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so it is my pleasure to welcome back to Cambridge phone so deep as well with no electrolyte the usage of survival is going to tell us all about your available sometime innovations hi so yeah thanks for the introduction I'm not sure I'll tell you all about it but I'll tell you what I know about it and what we can do as a team with these people to verify constant-time implementations so this will be presented I think next month I usenix so if you're there go there and talk to Mike will be giving the talk Michael Amy so what is this about and why do we need to verify constant time so before i go into constant time itself i'll go first into side channel security in general and what it means so the goal that we have the overall goal is to defend defend a program against an adversary it an adversary sorry who can listen in on on computation so your computation is going on and involves some secret data and you've got an adversary who is not supposed to know the the code to the lock but essentially you're giving it by some side channel like a piece of paper next to the look and that side channel can be execution time other timing channels like cash timing so the anniversary shares the cash with you and can through the timing he gets from memory accesses infer you did on the cash state power consumption so how much power your computation consumes will leak information about the data you're manipulating micro probing with the adversary gets a probe very close to your processor electromagnetic emissions sound vibrations everything essentially leaks information up to a certain extent and inner with a certain amount of noise added to it and so we're trying to defend simple programs in particular cryptographic programs against that kind of attacks at our assumption here in this particular setting is that the input/output functionality of your program is actually black book secure so you already got a proof of security for the input output relation of your program what you want to make sure of is that when you implemented it you did not introduce any additional vulnerabilities Chris I channels and having this black box security objective which is what you want to achieve actually informs the tagging of input as public or private and the tagging of outputs as public or private public outputs and public inputs are going to be things that the adversary is given anyway in the black box security definition and having this information especially about outputs which of the outputs are public allows us to allow some leakage as long as it doesn't leak more than what the outputs actually week more than what the public outputs leak so I'll give a bit more details about this so this is broadly what side channel security is about and our particular brand of side...