will soon be uploaded but all three will be available to watch via YouTube or the Carnegie website thank you again to you and all your loved ones stay safe stay healthy and at this point in lockdown and stay sane I wish you all very well and thank you again to our speakers take care